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The topic of this study is educational law. More precisely, this study examines 
case law. This study chronologically analyzes the Oklahoma Supreme Court cases 
involving public school issues that were adjudicated from 1930 to 1999. In addition to 
the Oklahoma Constitution (specifically Article 10), educational law has existed since 
statehood in the forin of statutes and policies and procedures produced by the state 
legislature and other governmental agencies. With the creation of the state also came the 
creation of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The law created by the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, known as case law, has been vital to the development of educational law in 
Oklahoma. And this development began as early as statehood with the first Oklahoma 
Supreme Court case concerning a public school issue in 1907, School District No. 57 v. 
Eager. Eager was the recipient of an incorrectly signed check by the school treasurer. 
Complicated by the closing of the bank upon which the check was written~ the Court 
determined that the debt owed Eager was valid. 
In 1933, the Oklahoma State Department of Education published an analysis of 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decisions for the years spanning from statehood to 1930. 
This publication, titled Supreme Court Decisions Relating to Schools in Oklahoma, 
provided an analysis of the cases that established precedence primarily for issues 
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involving Oklahoma's schools. This study analyzed the succeeding 70 years of the 
Court's history in deciding legal questions involving Oklahoma's public school districts. 
2 
School law has impacted society and the operation of schools in multifarious 
ways. This has been true at both the federal and state levels. For example, at the federal 
level, the U.S. Supreme Court greatly impacted public education in the 1896 case, Plessy 
v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537). Although the decision immediately affected railway car 
transportation, it certified the inane and inadequate social practice of separate schools for 
Blacks and Whites. In essence, the Court legitimized the practice. 
School law in general has been a growing area of activity since the 1950' s when 
the Court, in a somewhat rare occasion, reversed itself. In the 1954 case, Brown v. 
Topeka Board of Education (347 U.S. 483), the Court not only changed the fabric of the 
social structure of public schooling by declaring that separate schools for races were 
"inherently unequal," it also brought a spotlight to school issues in the courts. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has impacted the operation and functioning of public 
schools in very general and specific ways. In a landmark case in 1969, Tinker v. Des 
Moines (393 U.S. 503), the Court declared that students "do not shed their Constitutional 
rights at the schoolhouse door." In the 1970' s the Court ruled that students were entitled 
to the same basic due process afforded adults. In the 1975 case, Goss v. Lopez (419 U.S. 
565), the Court mandated the elements of due process in cases of student suspensions 
from school. The Court stipulated the circumstances in which schools became entangled 
with religion in the 1971 case, Lemon v. Kurtzman (403 U.S. 602). In a 1988 case, 
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeir (484 U.S. 260), the Court clarified restrictions placed on school 
administrators and teachers to censure school newspapers. At the time of this study, the 
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U.S. Supreme Court again considered a case that would affect the daily operation of 
schools across the county in Falvo v. Owasso. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on whether 
or not students exchanging papers and calling out grades for a teacher to record was 
constitutional and violated the Family and Educational Records Privacy Act (FERPA). 
The Court decided there was no violation of the U.S. Constitution nor FERPA. 
The growth in the number of educational issues litigated in the courts over the 
years has, in many ways, mirrored the importance of the topics of the cases. This was 
important because the courts established law in their decisions that transcended the 
specific schools in the cases. Once published, the decisions of the courts of last review 
affected the operation of all schools. Any public school law obviously affected the 
schools in one or more ways. Case law carried the same effect as statutory law. Case law 
at the national level has grown in significance to the body oflaw since the 1950's, and its 
impact on the operation of public schools has been tremendous. Many of the cases have 
changed the daily operation of schools. 
While the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court impacted all public schools, other 
court decisions also impacted the operation of Oklahoma's public schools. These were 
the decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 
For educational researchers the importance of the study of educational law may 
vary depending on the topic. As a byproduct, this study demonstrates that educational 
law in Oklahoma creates its own significance, whether intentional or unintentional, in a 
wide variety of ways and on a wide variety of topics through the decisions of the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court. Legal research in the area of educational issues enriches the 
knowledge base for educators and provides valuable tools for understanding the operation 
of schools (Morris, et al., 1997). Considering the history of the judicial system in 
educational issues at the national level, understanding the case law of the federal courts 
became a necessity. Understanding the case law of the Oklahoma courts bears the same 
necessity for those who operate Oklahoma's public schools. 
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This study reviews chronologically the involvement of the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court in educational issues from 1930 to 1999. In this period of time over 242 cases 
involving Oklahoma's public schools were heard by the Court. Understanding the case 
law developed by these cases is just as important to the school administrator as 
understanding the more commonly known statutory law and the policies and procedures 
of governmental agencies. In Oklahoma the first significant rise in the number of cases 
occurred in the 1930s. For example, eight cases were heard from 1907 to 1909. From 
1910 to 1919, 32 cases were heard. From 1920 to 1929, 37 cases were heard. The Court 
heard 56 cases in the 1930s. Increases in the numbers of cases in Oklahoma also 
mirrored the national trend that occurred in the late 1950s (Pacific Reporter). 
As a matter of curiosity and practical information, this study included in its 
analysis the circumstances that involved the schools in the precedential cases of the 
Court. Considered are the circumstances that made schools the plaintiff or defendant; 
these variables correlated with the outcomes of the cases, and the success rates, or 
number of wins and losses in court by school districts. 
To the practicing school administrator, knowledge of case law has become a 
fundamental requirement. Considering the rise in court cases involving schools and the 
basic requirement for schools to conform to the rudiments of case law, the need for 
school administrators to understand and have access to case law has been fundamental to 
the successful operation of their schools and the daily operation of their jobs. This study 
was an attempt to con:ipile a guide to the case law. 
Development of the Oklahoma Supreme Court System 
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court was created in 1907 with the ratification of the 
Oklahoma Constitution. Shortly after statehood, the first Supreme Court was established 
with five justices. Because the increasing number of cases heard by the Court, the 
number of justices was increased to nine in 1917. Originally the Court heard all appeals 
filed in the state, both criminal and civil. An increasing number of criminal cases created 
the need for an adjustment to its composition (Oklahoma Supreme Court Network, 2001). 
In 1918 the Criminal Court of Appeals was created, separating a function of the Supreme 
Court in the state's judicial system. In the 1960s, Oklahoma's Court system became one 
of only a few in the United States to have a dual appellate system; that is a dual court 
system of last review (Oklahoma Supreme Court Network, 2001). The Criminal Court of 
Appeals hears all criminal appeals. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all civil 
appeals. 
Created in the 1960s because of the growing population in the state and the 
number of cases filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of Civil Appeals has evolved to 
where it hears the vast majority of appeals from the state's district courts (Oklahoma 
Supreme Court Network, 2001 ),. Before the creation of the Court of Civil Appeals, the 
Supreme Court heard all appeals of a civil nature in the state. The Court of Civil Appeals 
is made up of twelve judges who are divided into four divisions. Two divisions of three 
judges each are located in Oklahoma City with the same arrangements in Tulsa. 
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Article 7, Section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution, provided that all litigating 
parties who lose in a lower court are entitled to an appeal before an appellate court. 
Appeals to the Oklahoma Supreme Court must first originate at one of the lower courts or 
legal administrative agencies in the state such as in one of the 77 district courts, the 
Workers' Compensation Court, the Court of Tax Review, the Oklahoma Tax 
Commission, the Department of Public Safety, the Department of Human Services, and 
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (20 O.S. Section 30). The only exception to this 
rule was when the Court agreed to assume original jurisdiction in a case. Though unique, 
the Court assumes original jurisdiction in cases of high or immediate necessity and public 
importance and, at times, in cases between state agencies (Mann, 2002). · 
The Court of Civil Appeals has been assigned to hear most of the appellate cases 
in Oklahoma since its inception (Oklahoma Supreme Court Network, 2001). As a matter 
of practice, the Supreme Court assigns all cases presented for appeal from the district 
courts. The Court either keeps the case for its purview or forwards the case to the Court 
of Civil Appeals. 
The significance of a decision made by the Court of Civil Appeals, in terms of its 
precedential value, depends on whether or not the Supreme Court validates the decision 
by a vote of the Justices. Chapter 20, Section 30 of the Oklahoma Statutes mandates the 
process by which a decision of the Court of Civil Appeals may carry the weight of 
establishing precedent. 
The Court of Civil Appeals shall effect disposition of cases assigned 0to it 
by a written opinion ... No opinion of the court of Civil Appeals shall be 
binding or cited as precedent unless it shall have been approved by the 
majority of the justices of the Supreme Court. 
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If the Supreme Court approved the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, the decision 
was published in the official reporter (the Pacific Reporter, Second Edition) in the name 
of a Supreme Court decision with a notation that it was written by justices of the Court of 
Civil Appeals. Cases heard by the Court of Civil Appeals that were not given 
precedential status by the Court were published in the Oklahoma Bar Journal (Oklahoma 
State Supreme Court Rule 1.200 c. 1.). Such decisions were described as having 
"persuasive" rather than precedential value (Mann, 2002). Decisions in thi~ category 
were not included in this study. 
The Court hears appeals through three different means. The first is by a writ of 
certiorari, which is the method by which all cases decided by the Court of Civil Appeals 
are appealed to the Supreme Court. If granted, the Supreme Court hears the appeal. The 
second is by a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is the method used by the Court to require 
a case to be heard directly by the Supreme Court from a lower court, usually a district 
court. The last occurs in cases where the Court has original jurisdiction in a legal dispute. 
This most commonly occurs when two state agencies disagree and seek relief from the 
Court (Morris, et. al., 1997). 
Statement of the Problem 
It is the duty of public school administrators to operate their schools in the most 
effective manner possible. It is impossible to operate schools effectively without 
observing the laws of the state. For the most part, four types of "laws" govern public 
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schools in Oklahoma: constitutional law, statutory law, policy and procedures adopted by 
state agencies, and case law. 
Case law in Oklahoma has played a vital role in the formulation oflaw. Case 
law, comprised of decisions made by a court, has been important to observe as it acted the 
same as statutory law in its authority to all within the jurisdiction of the court making the 
decision. The authority of the Oklahoma Supreme Court extends to the entire state. 
Supreme Court case law related to school issues became important to the school 
administrator due to the legal concept of stare decisis. Stare decisis, or precedent, is 
important to school administrators in cases involving school issues as "the rule 
announced by the court is binding on all lower courts and area within its jurisdiction" 
(Morris, et al., 1997). 
As discussed above, the trends at the federal level suggest that the court system 
will continue to provide important revisions and updates to law on an every-increasing 
basis. Since the 1950s, the federal courts have made a large impact on the operation of 
public schools. For example, schools have been integrated, students' rights have been 
clarified, and censorship implications have been analyzed. This study looked at the 
impact that the Oklahoma Supreme Court has made on the public schools in Oklahoma. 
Whether on not the same trends were found in the Oklahoma Supreme Court as were 
found in the federal courts, while interesting, did not diminish the fact that the decisions 
of the Court were important. The decisions of the Court constituted law, thus ultimately 
impacting the operation of schools. 
Various publications provide reference materials related to statutory laws and the 
policies and procedures of governmental agencies. The case law of Oklahoma, however, 
was published only in the decision issues of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Specifically, 
the decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court were published in West Publishing 
Company's Pacific Reporter, Second Edition and on the Oklahoma Supreme Court's 
World Wide Web site (www.oscn.net). In addition, the Court's decisions have been 
periodically published or discussed in newspaper articles at.the time the Court decides a 
case and in occasional professional publications, such as the Cooperative Council of 
Oklahoma's School Administrator's publication, Better Schools. 
Case law has occupied a key component of the total law of a state. As such, the 
ability of school administrators to reference the material has been just as important to the 
effective operation of schools as has been referencing statutory law or governmental 
policies and procedure. No such reference existed for school administrators for the years 
after the 1930s. The goal of this study was to provide such a reference. In all respects, 
this goal was especially true to the researcher ifto no other. 
Purpose of the Study 
The primary purpose of this study was to examine chronologically the civil cases 
involving Oklahoma's public schools that were adjudicated in the Oklahoma appellate 
courts from 1930 to 1999, with a focus on discerning the court cases that established 
precedence in case law or had significant results for the operation of schools in 
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Oklahoma. Examined by decade, this study focused on the chronological development of 
case law affecting schools while also determining the rates at which schools were 
successful and unsuccessful in terms of winning or losing in the Court. 
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A secondary purpose of this study was to develop a chronological history of the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court cases involving public schools for future researchers, 'teachers, 
and school administrators. This study may serve as an educational reference for 
educators in Oklahoma. 
It is incumbent upon school administrators to have access to relevant information 
to effectively operate schools. Access to the case law of the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
that affects public schools provides insight into the meaning of school law and the 
direction of the Court as it relates to school law issues in Oklahoma. Without the 
knowledge of the Court's decisions, school administrators may very well break the law. 
Organization of the Study 
This study was organized in a manner that easily established a baseline for 
research and analysis. All of the Oklahoma Supreme Court cases from 1930 to 1999 
were categorized by decade. This approach was chosen to allow the researcher to review 
the cases within a time frame and refer to the writing and decision making of the court 
during similar time periods. With this approach, relevant legislation passed prior to and 
during the decades discussed enlightened the researcher in relation to the issues addressed 
by the Court. During every decade, the Oklahoma Legislature passed laws that impacted 
education. Examples are the periodical revisions of the Oklahoma School Code, the 
Open Meetings Act in 1959, the Oklahoma Bond Issues Proceeds Act in 1967, the 
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act in 1978, various school annexation and 
consolidation acts, and the Teacher Due Process Act of 1990. Upon reviewing the cases 
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in toto, the researcher determined that such an organization was necessary for the study to 
better understand the Court in its decisions and the precedent-setting history of the Court. 
Research Questions 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court cases adjudicated from 1930 to 1999 that involved 
the public schools were examined in order to answer the following research questions: 
1. What issues involving Oklahoma's public schools were considered by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court from 1930 to 1999? 
2. As a measure of success, did Oklahoma's public schools win or lose as 
plaintiffs and defendants in the cases adjudicated by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court from 1930 to 1999? 
3. What were the precedent-setting cases decided by the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court from 1930 to 1999? 
Limitations to the Study 
1. The usefulness of the study depends on two variables: first, the researcher 
used the methodology of content analysis in reviewing the cases. As such, 
a certain amount of subjectivity in determining the significance of cases 
may vary from one researcher to the next. Second, the study focused on 
precedent-setting and significant cases decided in each decade. Many of 
the cases heard by the Court considered not only issues involving the 
Oklahoma Constitution but also existing statutory law at the time of the 
case. The extent to which the cases remain relevant to current school 
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administrators rests with the Court in continuing the case law by the 
practice of stare decisis and the changing nature of the Oklahoma statutory 
law and Constitution. Three types of decisions were considered 
"precedentiar· in this study: those that overturned a previous decision of 
the Court, those that interpreted the Oklahon;ia Constitution, and those 
that, when viewed in the context of the decade and in relation to other 
decisions made by the Court, were considered important to understanding 
the total case law of the Court by the researcher. 
2. This study was limited to the review of the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
cases in the context of their significance to case law in the area of public 
school issues. While this study traced the development of case law it did 
not take into consideration the political and social issues contemporary to 
the decisions of the court. This study is limited to a legal history of the 
cases heard by the Court. 
3. A number of cases were chosen in each chapter to demonstrate the 
significance of a decade in the development of case law related to public 
school issues. In some instances different cases adjudicated by the Court 
also demonstrated the same development of case law. Therefore, a certain 
amount of bias is found in this study as the researcher chose to include one 
case to demonstrate case law development while another may have just as 
well demonstrated the same point. 
4. Studying the decisions made by the Court from during the period 
prevented the researcher from considering the entire history of the 
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Oklahoma Supreme Court and its total influence on the operation of public 
schools. This study was limited to the Court's impact developed from 
1930 to 1999. 
Definitions of Terms 
The following terms were used in this study. While many legal terms were used 
in the study, the following were found in many cases, and, at times, occupied different 
meanings, given the context in which they were used. As a guide to their meanings, the 
researcher included the definitions to provide added clarity to the work. 
Adjudicate: To settle in the exercise of judicial authority; to determine finally 
(Black, 1998). 
Affirm: To make firm; to establish; to ratify or confirm the judgment of a lower 
court (Gilmer, 1986). 
Appeal: An application to a higher court to correct or modify the judgment of a 
lower court (Gilmer, 1986). 
Appellant: The party who takes an appeal from one court or jurisdiction to another 
(Black, 1998). 
Civil Case: A lawsuit which has for its object the protection of private or civil 
rights or compensation of their infraction (Gilmer, 1986). 
Ex Rel.: On relation or information (Gilmer, 1986). 
Laches: Negligence or unreasonable delay in pursuing a legal remedy, whereby a 
person forfeits his right (Gilmer, 1986). 
J&yy: To assess, impose, or require a tax by a school district (Gilmer, 1986). 
Plaintiff: A person or group who brings an action; the party who complains or 
sues in a civil action and is so named on the record; a complainant (Black, 1998). 
Remand: To return a lawsuit to the court from which it came for trial or other 
action (Gilmer, 1986). · 
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Reverse: To set aside a judgment on appeal and enter a contrary decision (Gilmer, 
1986). 
Separate School: A school in Oklahoma organized for and occupied by Black 
students only (Pottawatomie County v. Chicago R.I. & RY Co (29 P2d 587). 
Statutory Law: An act of the legislature, adopted pursuant to its constitutional 
authority (Black, 1998). 
Tort: A civil wrong (Gilmer, 1986). 
Writ of Certiorari: An order by the appellate court which is used when the court 
has discretion on whether or not to hear an appeal (Black, 1998). 
Writ of Mandamus: To confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its 
prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it its duty is to do so 
(Black, 1998). 
CHAPTER II 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASE LAW 
REGARDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS: REVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS FOR THE 1930s 
Introduction 
The decade of the 1930s in Oklahoma has been best characterized in a similar 
fashion as most of the United States during the decade. Following the Stock Market 
Crash of 1929, it was a decade of poverty, uncertainty in financial markets, high 
unemployment, political and social scandals, and, as most often described, the period in 
our nation's history known as the Great Depression (English & Calhoun, 1989). In 
particular reference to this time period, Oklahoma has been referred to as the "Dust 
Bowl," a moniker made prominent in the minds of most Americans in the award-winning 
novel, The Grapes of Wrath by John Steinbeck. While a work of fiction, parts of 
Oklahoma and, to some degree, the exodus of Oklahomans to California were aptly 
described in the work. In 1933 summer temperatures soared, precipitation was scarce, 
and winds followed. Western Oklahoma, primarily an agrarian-based area, was 
devastated by failing crops combined by low prices for crops at the market. Farms, 
owned primarily by families, were taken over by banks. Families left Oklahoma by the 
thousands for states such as Arizona and California (Duvall & Boeger, 1985). 
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The economy of the state was tied to property during the 1930s. Farming, raising 
livestock, and oil production dominated the economy. The depression negatively 
impacted Oklahoma's economy. Farm crops sold at markets for less than it cost to grow 
them. The torturous climate of the state brought livestock producers to bankruptcy and 
the oil industry suffered massive losses as the price for a barrel of oil lost sixty-five 
percent of its value (Baird & Goble, 1994). 
The political climate ofthe 1930s was a direct reflection of the devastation of the 
Great Depression. The primary topic of legislation during the decade surrounded 
methods of taxation and reducing the burden of taxes on property owners (English & 
Calhoun, 1989). Governor William H. Murray (1931-1935) was elected to office in 1931 
on the platform of property tax reform (English & Calhoun, 1989). As a result of his 
efforts to change the tax structure and operation of tax collection in the state, the 
Oklahoma Tax Commission was created. Upon election, Governor Murray was 
successful in reducing property taxes for farmers and oil producers. As a result, the state 
lost the largest source ofrevenue needed to operate services (Baird & Goble, 1994). 
Schools predominantly survived financially from property taxes. Propositions to change 
the structure of the income tax failed. Other taxes were created, however, to make up for · 
the lost revenue created by the reduction in property taxes. Gross production taxes, 
inheritance taxes, and corporation licensing fees were created to generate revenue (Baird 
& Goble, 1994). 
The social, political, and economic climate of Oklahoma during the 1930s 
properly fit within the characterization made by Steinbeck. The state was in turmoil and, 
at times, despair. This was primarily the result of the poor economy and how political 
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pundits and society addressed the depression. The vast majority of cases heard by the 
Oklahoma during the 1930s specifically addressed finance issues, a finding of no surprise 
considering the economy of the state. Legal battles were fought over property taxes and 
tax levels for schools. Other battles surrounded ways that those outside of school could 
reduce taxes paid to schools. 
Court battles over school district annexations and consolidations were found 
during the decade. Such would, as some argued, reduce the tax burden for property 
owners. Issues not directly tied to the economy or the circumstances of the depression 
were litigated, too. The economy of the 1930's directly impacted the litigation involving 
public schools, however. 
Introduction of the Supreme Court Cases in the 1930s 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court heard 56 cases involving Oklahoma's public 
schools during the decade of the 1930s (See Appendix A, Tables I & II). The 
significance of this number was two-fold: first, 32 percent of the cases heard by the 
Supreme Court involved public schools (Pacific Reporter, 2d); second, a single issue 
appeared in the majority of cases. Issues of school district finance, including taxation, 
expenditures, school fund maintenance, and estimates of needs dominated the court cases 
involving public schools. Finance issues were not the only issues litigated during the 
decade, however (See Appendix A, Table III). The categories of issues litigated in the 
Supreme Court in the 1930s included: finance, personnel, district, and district v. district. 
School districts were successful in the Supreme Court during the 1930s by 
winning 75 percent of the 56 cases. School districts were plaintiffs in 24 and defendants 
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in 29 of the cases. As plaintiffs, school districts won their cases an astounding 79 percent 
of the time. Likewise, as defendants, school districts won 75 percent of the time. 
Oklahoma school districts lost only 12 of the cases in the decade (See Appendix A, Table 
IV). Though school districts were taken to court as defendants 2() times, they were highly 
successful in demonstrating competency and legal adequacy in conducting school affairs. 
The major areas identified above were derived from the 56 cases adjudicated in 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court involving public schools. While many of the cases dealt 
with issues of a similar nature, some were unique and decided issues peculiar to those 
cases, the situations in the cases, and the people; agencies, or businesses subject to the 
cases. This fact presented the reality that while the decisions did develop precedent, it 
was, in many cases, very particular precedent. 
Finance Issues 
Issues of finance dominated the cases litigated in the Supreme Court. Over fifty-
five percent of the cases during the 1930s involved an issue of school finance. This is 
significant, especially considering the second most litigated issue concerned personnel at 
20 percent of the cases (See Appendix A, Table III). School districts were plaintiffs in 
26percent and defendants in 28 percent of the cases involving finance issues. 
Out of the 31 cases in the area of finance, three major issues were litigated. The 
first was the authority of county excise boards in authorizing estimates of needs. Second, 
several cases addressed the attempt by disgruntled and/or terminated teachers to recover 
their salaries from districts. Third, several cases addressed the problems districts had 
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with maintaining school funds or when funds were expended from wrong accounts or out 
of accounts without b~lances to cover the expenditures. 
The primary involvement of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Oklahoma's public 
schools during the decade of the 1930s was in the area of school finance. Private citizens, 
school districts, small and large businesses and corporations, and state officials all 
contributed to the rather large number of litigated issues surrounding school finance. The 
issue of school money was involved in 31 of the 56 cases decided during the decade. 
The most litigated issue in the area of finance was the role and authority in 
approving the estimate of needs by county excise boards for school districts. Of the 31 
cases involving finance issues, 20 cases considered, at least in part, the legitimacy of a 
school district's estimate of needs and the role the excise board played in the approving 
the estimate. 
The first case, State ex rel. Joint School District No. 102 v. Excise Board of Pavne 
County (1932), was important as it firmly established the role and authority of the county 
excise board in approving a school district's estimate of needs. The Payne County school 
district brought suit for mandamus against the Payne County Excise Board to compel the 
excise board to approve the district's estimate of needs. The Court granted the writ of 
mandamus. 
The district prepared an estimate of needs based on its estimated budget and a 
fifteen mill levy approved by it~ voters. After completion, it was submitted to the excise 
board for approval. At its meeting the excise board reduced the estimate of needs and the 
millage levy from fifteen mills to thirteen mills. No reason for the reduction was given. 
In its decision, the Court stated: 
An estimate made by a school district for the conduct of a school may not 
be reduced by the excise board, if the rate of levy authorized by the voters 
of the school district under statutory and constitutional limitations is 
sufficient to produce the amount of the estimate of needs. 
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The Court established a clear precedent in stating that a school district's estimate 
of needs shall be approved if the levy approved by the district's voters was sufficient to 
generate the money needed to cover the projected budget in the estimate of needs. The 
Court left no area open for discretion on the part of the excise board in this matter. 
Rather, the Court maintained that the excise board's responsibility was to certify 
sufficiency of the millage level producing the amount requested, not to provide discretion 
as to the amount of the levy or the estimate of needs. 
During the decade, the Court established the role of the county excise board in 
apprnving supplemental estimates of needs and appropriations. In State ex rel. Board of 
Education v. Morley ( 1934) the Tulsa City School District filed suit to compel the Tulsa 
County Excise Board to approve its revised estimate of needs and supplemental 
appropriations. As provided by law, the district submitted to the excise board a statement 
of financial condition in mid-year, along with a revised estimate of needs and request for 
a supplemental appropriation, which outlined a cash surplus of revenue in its general 
fund. The surplus was a result of delinquent taxes collected during the current fiscal year 
but owed the previous fiscal year. As the district received the revenue, a request to 
include the money in its appropriations was made to the excise board. 
Upon its consideration, the excise board refused the request of the district and 
cited for authority that it had discretionary power in authorizing supplemental 
appropriations for school districts. The Court disagreed with the excise board. In a 
snappish opinion, the Court stated: 
The state has a sovereign interest in the maintenance of common schools 
throughout the state and might by reason of this interest delegate to the 
excise board the power to determine the necessity for supplemental 
appropriations of school districts. However, it has not seen fit to do so. 
On the contrary, the Legislature, in its wisdom and in recognition of the 
propriety of local self-government, has deemed it best to vest in a large 
manner the power to control and manage the public schools in the people 
of the locality in which such schools are situated. 
Quite clearly, the Court maintained that excise boards were not in existence to exercise 
value judgments on the necessity of an estimate of needs, levies, or appropriations. 
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Rather, the legitimate function of the excise board was to determine the correctness of the 
statement submitted by the school district and the existence or nonexistence of a surplus 
of revenue. Concisely, the local district was vested with power to determine the 
necessary use for funds, not the excise board. 
In the 1930s the Supreme Court established the legitimacy of a district's estimate 
of needs as the estimate relates to a district's separate schools. In Board of Education v. 
ID (1932), the Court considered the authority of an excise board to reduce a district's 
estimate of needs, levy, and appropriations based on the district's treatment of its separate 
schools in financial statements. In ID the Guthrie City School District filed suit in the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court for mandamus to compel the county excise board to approve 
its estimate of needs as submitted. The school district included in its estimate of needs a 
budget and appropriation request to operate its separate schools in the district. The excise 
board reduced the district's estimate of needs in the area of the separate schools and, as a 
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result, also reduced the levy requested by the estimate that was approved by the voters of 
the district. In its decision, the Court stated: 
It is the duty of the excise board to approve the budget and estimated 
expenses submitted to it by the board of education of the city of Guthrie 
for the support and maintenance of separate schools in and make such 
appropriation as will provide for the support of the separate schools in the 
district for a school term equal in length to the white schools and with like 
accommodations and facilities. 
The Court maintained that it was unconstitutional not to provide "separate but equal" 
finances and educational accommodations to the separate schools in the state. Reducing 
the estimate of needs in the area of the separate schools was not within the power of the 
excise board. 
The Court also rationalized that "the duty of the excise board in any county is to 
make a levy sufficient to raise money necessary to maintain separate schools." By 
reducing the estimate of needs, the excise board also reduced the levy level requested in 
the estimate. This act was not in their authority to do. The Court continued on this 
subject by stating that the excise board must approve the levy level in an estimate of 
needs for separate schools "regardless of how many mills on the dollar's valuation will be 
required, so long as it is within the maximum constitutional limitation." With this 
statement, the Court made it clear that the millage level established in the estimate had to 
be approved, regardless of its level compared to the "white" schools, to address the equity 
issue between the "white" and separate schools. 
Six of the 31 cases adjudicated in the Supreme Court in the area of finance during 
the 1930s involved the salaries of employees, and the district was the defendant. All of 
these cases involved, to some degree, discussed the legitimacy of the manner in which 
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employees were paid, how they were paid, from which fund they were paid, and·whether 
or not they should be paid at all. The districts won all of the cases except one. 
Three of the six cases established precedence for the operation of Oklahoma's 
public schools. These issues were: 
1. Whether or not a teacher's contract that stipl;}lated a salary for a school 
year outweighed the outcome of the approved estimate of needs approved 
by the county excise board? 
2. The legality of a Board of Education of an Independent School District 
utilizing funds of a separate school to pay for part of a superintendent's 
salary and the other part paid by the independent district's funds? 
The first issue was especially interesting as the Court provided two different 
decisions to the issue yet provided clarity with a marked distinction. In the 
case, Burton v. School District Number 78 (1936), a teacher filed suit for mandamus in 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court to guarantee her salary as stipulated in her contract with the 
Board of Education. At a meeting of the county excise board, the teacher's salary was 
reduced in the estimate of needs. The excise board approved the millage levy passed by 
the voters of the district that was sufficient to meet the requirements of the estimate of 
needs submitted by the school district. Yet, the excise board reduced the teacher's salary. 
As was mandated by the Court in State ex rel. Board of Education v. Excise Board 
of Payne County ( 1932), the court once again stipulated that the excise board is without 
authority to reduce an estimate of needs, through itemization or otherwise, if the levy 
level approved by the voters of a district sufficiently produced the revenue necessary to 
meet the estimate. The excise board argued that the teacher was not a real party of 
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interest and cannot, in her own name, maintain the action. As argued, such was the 
responsibility of the school district, not an individual teacher. The court disagreed and 
affirmed the county court by stipulating that the teacher shall receive the salary negotiated 
in her contract, as the excise board had no auth(Jrity to reduce the estimate of needs. 
In the case, Stockton v. Excise Board of Payne County(1932) the court concluded 
in a different manner. This case involved the same issue as the Burton case. The teacher 
in this case filed suit in the Oklahoma Supreme Court for mandamus to compel the excise 
board to approve the teacher's salary as stipulated in her contract with the school district 
and submitted to the excise board in the district's estimate of needs. At the time of 
submission, the excise board reduced the amount itemized for the teacher's salary as well 
as others. At the time of approval, no legal steps were taken by the teachers affected or 
the district to compel the excise board to approve the estimate of needs as submitted. The 
decisive point of the Court in this case involved timing. The pleadings submitted by the 
teacher were almost two years after the contractual year in question. The Court reasoned 
as follows: 
The plaintiff had knowledge of the fact at least not later than the day 
school began that the excise board reduced the district's estimate of needs 
regarding teacher salaries and if she was not willing to accept the 
proportionate share of the amount of the estimate allowed and approved 
for teachers' salaries as full compensation for their services, it was her 
duty as soon as the amount of the estimate was known to her to take 
immediate and appropriate action. 
In essence, the Court scolded the teacher for not acting on the issue of her salary when 
she first discovered the discrepancy between her contracted salary and the amount 
approved by the excise board. 
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The Court further acknowledged that the provisions of the teacher's contract 
stipulated the possibility of a reduction in salary in the event the excise board reduced the 
district's estimate of needs. While this was not grounded in statute or in precedent 
involving the requirements of e:(cise boards to approve estimate of needs as submitted by 
districts, the Court maintained that such a disclaimer was valid in this case. The teacher's 
contract stipulated: 
Provided that neither the school district nor any member of the school 
district board shall be liable for any amount of difference between the 
amount of this contract and the amount of the estimate made and approved 
by the excise board. 
The teacher lost this case on two points: first, the teacher waited over two years before 
filing a claim calling for the excise board to approve a district's estimate of needs 
regarding teachers' salaries. This amount of time, the Court reasoned, was too long. 
Second, the Court found that the teacher had no recourse against the district, as she was 
contractually notified and agreeable by her signature that the district and board members 
were without liability in cases of the excise board reducing the district's estimate of 
needs. 
The second issue regarding employee salaries was adjudicated in Pottawatomie 
County v. Chicago R. I. & P. RY. Company(1934). In this case the Chicago Railroad 
Company filed a protest in the Oklahoma Court of Tax Review to protest the manner in 
which a school district appropriated its superintendent's salary. The school district 
appropriated·from its separate school fund a part of the superintendent's salary. The 
superintendent acted as the superintendent for the district and the separate schools.in the 
district. In its decision, the Court rationalized that superintendents of school districts with 
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separate schools were simply the superintendents of all the schools in the district. The 
responsibility for hfring and paying the superintendent, however, was with the school 
district board of education and the districf s funds. Though the maintenance and 
supervision of the separate schools remained the resplinsibility of the board of education 
and the superintendent, the law did not authorize the expenpiture of funds for a 
superintendent of the separate schools or the use of separate school funds for a 
superintendent's salary. In its decision, the Court specifically noted that: 
It is the duty of boards of education to prepare separate budgets of the 
amount of money that will be required to be raised by taxation for the 
support and maintenance of the separate schools within ari independent 
school district, such budgets shall not include any amount for the 
compensation of superintendents of separate schools employed by the 
boards of education. We find no authority for such employment to be paid 
for out of the separate school funds, and since no provision has been made, 
the inclusion of the amounts in question in the amount appropriated was 
without authority of law and is void. 
The Court established the point of law that school districts with separate schools were 
held with the responsibility of supervising separate schools with superintendents 
employed and paid by the district without the aid of separate school funds. 
Three of the 31 cases adjudicated in the Supreme Court in the area of finance 
during the 1930s involved errors in the manner in which school funds were expended and 
maintained. Though this area was not a heavily litigated issue this decade, it was 
fundamental in the nature of operating school districts. As functionaries of the state in 
the disposition of public funds, it was paramount to the legitimacy of schools that school 
fund maintenance function in the open, under the scrutiny of the public, and operate 
according to law. School districts lost two of the three cases involving errors in 
maintaining school funds. The significance of this area of litigation concerned the 
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precedence established by the Court in terms of procedures when errors in school fund 
maintenance occurred. 
One case in particular illustrated the importance of school fund maintenance: 
Board of Education v. Board of Commissioners of Muskogee Countv (1934). At issue 
was the legality of using money from one fund to purchase warrants and reimbursing that 
fund with money from another fund. Specifically, the district issued warrants from its 
sinking fund and the fund was without the necessary money to cover the warrants. To 
cover the warrants, the district used the separate school fund. In its decision, the Court 
noted 
there is no authority of law for a school district to place separate school 
funds in the sinking fund of the district. School funds were created for 
specific purposes. School districts must strictly adhere to those purposes 
as is required by law for school districts to follow. To do otherwise is an 
act against the public trust. 
While statutes existed defining different types of school funds and the ways in 
which they may be expended, the fact that funds existed served as a reminder that mixing 
them, under most circumstances, violated the intent of the funds and most often the law. 
The precedent established in this case clearly established the issue of fund maintenance 
and the legal error of using one fund to make up for the liability of another. 
Personnel Issues 
Personnel issues, the second most litigated area during the decade, were litigated 
in the Supreme Cqurt in 11 cases (See Appendix A, Table III). The district was the 
defendant the vast majority of the time, ten times a defendant and a plaintiff once. Ten of 
the cases were won by the school districts. In 11 cases, the issue most litigated was the 
validity of employee contracts, especially in terms of the date they were approved and 
how they were approved. Other personnel issues litigated included: 
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1. The authority of the county superintendent to oust district board members 
for misconduct and 
2. The legitimacy of the number of board members in city school districts. 
One of the cases in the area of employee contracts was also one of the most 
important cases adjudicated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court regarding public schools in 
the 1930s:. Wilkinson v. Hale (1939). At issue was the date a teacher's contract was 
approved and the Teacher Tenure Law of 193 7. 
In August of 1937 the teacher was notified by the board of education that her 
services were not needed for the school year. This was done in spite of the fact that the 
teacher was told by the superintendent during the previous spring of her desired 
employment by the district as a teacher for the next school year. The Court reasoned, 
based on previous Court decisions, that the teacher's contract with the district was void 
because it was never acted upon by the board of education after July 1 of the fiscal year. 
This was the only conclusion availableto the Court as "school districts [were] prohibited 
from entering into contracts for a fiscal year outside the fiscal year." This case law was 
established during the 1930s in Board of Education v. Montgomery ( 1936) and Anderson 
v. Miller (1934). In Anderson the Court found that "school district boards shall not have 
any authority to enter into contracts, including contracts with teachers, until after the 
beginning of the fiscal year for which said contract was entered." In Montgomery the· 
Court reasoned that boards of education were the only legal entity able to ratify a contract 
and an agent, whether the superintendent or other, carries no authority without the 
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approval of the board upon ratification in a board meeting on or after July 1, the 
beginning of the new fiscal year. 
In Montgomery a custodian found that his contract was void as the board did not 
ratify the contract although a fellow custodiar1 had informed him that his services would 
be needed for the next school year. The board never intended to offer a contract, rather it 
desired to employ the custodian on a monthly basis. The fact that another custodian, 
acting as an agent of the district, notified the employee of his desired employment with 
the district for the school year did not guarantee or provide for a legal contract with the 
district. 
In Wilkinson, despite finding the contract void, the Court continued to consider 
the Teacher Tenure Law of 1937 as presented as a defense by the teacher. The Teacher 
Tenure Law was passed and approved by the Governor in May of 1937 with an 
emergency clause. Cited as Article 16, Chapter 34, S.L 1936-37 (also known as Senate 
Bill 139), the Teacher Tenure Law of 1937 was enacted, according to the Court to "afford 
a measure of security to teachers employed by school districts situated in the sections of 
the state with large populations and large school districts, such as Tulsa and Oklahoma 
City." The Law provided for the classification of teachers in accordance with their past 
experience, employment, and it provided that they could not be discharged or replaced 
without cause. Specifically, the Teacher Tenure Law of 1937 stated: 
In all counties in the state having a city therein of over one hundred 
thousand (100,000) population ... is hereby established a legal procedure 
for the proper selection in the employment of teachers in the public school 
of the several districts within said counties and the condition under which 
they may be discharged or demoted. 
According to the teacher's defense, she was not subject to discharge or demotion as the 
district was within Tulsa County and no cause was demonstrated or stated for her 
discharge. 
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At issue with the Court was whether or not the Teacher Tenure Law of 1937 
violated the Oklahoma Constitution, specifically Section 46, Article 5 which "prohibits 
local or special laws regulating the management of public schools" and Section 59, 
Article 5 which provided "that laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation 
throughout the state, and that where a general law can be made applicable no special law 
shall be enacted." The Court found the Teacher Tenure Law of 1937 unconstitutional 
based on the conclusion that "the law [was] placed in operation only in those school 
districts situated in Oklahoma and Tulsa counties, to the exclusion of districts situated in 
all other portions of the state." The Court reasoned that such a law was special in nature 
and "capricious in application" as "no substantial difference distinguishes a school 
district in a large county from a school district in a small county and the task of 
employing teachers." As the law was deemed special in nature and had no affect as a 
general law, the only conclusion of the Court was an unconstitutional determination. 
The importance of this case was that it struck down the first teacher tenure law in 
Oklahoma as unconstitutional. Given the strong teacher tenure laws enacted during our 
state's legislative history (House Bill 1017 in 1990 for example), this case provided not 
only precedent for the operation of schools relating to employing teachers but also 
provided a fundamental starting point for future legislation in the area of teacher tenure. 
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District Issues 
District issues and policies were litigated in the Oklahoma Supreme Court in six 
cases (See Appendix A, Tables I & III). School districts were the defendants in four of 
the cases and the plaintiff in two. Likewise, the school districts won four of the cases and 
lost two. 
Though a small area of litigation in the 1930s, the importance of the cases heard 
impacted school district operations, some confirming their operations and others 
requiring districts to change the way policies were implemented and carried out. Issues 
litigated included student bussing plans, the authority of county superintendents to create 
new school districts, school consolidation, school elections, annexation, detachment, and 
school boundaries. One of the most interesting issues addressed by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court involved the process of determining the ownership of school property 
(See Appendix A, Table II). In this case, the Court considered it lawful for an individual 
to be forced to sell his property to a school district. 
Two of the cases best illustrate the involvement of the Court concerning these 
issues. In the first, Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City (1939), the court 
considered whether or not a county superintendent had authority to create a new school 
district. In the second, Kirk v. Union Graded School District No. 1 (1937), the court 
queried the issue of school property ownership. 
In Dowell, the Oklahoma City Board of Education brought suit against the 
Oklahoma County School Superintendent seeking a writ of prohibition and injunction to 
restrain the county superintendent from detaching a part of the Oklahoma City school 
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district and creating a new school district. The events that occurred leading to the order 
by the county superintendent took place during the term of his predecessor. Nevertheless, 
the newly seated county superintendent acted upon a petition signed by 60 percent of the 
registered voters in the area of detachment, as prescribed by law, and ordered the 
detachment from Oklahoma City Public Schools and the creation of a new school district. 
In its argument against the action taken by the county superintendent, Oklahoma 
City schools made two points of contention: first, the law which allowed the detachment 
of an area of a school district was voided by a new law. Second, the Oklahoma City 
schools argued that the law which allowed for county superintendents to detach areas of a 
school district and create new school districts as a result of a county superintendent 
declaring the action "proper and to the best interests of the school of such school or town" 
(70 Okla. St. Ann. Section 182) was also void due to the replacement of the law by a new 
law. 
During the process of generating a petition for the detachment and creation of a 
new school district, a new law respecting such issues was passed by the Oklahoma 
Legislature, referred to as the School Law of 1937 (70 Okla. St. Ann. sec. 189). The 
Legislature also attached an emergency clause to the new law, thus making it effective the 
day signed by the governor and not the usual waiting period of ninety days (Section 58, 
Article 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution). The·section of the School Law of 1937 
pertinent to this case stipulated that the ... 
JK7town and by a majority of a special meeting of the legal voters in the 
territory petitioning to be attached to the district, summoned by the county 
superintendent and voting by secret ballot on ballots furnished by the 
county superintendent who shall issue an order attaching such territory to 
such city or town for school purposes. 
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This new law provided a fundamental change in school law in that the change 
omitted and deleted the passages of the law allowing for detachments of areas of a school 
district and creating a new school district. The new law also removed the section of the 
law that provided the county superintendent discretion in determining the need for such a 
detachment and creation of a new school district. The Court reasoned that since the new 
law Remove provisions for detachment and creating a new school district, the actions of 
the county superintendent in this case were without authority of law despite the petition in 
favor of the action by the voters in the area. Thus, in affirming the case of Oklahoma 
City schools, the court specifically removed the power of the county superintendent to 
authorize detachments of areas from all school districts in the state. 
The second case in the area of school district issues was rather unique. No other 
case in the history of the Oklahoma Supreme Court exists quite like it. The Kirk case 
found its way to the Oklahoma Supreme Court via appeal from the District Court of 
Sequoyah County. S. E. Kirk, a teacher employed by the Union Graded School District, 
developed a plan to build a facility on the school grounds for the purpose of having a 
place for "the kids to play ball." The record of the school district demonstrated that Mr. 
Kirk presented the plan for the building to the Union Graded School District at a regularly 
scheduled board meeting, after which the board of education approved the plan as 
presented. Several days later, Mr. Kirk drafted a contract and took it to the homes of two 
of the board members for signature. Both board members, the director and clerk of the 
school board, signed the contract. During the same school year, Mr. Kirk paid for and 
erected the facility on school property. 
The contract written by Mr. Kirk and signed by two of the board members was 
entered into the Court record as follows: 
Roland, Oklahoma 
Oct. 7, 1930 
Know All Men by the - Presents: 
Sch. Dist. U. G. No. 1 party of the first part and S. E. Kirk party of the second 
part. 
This contract entered this 7 day of Oct. 1930 party of the first part, Sch. Dist. U. 
G. No. 1 agree that S. E. Kirk, party of the second part builds a house on school 
ground of said U. G. No. 1, to be used for school purposes and games, said 
building to be S. E. Kirk's party of the second part until cost shall be returned to 
him. 
Entered by party of the first part and party of the second part this Oct. 7, 1930. 
Frank Howell, Director 
J. K. Carr, Clerk 
S. E. Kirk 
The Supreme Court heard this case as a result of Mr. Kirkfiling an appeal from 
the district court. In the district court, the Union Graded School District filed for an 
injunction against Mr. Kirk from removing the building from school property as the 
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district claimed it was on school property and the building was school property. Mr. Kirk 
pleaded that it was his property for disposition. The county court agreed with the school 
district and approved the injunction. 
On appeal, Mr. Kirk disagreed with the findings of the district court. The district 
court found that the contract was invalid as it was signed out side of a board of education 
meeting, and, as such, only two board of education members signed it. This contention, 
the district court claimed, was supported by School District v. Shelton (109 P.2d 67, 
1930). In Shelton, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that "the acts and declarations of 
individual members of a school board, independent and apart, as distinguished from 
actions by the members as a board in its capacity as such, will not create an enforceable 
contract." 
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In his appeal, Mr. Kirk also objected to the decision of the district court that held 
the contract invalid due to its violation of the Oklahoma Constitution, specifically Section 
26, Article 10. This section of the Constitution disallowed school districts from 
becoming "indebted in any amount exceeding, in any year, the income and revenue 
provided for such year." In other words, the district court held the contract invalid due 
the failure of the district to list such budget item for a contract on its estimate of needs for 
the year the building was constructed or any subsequent year thereafter. Therefore, since 
the district or the county excise board did not enter an encumbrance or appropriation of 
funds for the purpose of satisfying the costs of the contract, the contract was invalid. 
The district court further reasoned that since the contract was invalid and the 
building was on school property, the building was school property, not Mr. Kirk's. This 
made the building under the complete control of the school district. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed with both findings of the district court in 
this matter. On the issue of the contract's validity in relation to its ratification by the 
board of education, the Court reasoned that "the contract was approved in open session at 
a board meeting, and actual signature of the contract need not occur during the board 
meeting." Furthermore, the Court found the contract valid by years of public 
demonstration and common knowledge that Mr. Kirk owned the building. The Court 
wrote: 
Repeatedly at regular meetings of the board, according by the testimony of 
board members themselves, it was admitted that the· defendant owned the 
building. As one illustration, testimony was given that the board approved 
the janitor to collect admission to the building when basketball games 
were being played so that some check could be kept upon the amount of 
receipts and possible use such at a later date to be applied to the cost of 
reimbursing Mr. Kirk for the building. These instances, and a number of 
other events, clearly illustrate the fact that the board, both within and 
without its meetings, permitted themselves and Kirk to retain the 
impression that the building was his. It is contended throughout the brief 
of the plaintiff that Kirk, was holding the building over the heads of the 
school district in order to compel the district to reelect him each year. The 
record does not bear out this contention, but the contention does serve as 
an admission that at all times all parties treated the building as belonging 
to the defendant. According to the principles of natural justice and equity, 
the defendant should have his building, which he built and paid for. 
Regarding the contention that the contract was void due to the fact that funds to 
satisfy the cost of the contract were not properly budgeted, the Supreme Court also 
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disagreed with the district court and found in favor of Mr. Kirk. The Court reasoned that, 
in its original approval of the contract, the board did not obligate the district to any 
financial condition. As stipulated in the contract, both parties agreed that the building 
remained the property of Mr. Kirk until and if such time the district reimbursed Mr. Kirk 
for the cost of the building. Such an agreement is not a financial obligation. It is an 
obligation, the Court reasoned, to consider a financial obligation in the future. Since the 
board had never considered the financial obligation, no violation of law had occurred and 
the building remained the property of Mr. Kirk. 
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District v. District Issues 
Issues, which found their way into the Supreme Court between two or more 
school districts as the plaintiff( s) and defendant( s) occurred eight times during the 1930s. 
Interestingly, the plaintiffs won six of the eight cases, or 75 percent of the cases (See 
Appendix A, Tables I & II). Three of the eight cases involved the issues of school district 
boundaries and how they were determined to be the proper boundaries. Other issues 
adjudicated in this area included the legitimacy of student transfers and transfer fees from 
one district to another, the proper ownership of property after school annexations and 
detachments, and the process of annexation petitions. 
In the area of school district boundaries one case in particular settled a legal 
question queried since statehood; that is, how were school district boundaries settled 
when disputes over boundary lines concerning districts that were created at the time of or 
in existence prior to statehood? The Oklahoma Supreme Court case, School District No. 
1 v. School District No. 2 (1934) answered this question. 
In School District No. 1 the plaintiff school, School District No. 2, filed suit in the 
District Court of Marshall County for the purpose of requiring the court to mandate that a 
portion of property in the town of Madill belonged to School District No. 1, not school 
districts No. 2 and No. 46, both of which were claiming ownership. The primary 
motivation for this plea by School District No. 1 was that the county removed the 
property from the tax rolls of the district during the previous year and placed it on the tax 
rolls of School Districts No. 1 and 46, as those districts had requested. At issue was the 
legitimacy of the students living in the disputed area as to where they attended school; 
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just as important, however, was the fact that a railroad track ran through the disputed area 
thus affecting its valuation. The rightful owner of the property, in terms of district 
boundaries, received the taxes from the property. 
To deterrn:ne the correct boundary for the disputed area and the district in which it 
belonged, the Court reviewed three distinct legal actions affecting the establishment of 
school district boundaries in Oklahoma at the time of statehood. 
1. The Curtis Bill, enacted on February 5, 1902 by United States Congress, 
authorized the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Indian Territory in Ardmore to decree and incorporate towns in its 
jurisdiction. 
2. Pursuant to the Curtis Bill, plats of towns were prepared and approved by 
the United States Secretary of the Interior. 
3. A statute created by the First Legislature of Oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes 
1931, Section 6771, gave county superintendents the authority to create 
school districts immediately following statehood. 
The importance of the Curtis Bill was twofold: first, the legislation directly 
resulted in the creation of the township of Madill, Oklahoma. The City of Madill and its 
boundaries became the area of School District No. 2. Secondly, the Curtis Bill authorized 
the Secretary of the Interior to produce the plat for the town of Madill. The reason these 
issues were important to the creation of School District No. 1 was that the county 
superintendent, immediately following statehood, established School Districts Numbers 
1, 2, and 46, and he described School District No. 2 in the following manner: 
This district shall embrace and consist of the incorporated town of Madill 
and no other territory is included by terms of organization. 
The problem the Court had in determining the legitimate boundary for School 
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District No. 2 involved the poor workmanship of the county superintendent ,vho created 
the school districts. According to his statutory duty, the county superintendent was to 
divide the county into a convenient number of school districts and to change such 
districts when the interest of the people may require it, by making them conform 
to existing topographical or physical conditions. The county superintendent shall 
keep in a book a description of the boundaries of each school district and part of 
district in his county with a plat of same, date of organization, and date and full 
record of all changes of boundaries. 
The record of the county superintendent became disputed for the failure to make a plat of 
the district that went along with the description. In this case, school districts Number 2 
and 46 interpreted the description to place the disputed area inside their boundaries. 
In its decision the Court relied on the orders of the United States District Court 
and the plats developed by the United States Secretary of the Interior to determine the 
township boundaries of Madill and combined them with the pronouncement of the county 
superintendent that boundaries of School District No. 2 would mirror the township of 
Madill. In drawing this conclusion, the Court found in favor of School District No. 2 and 
held that the disputed area was originally and rightfully within the boundaries of the 
school district. 
The significance of this case underscored the importance of accurate recorded 
keeping by officials for posterity and for the use of interested parties for the purpose of 
answering questions and settling disputes. Here, the Court also demonstrated a clear line 




REGARDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS: REVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS FOR THE 1940s 
Introduction 
The Great Depression experienced by all of the United States in the 1930s 
continued to affect the economy, politics, and public policies of Oklahoma in the early 
years of the 1940s. Many Oklahomans suffered the depression as Oklahoma remained 
predominantly an agrarian state during the decade. Crop prices and the demand for crops 
continued to be low. Family farms suffered as most were lost due to foreclosure or taken 
over due to the failure to pay property taxes (Baird & Goble, 1994). The oil industry, also 
heavily dependent upon rural communities and the land that surrounded them, also 
suffered. Oil production increased at its highest levels during WWI and after, especially 
due to the demand for gasoline as automobiles became more affordable after WWI. The 
depression changed that need. Prices per barrel of crude fell drastically, affecting all 
Oklahoma oil producers, even Oklahoma's wealthiest, such as the Kerr, Marland, Phillips 
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dynasties (English & Calhoun, 1989). 
Two events brought Oklahoma out of the depression and restored its economy. 
Both events spurred the imaginations of politicians as well. The first involved the 
40 
41 
legislation surrounding President Roosevelt's New Deal programs. Governor Murray, a 
staunch opponent of Franklin Roosevelt, refused at every opportunity to support the 
initiatives of the New Deal. His successor, E. W. Marland, won election on the platform 
of Oklahoma's "Little New Deal" which promised to bring jobs and programs to the state. 
The programs were highly successful in bringing jobs to the state as workers in the Works 
Progress Administration built roads, government buildings, schools, and state parks 
(Baird & Goble, 1994). 
While Marland's "Little New Deal" did spur the Oklahoma economy and 
provided jobs, it was very expensive. The federal programs were predicated on the fact 
that the state had to match the federal funds. Oklahoma's tax collections were abysmal, 
much like that of other states, and the state created a debt of over $26 million (English & 
Calhoun, 1989). Marland's successor, Leon Phillips, despised the New Deal Programs, 
primarily due to his philosophy that a state or the federal government should not spend 
money not in the coffers. Spurred by this philosophy, Oklahoma passed the first 
"balanced budget" amendment to its Constitution. In a very clear way, the state of 
Oklahoma mandated that its government would not ever operate in debt again. 
The second event that led to Oklahoma's recovery from the depression was the 
entry into WWII. Much like the county as a whole, Oklahoma greatly benefitted from the 
war effort. Federal dollars and jobs poured into Oklahoma, and over 41 military 
establishments were created, including air bases, Army camps, and even naval bases. The 
state's oil fields, mines, and industries, including the workers in these areas, greatly 
benefitted from the war effort, producing raw and finished materials (Duvall & Boeger, 
1985). 
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Several issues specifically relating to education were legislated during the 1940s. 
In 1942, Governor Robert S. Kerr was successful in winning a referendum vote for free 
textbooks for schools. In 1941, a board of state regents was created to operate and take 
the politics out of the operation of the state's major colleges. Two significant legislative 
events changed the nature of education in the 1940s. First were the beginning steps of 
desegregating education. A black student, Ada Lois Sipuel, was denied admission to the 
law school at the University of Oklahoma. Despite the refusal, the federal court 
mandated that she and other blacks must be admitted and allowed the opportunity to 
pursue studies in graduate education. This issue effectively began the desegregation of 
Oklahoma's colleges (Baird & Goble, 1994). 
The second was the passage of the Oklahoma School Code in 1949 (S.L. 1949, 
Chapter IA). The aim of the legislation was to reorganize the laws of the state 
concerning education in a manner that clearly fulfilled the constitutionally imposed duty 
for the "establishment and maintenance of a system of free public schools" (Oklahoma 
Constitution, Article I, Section 5). The most significant part of the legislation, the 
creation of the State Department of Education, stipulated that the Department was 
charged with the obligation to determine policies and supervise the public schools. Along 
with the new Department came the creation of state regulations, interpretations of school 
law by the Department, standards for schools, and student and budget accounting 
systems. Issues regulated by the Department, such as annexations, the reduction in the 
number of school districts in the state, accounting procedures, student transfers, 
accreditation standards, and the like, became the subject oflitigation in Oklahoma's court 
system. 
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Introduction of the Supreme Court Cases in the 1940s 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court heard eighty-eight cases involving Oklahoma's 
public schools in the decade of the 1940s (See Appendix A, Tables V & VI). Two types 
of cases were heard most frequently during the decade: these decided issues regarding 
taxation and the processes involved in the taxation for schools, and those involving 
annexation, attachment, and detachment of schools. (See Appendix A, Table VI). While 
these types of cases were dominant in the Court's proceedings, other categories of school 
issues were litigated: finance, district, and personnel. 
Finance issues adjudicated by the Court included cases involving taxation, 
contracts, school financial accounting, warrants, and school bonds. School district issues 
involved school annexations, detachments, attachments, and the school elections. Also 
included in this category were issues of school property and safety. Personnel issues that 
found their way to the Court included employee contracts and issues surrounding the 
appropriate conduct by board of education members. Whether or not board of education 
members legitimately held their positions was also litigated. 
The litigation of school issues increased during the 1940s. A striking difference 
occurred in the number of cases heard by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the 1930s and 
1940s. Fifty-six cases were adjudicated in the 1930s while an increase of22 cases were 
heard and decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the 1940s; this latter number 
represents an increase of 28 percent. This increase in education-related cases was 
representative of the overall caseload of the Court, as the Court experienced a 12 percent 
increase in the rate of cases. (Oklahoma Supreme Court Network, Supreme Court of 
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Oklahoma, 2001 ). Comparatively, increases in education issues were more than double 
the other areas combined. 
School districts continued their success in terms of winning percentages in the 
1940s. Fifty-six (68 percent) of the 78 cases involving public schools were won by 
school districts. School districts were the plaintiffs in 23 and the defendants in 59 of the 
cases. As the plaintiffs, school districts won their cases 48 percent of the time, but as the 
defendants, they won their cases 76 percent of the time. School districts lost 26 of their 
cases. 
Though there was an incr~ase in the number of cases adjudicated during the 
decade, school districts continued to demonstrate in the Court the competency of school 
district operations, positions, and processes. Though overwhelmingly getting "sued" 
much more than doing the "suing," school districts continued to win court cases in the 
1940s. 
In general terms, the cases considered by the Court reviewed unique and particular 
issues between a school and a second party or between two schools. While instructive, 
the relative impact of such cases on establishing precedence in the area of educational law 
in Oklahoma was minor. However, several cases adjudicated established important 
precedence for Oklahoma schools. As such, all of the cases were categorized in the areas 
identified above as a method for analysis and discerning precedent. 
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Finance Issues 
Over half (53 percent) of the cases decided issues surrounding school finance. 
Over seventy percent of the cases involved school districts as the defendants. In only 11 
of the cases were the school districts the plaintiffs. 
In the area of school finance, the Court heard a variety of cases (See Appendix A, 
Table VI), including issues surrounding state aid for schools, the collection of bond 
revenue by schools, the legitimacy of contracts with schools for products and services, 
school district accounting and bookkeeping policies and procedures, tax protests, the 
fiscal validity of school warrants, bond fund uses and accounting, and the right of school 
districts to dispose of school property. Though such a diversity of issues was addressed, 
three important areas were litigated the most and produced precedence for schools: 
protests from schools against the state to discern the adequacy and inadequacy of state aid 
appropriations to schools, contracts with schools were considered by the Court, and bond 
fund accounting and the use of bond funds. Contract cases involved the legitimacy of the 
. contracts with vendors and whether or not the school and the school's employees and. 
board of education members were liable for alleged violations of the contracts. 
State aid appropriations to schools in Oklahoma was the primary topic of 
litigation in 11 cases. At issue was the application of the state aid formula law specifically 
addressing revenues to school districts. Known as the State Aid School Law (70 O.S., 
Chapter III, Sections 1-12), this legislation was first passed by the Oklahoma Legislature 
in 1943 and amended in each of the two successive biannual legislatures. The intent of 
the State Aid Law was to provide a mechanism the state to provide equity in school 
funding among the school districts by providing the "difference between the minimum 
program cost and the minimum program income" of school districts (70 O.S., Title III, 
Section 1, 1943). Litigation by the Court during the 1940s centered primarily on the 
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legislative intent of ( or meaning of) a "minirnum program cost" and a "minimum program 
income." The Court's involvement led to the discernment of practical applications of the 
legislation. Also considered by the Court was the relationship state aid played as a part in 
the budgets of districts with separate schools. 
The first case in this area, State ex rel. Board of Education v. State Board of 
Education (1947), considered whether or not the state had authority to reduce a district's. 
state aid based on the district's actual collections oflocal revenues. The Court considered 
whether or not the reduction in state aide to the City of Sapulpa School District was legal. 
Specifically, did the state have the authority to reduce state aid to a district based on the 
actual difference between the cost of a minimum program and the minimum program 
income? 
According to the State Aid Law of 1943 (70 O.S. Supp. 1943 Section 651 ), the 
difference between the cost of a minimum program and the amount of the minimum 
program income determined the amount of state aid for a school district. The "minimum 
program cost," the total costs of a district to operate its schools, such as paying employee 
salaries and purchasing textbooks, was certified by its board of education and filed with 
the county excise board. A district's "minimum program income" was determined by 
adding all of a district's income sources, such as local taxes, transfer fees, federal grants, 
and state and county revenues apportioned to school districts. If the income exceeded the 
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cost, no state aid was disbursed. If the cost exceeded the income, the district was entitled 
to $7 .50 per student i:p. the district. 
In this case the City of Sapulpa School District was originally certified by the state 
to receive $94,949 in state aid for the year. As the school year progressed the school 
district received from its state apportionment sources (automobile licensing fees and State · 
School Land Commission fees) an increase of $7,961 in revenue. The state 
correspondingly reduced the amount of state aid to the district by $7,961. 
The Court agreed with the state and determined that state aid could be reduced 
based on increased school revenues. In its decision, the Court reasoned that 
it can be clearly seen that the purpose and intent of the Legislature in 
enacting these laws was to provide funds to supplement those already 
allocated or earmarked for school purposes, sufficient to enable all public 
schools to maintain a minimum program of education. It was not the 
purpose of the law-making body that said State Aid should be used to 
build up a cash surplus. 
While defining the practical application of state law in this case, the Court firmly 
established that state aid was for the purpose of meeting "minimum" needs of a school 
district; in this sense, the minimum meant the amount that was needed by a school district 
in order to meet its financial obligations for the year as was prescribed on its estimate of 
needs to the county excise board. The Court made it clear in this decision that it was not 
the job or the desire of the state to fund cash surpluses in school districts. 
The second case to explore the decision of the state in denying state aid to a 
school district, Board of Education of Oklahoma City v: State Board of Education (1946), 
this case pitted the Oklahoma City School District against the state in the interpretation of 
the State Aid Law of 1945. The primary issue revolved around whether or not the 
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average daily attendance of students attending the separate schools in a school district 
was a part of the state aid formula. As a matter of calculation, all school districts that met 
the requirements of the State Aid Law were statutorily entitled to seven dollars and fifty 
cents for every student in its average daily attendance report. The issue that made this 
case unique was the Court's consideration of the average daily attendance of students in 
separate schools in the calculation of state aid. 
The state contemplated the meaning of Title 70, Chapter 15 (1945) in its 
application of state aide. This statute, cited as 70 O.S., Chap. 15, Sections 1-18, provided 
for the maintenance of separate schools within a school district; as such, separate schools 
could not exist on their own. Furthermore, the state argued that Section 8 of the State Aid 
Law of 1945 authorized the inclusion of separate schools in determining the "minimum" 
program of a district with separate schools but did not allow such inclusion for the 
calculation of the "minimum program income." The Court argued that the interpretation 
of the state was incorrect as this statute addressed the district in determining the 
minimum program income. The district, not the separate schools apart from the district, 
determined the minimum program income. Those districts with separate schools were to 
include such needs in their calculations. The Court wrote: 
The act proposes to underwrite by state aid a part of the costs of a 
minimum standard for all public schools therein shown, including separate 
schools. That minimum standard is known therein as the minimum 
program. They also provide that when such minimum program is met, the 
cost thereof in excess of the amount raised by the "minimum program 
income" will be paid by the state. The payment of such excess cost to be 
by the state. 
The outcome of this case directed the state to include the average daily attendance 
of the students attending separate schools within school districts in its calculation of state 
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aid for school districts with separate schools. In a practical manner, the Court directed 
the state to accept the school's calculations of its minimum program income with the 
inclusion of the average daily attendance of its separate schools. Prior to the decision in 
this case, districts with separate schools were not allowed to include the average daily 
attendance of their separate schools. 
In finance issues, the Court considered nine cases that adjudicated contractual 
disputes between vendors and schools (See Appendix A, Table VII). As in the decade of 
the 1930's, disputes over the validity of contracts continued to find their way to the 
Supreme Court, specifically over the terms making a contract with a school district valid. 
In the 1940s, however, the Court considered the personal liability of school board 
members in obligating school district funds by entering into contracts with vendors for a 
school district. This was a new area explored by the Court. 
In 1945 the Court heard American Asbestos Products Company v. Independent 
School District No. 14, the first case in which the Court explored the notion ofliability on 
the part of board of education members in obligating school district funds in the absence 
of a valid contract. The president and clerk of the board of education issued and signed a 
purchase order with the American Asbestos Company for paint and other products in the 
amount of $240.60. Though signed by the board of education members, the purchase 
order did not stipulate the fund from which the purchase was to be made nor the 
unencumbered balance in the fund obligated for the bill. The Court heard two issues. 
Considering an established precedent, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision that a 
contract· (purchase order in this case) was not valid unless it was approved in advance by 
the board of education and in the fiscal year in which the funds obligated by the contract 
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were expended. The expenditure also had to stipulate the unencumbered balance of the 
fund from which purchase was to be made and that it was sufficient to cover the cost of 
the purchase. If a contract (or purchase order) did not meet this requirement, it was not 
valid and the school district was not obligated for the expense of the contract (Board of 
Education of Town of Carney v. News Dispatch Printing & Audit Company (1915). 
The precedent setting nature of this case stipulated that the board of education 
members, with the same implication for school employees, were personally liable for 
purchases they authorized but did not meet the requirements of a valid purchase order. In 
its decision, the Court stipulated the following: 
Legal indebtedness against an independent school district can be incurred 
only by its board of education in regular session, certified by the proper 
officer as being within the unencumbered balance of an appropriation 
made for the purpose. The purchase orders which were attached as 
exhibits to plaintiffs petition disclose that these two members of the board 
of education did not have said purchase orders approved by the board of 
the district, nor did they, after such approval by the board, cause the same 
to be certified as within an unencumbered balance of an appropriation 
made for the purpose. These two ministerial acts are mandatory 
requirements of our law. The board members who sign such a written 
order and procure delivery of the supplies ordered thereby are personally 
liable thereon. 
The decision ofthis case was reasonable. Those who failed to properly obligate public 
funds suffered the responsibility of the obligation. With the decision of this case, 
however, the precedent established firmly a principle of public policy. Such a decision 
noted for all board of education members and school employees that the process 
prescribed by law for obligating school funds must be followed; and, if not, board of 
education members could suffer the personal liability. 
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School taxes was the most litigated issue in of school finance. Fifty-two percent 
of the cases heard by the Court in school finance involved school taxes in one form or 
another. Cases involving the legitimacy of school levy elections, the accuracy of schools' 
estimates of needs, the legitimate use of b\ ind funds, the legitimacy of carrying over bond 
funds from one year to the next, and the millage levels required to meet school districts' 
estimate of needs were heard by the Court (See Appendix A, Table VI). The vast 
majority of these cases were decided using established precedent by the Court or by using 
particular or unique circumstances of the case or the litigants. 
Two school finance cases established important precedence for schools. The first, 
Oklahoma County v. Kum (1941), considered the legality of using bond money approved 
for erecting school buildings to also equip and furnish the new school building. The 
second, Lone Star Gas Company v. Brvan County Excise Board(l943), queried the 
legality of accumulating bond funds for the same purpose from one bond election and 
approval to the next. 
In the Kum case the Court considered the issue of whether or not bond money 
approved by the voters in a school district was legally spent on items other than those 
specifically needed for erecting a school building. As a matter of background, the issue 
before the court was the following provision of the Oklahoma Constitution, specifically 
Article 10, Section 10: 
For the purpose of erecting public buildings in counties, cities, and school 
districts, the rates of taxation herein limited,·may be increased, when the 
rate of such increase and the purpose for which it is intended shall have 
been submitted to a vote of the people, and a majority of the qualified 
voters of such county, city, or school district, voting at such election, shall 
vote therefore. 
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On initial reading of this section of the Constitution, the reasonable conclusion voiced by 
the protester in this case was that the Constitution did not allow for the purchase of items 
with bond money originated for the purpose of erecting a school building. 
In the Kum case the Oklahoma City School District utili;,ed bond funds 
originating from a bond election for the purpose of building two additional classrooms to 
an existing school building. Upon completion of the classrooms, the district utilized 
funds from this bond account to equip the classrooms with desks and chairs. On the 
succeeding school year's estimate of needs submitted to the Oklahoma County Excise 
Board, the estimate of needs showed the balance of bond fund account as reduced by the 
purchase of the desks and chairs. The protestor in the case, St. Louis-San Francisco 
Railway Company, asked the Court to void the warrant and retw-n the funds to the bond 
account, thus reducing the amount of bond funds needed and asked for in the succeeding 
school year. This scenario would have reduced their tax obligation. 
In considering the issue, the Court relied on legal principle and exercised common 
sense. Finding in favor of the practice exercised by the district, the court found that the 
purchase of such equipment was necessary to the proper use of the classrooms and was 
within the powers implied from the express powers granted in the Oklahoma 
Constitution. In other words, the Constitutional provision allowing the direct levy to 
erect a school building includes the implied power to equip such a building from the same 
levy, at least to the extent necessary to place the building in a condition to use it. In 
stipulating the use of such implied powers, the Court stated that "we have held that the 
construction of a constitutional provision must not be so strict or technical as to defeat the 
evident object and purpose of its adoption." Implied powers, such as those exercised by 
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the district in purchasing equipment for the classrooms, make the Constitution work. In 
its decision the Court quoted part of a previous case on the issue of implied powers, 
Jurney et al. v. Harlow et al., 1910, 10 P 271: 
It would not be practical, if possible, in a written Constitution, to specify 
in detail all of its objects and purposes or the means by which they are to 
be carried into effect. Such prolixity in a Code designed as a form of 
government has never been considered necessary or desirable; therefore, 
constitutional powers are often granted or restrained in general terms from 
which implied powers and restrictions to be found in constitutional 
provisions are therefore a very important element to be considered. It is an 
established rule of construction that, where a Constitution confers a power 
or enjoins a duty, it also confers, by implication, all powers that are 
necessary for the exercise of the one or for the performance of another. 
Prior to this decision, the strict adherence to Section 10, Article 10 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution was thought to prohibitthe use of bond funds for anything other 
than erecting school buildings. This case established a dramatic precedent for schools in 
their use of bond funds. Equipping buildings with the same bond funds used to create 
them became legal. 
As with the general restriction on the use of bond money before the decade of the 
1940s as described above, the general guidelines regarding the time constraints when 
bond money could be used had also followed a general restriction. In Lone Star Gas 
Company the Court considered the restriction placed on the time allowed for on the 
expenditure of bond funds and, more importantly, the legality of accumulating bond funds 
from one fiscal year to the next for use on the same purpose. In general terms, the Court 
considered whether or not it was legal for a school district to pass a bond issue and collect 
the revenue for that bond issue in one fiscal year and carry the revenue over to the next 
fiscal year. After carrying over the revenue, the Court considered the legality of adding 
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the revenue to a succeeding bond issue and revenue passed for the same purpose ·as the 
preceding bond issue. As an example, the Court considered whether or not a district 
could erect a school building costing $10,000 with a $5,000 bond issue in one fiscal year 
and add it to another $5,000 bond issue passed and collected in the succeeding year. 
At issue in the Lone Star Gas Company case was th~ same provision of the 
Oklahoma Constitution as considered in the Kum case, Article 10, Section 10. Again, in 
this case, the Court applied the implied powers rationale to this argument. The Court 
rationalized that school districts have the expressed power by the Constitution in Section 
10, Article 10 to erect school buildings by passing bond issues. Implied in this expressed 
power, reasoned the Court, was the legitimacy of local school districts to determine their 
needs for school buildings and the necessary funding for the erection of those buildings. 
In formulating this opinion, the Court stipulated that ... 
In view of such circumstances and the other methods provided for 
financing the erection of public buildings, it seems reasonable to suppose, 
and we hold, that the framers of the Constitution, by Article 10, Section 
10, intended to provide a method whereby schools, not wishing to become 
indebted for the purpose of erecting buildings, might levy an annual tax for 
such purpose, and that they contemplated the governing board should have 
the power to allow the proceeds of successive levies authorized by a vote 
of the people to accumulate and be expended together. 
Along with the "implied powers" principle argued in legal terms, the Court 
applied some plain, reasonable logic to the issue as well. Scattered about Oklahoma in 
the decade of the 1940s were school districts of all sizes, some large.but most were small. 
Though not always true, the ability of school districts to.raise sufficient funds to erect 
school buildings had a proportionate relationship to the size of the district. In deciding 
this issue, the court reasoned that: 
If school districts were denied the right to allow the various building fund 
levies to accumulate and be spent together, many small districts would be 
deprived of this means of financing a new building, for few districts have 
an assessed valuation sufficiently large to erect a building with the 
proceeds of a single five-mill levy. 
Prior to the decision in this case, the constitutional provision of the Article 10, 
Section 10 was interpreted to mean that school districts could not carry over bond 
revenue from one fiscal year to another for any purpose. The restriction of such an 
55 
interpretation severely limited the ability of a school district to erect any building with an 
associated cost larger than available in one year's bond revenue. The ability to 
accumulate bond revenue greatly changed the nature of bond accounting and the ability of 
school districts to fund the erection of school buildings. 
District Issues 
District issues were the second most litigated in the Court during the decade of the 
1940s. Out of the 88 cases, 31 (35 percent) involved school district issues (See Appendix 
A, Table VII). In this area of litigation, school districts were the defendants in 58 percent 
of the cases and the plaintiffs in 13. 
This area of litigation involved a variety of cases. Cases were categorized as 
"district issues" if they fell in a group that involved the organization, structure, processes, 
programs, and policies of a district. While some cases in this category skirted the issues 
of finance and personnel, their primary scenarios and decisions addressed more 
specifically the basic operation of a district, whether such operation dealt with the 
annexation of a district or the functions of board of education relations, district 
procedures for selling surplus property, or district policies in determining the location of 
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schools or programs offered in schools. · The legitimacy of school annexations dominated 
this area oflitigation, however. Specifically, issues in this category were heard by the 
Court in 73 percent of the cases. 
Two cases produced interesting precedent. As found in the cases of tl·1e previous 
two decades, the discretionary power of the county superintendent was often called into 
question, especially in the area of his legal powers in school annexations. The case, 
Musick. County Superintendent v. School District No. 41, et al. (1940) addressed the 
issue of a county superintendent's discretionary power. Also establishing precedent was 
Spann v. Cresswell (1947). Spann considered the legality of an annexing school district 
to dispose of property formerly in the annexed district. 
At issue in the Musick case was the protest by the Kingfisher school district 
against the county superintendent in his application of his discretionary powers in 
connection with the separate school in the district. Prior to the action in question by the 
county superintendent there existed a school district occupied solely by blacks. The 
school district had existed as blacks were the majority race in the district and board of 
education members of the district were all black. The county superintendent issued an 
order declaring whites the majority in the district and ordered the creation of a new 
common school district. In the new school district, the white children would attend 
schools in the district and black children would attend a separate school. The protesters 
in this case sought relief in the Court by challenging the power of the county 
superintendent to issue such an order. 
Regardless of the politics in this matter, the Court clearly stated the statutory 
authority of the county superintendent in scenarios which involve common schools and 
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separate schools. In approving the discretionary powers of the county superintendent, the 
Court relied on two separate statutes in existence at the time. First, O.S. 70, Section 7040 
(1937) authorized county superintendents to form common school districts (school 
districts existing on their own, with their own boards of education and having control of 
separate schools while still under the authority of the county superintendent) at his 
discretion when it best suited the needs of the students. The Court found in this 
circumstance that the county superintendent acted within his discretionary powers. The 
legitimacy of the county superintendent's determination of which schools the white 
children and black children would attend was supported by the O.S. 70, Section 7051, 
which stipulated "when there are two schools in one district, the county superintendent 
may designate which shall be the common and which the separate school and, regardless 
of which race is the majority with respect to school children, may direct which class shall 
attend the respective schools." 
While on face value the significance of this case may rest in the details, the 
practical application of the discretionary powers of the county superintendent was of 
importance. The primary importance of this case was the affirmation of the county 
superintendent's use of discretionary power in the political environment ofrace issues. 
Forty-two Oklahoma Supreme Court cases involving issues surrounding separate schools 
were adjudicated in the period from 1930 to 1973 (Oklahoma Supreme Court Network). 
This case allowed the county superintendent to solve a race issue in a county that needed 
schools for both black and white children. 
The second case that generated new precedence in this category was Spann v. 
Cresswell (194 7). Here, the Court considered for the first time the legality of an annexing 
district disposing of property formerly owned by an annexed district. The actual 
ownership of annexed school property had long been established statutorily and had not 
been an issue in case law. The query posed in this case was the validity of a 
detennination for the fate of property owned by an annexed district prior to the 
annexation and whether or not an annexing district must comply with such a 
determination. 
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In this case, two school districts were annexed according to established procedure 
and receiving the requisite number of voters required for annexation. Prior to issuing the 
final order of annexation, however, the county superintendent, who was statutorily 
required to oversee the annexation process, issued an order that stipulated that the 
"schoolhouse [in the annexed district] as it now stands shall ·remain on the present 
location to become a church and community meeting place." After the annexation took 
place, the annexing district decided to sell the schoolhouse. A taxpayer in the annexed 
school district filed suit to prevent the sale of the property and mandate the annexing 
school district to comply with the order of the county superintendent at the time of 
annexation. 
In its decision, the Court concluded that the order concerning the fate of the 
annexed district's property was invalid. The Court reasoned that" ... since statehood this 
court has held that the grant of powers to boards of county commissioners must be strictly 
construed, because when action under special authority they must act strictly on the 
conditions under which their authority is given." The Court, applying this logic, 
proclaimed the authority of the county superintendent to change the school district's 
boundaries in the issue of the annexation. However, the Court further rationalized that 
" ... in the present case the county superintendent attempted to include in his order 
changing the school district boundaries a restriction; no statute exists giving him the 
authority to make a restriction." In the absence of such authority, the Court's decision 
was as follows: 
Upon the county superintendent's making the order of annexation, the 
annexing district became the owner of the school district property as 
provided by statute and could dispose of it in any legal manner. 
The significance of the precedence of this case was twofold: first, annexations 
were to be free ofrestrictions by county superintendents, especially in the area of the , 
disposition of property; secondly, the Court re-affirmed the statutory right of annexing 
school districts to dispose of property derived from an annexed school district. 
Personnel Issues 
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Cases that addressed personnel issues during the 1940s were few in number. Only 
six cases, roughly six percent, of the cases heard by the Supreme Court involving public 
schools adjudicated personnel issues. School districts were the defendants in five of the 
cases and the plaintiff in only one. 
In this area oflitigation, the Court heard cases involving the validity of teacher 
and superintendent contracts and teacher termination. One case unique to the decade and 
the Court involved the legitimacy of a school district raising teacher salaries during a 
given fiscal year for the same fiscal year. In this case, Edwards v. Board of Education 
(1946), the Court considered the legality of a Oklahoma City School District paying 
salaries to its teachers in excess of that specified in their contracts with the district. In 
July, before the 1945-46 school year, the school board of the Oklahoma City schools 
issued the following resolution: 
It is impossible, prior to the opening of the Oklahoma City schools to 
ascertain with any degree of certainty the amount of money that will be 
available for the payment of teachers' salaries. For that reason the salaries 
in the contracts entered into with teachers is made a tentative salary and is 
subject to revision, up or down, depending upon the funds available for the 
payment of teachers' salaries. 
The fixing of the permanent salary shall be made as soon as it is 
ascertained what funds are available. 
It is not intended that in revising the fixed salary that the revision will be 
made individually as to the individual teacher, but that the revision will be 
uniform in the sense that it will be according to a plan for revision to be 
made by the Board. It is contemplated that as to certain types and certain 
classes of teachers, there will probably be no revision or not material 
revision froin the tentative salary. 
In keeping with the resolution, the district carried out its provisions by increasing the 
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salaries of its teachers. This addition was in excess of the original estimate of needs filed 
with the county excise board but approved by the county excise board in a supplemental 
appropriation. 
In its decision, the Court reasoned the contracts valid as all contracts involving 
public schools are dependent upon estimated income. This was self-evident in the 
process of an estimate of needs approved by the county excise board. The court noted 
that all "contracts with school districts are tentative" at best as they become invalid if 
funds once estimated are not realized through tax collection or other means." 
Specifically, the Court wrote "where contracts are executed, they are enforceable within 
the estimated income and unenforceable beyond that point." In this case, the board 
certified a salary as agreed in the teacher contracts with the excise board in an estimate of 
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needs. As tax collections generated unanticipated revenue, the district asked for and 
received a supplemental appropriation from the county excise board. Once approved, the 
district legally paid the teachers in excess of their contracts. In its final remarks, the 
Court stipulated that "the record disclos[ed] that the board's purpose and plan with 
respect to the total salaries to be paid has been consistent and nondiscriminatory, and the 
lawful provisions governing the details of fiscal management." 
The decision in this case constituted a fundamental right of school districts to 
decide the salaries of its employees with the additional help ofrealizing its total revenue. 
The process of certifying an estimate of needs with the county excise board determines a 
"best guess" on what the revenue of the district will be for the school year. As the school 
year progresses and actual revenues are received the district becomes better able to 
determine an accurate budget. With the aid of the ability to seek additional 
appropriations by the county excise board, districts could, after this case, award additional 
salary to teachers. 
CHAPTER IV 
OKLAHOMASUPREMECOURTCASELAW 
REGARDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS: REVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS FOR THE 1950s 
Introduction 
During the decade of the 1950s, Oklahoma changed in many ways that were not 
unlike the rest of the country. The modernization of the state as well as ideas became to 
take shape in Oklahoma. During the tenure of Governor Johnston Murray, for example, 
legislation created the opportunity for women to serve on juries. Other pieces of 
legislation that were characteristic of the decade included those that created state-operated 
mental health institutions, funding mechanisms for building roads, and avenues for the 
consolidation of the state's small, rural schools (English & Calhoun, 1989). 
The "Red Scare" that swept the county during the 1950s also found a place in 
Oklahoma. One of the pieces of legislation aimed at ensuring that communists did not 
infiltrate government jobs and the schools created the loyalty oath. In 1953, the U.S. 
Supreme Court found the loyalty oath unconstitutional. However, the final version of the 
loyalty oath, written to meet the rudiments of the Court's decision, was also created in 
1953, and it remains law in Oklahoma. All government employees, including teachers, 
sign the oath before taking employment. 
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In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in the case, Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka, Kansas. While this case federally mandated the end of educational 
segregation at all levels, the Court's ruling was not met with popular approval or 
compliance immediately. Oklahoma, under the stewardship of Governor Raymond Gary, 
attacked the issue immediately in encouraging Oklahomans to comply with the ruling and 
act responsibly (Baird & Goble, 1994). In 1955, the Oklahoma Legislature created the 
Better School Amendment, a law drastically changing the state funding mechanisms for 
school districts in that it created the same funding systems for all school districts and 
abolished the separate schools for blacks. An important part of the law mandated 
compliance by school administrators or state funding would be withheld. 
Introduction of the Supreme Court Cases in the 1950s 
Sixty-eight cases involving Oklahoma's public schools were heard by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court during the decade of the 1950s (See Appendix A, Tables IX & 
X). This number was significantly less than the previous decade. The trend in the 
number of cases heard over this 30-year period created a rather unique graphical picture. 
As illustrated in Figure I (Appendix B), the decade of the 1940s produced a graphically 
significant rise to the baseline decade of the 1930s, resulting in a 43 percent increase in 
cases. The number of cases heard during the 1950s sharply reduced the graphical picture 
as a 23 percent decrease in the number of cases was heard. 
Though the Court's decisions decreased during the 1950s, this decade provided a 
significant volume of issues for school case law. The areas of litigation most addressed 
were school finance ( similar to the decades of the 1930s and 1940s ), the financial 
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operation of schools, taxes, and financial aid from the state. Finance issues constituted 
over 42 percent (See Appendix A, Table XI) of the cases. The Court also addressed many 
issues normally associated with the operation of a school district such as annexation, 
student transfers, and the use, ownership, and maintenance bf school property. The most 
common issue surrounding property was that associated with the ownership of property 
used by schools or given to schools by individuals or families for extended periods of 
time. School district issues comprised 39 percent of the cases. 
Issues of school finance and school property were not the only issues heard by the 
Court. All of the types of cases heard by the Court during the 1950s included issues of 
finance, the district, personnel, and district v. district. 
Approximately 42 percent of the cases involved school finance issues. District 
issues, such as school property ownership, annexation, student transfers, and school 
elections, constituted 39 percent of the cases. Issues surrounding the personnel associated 
with school districts, teachers, superintendents, and school board members - constituted 
approximately 20 percent of the cases. Only one case between two school districts was 
adjudicated. This was a sharp departure from the two previous decades where eight and 
five such cases appeared in the Court during the 1930s and 1940s, respectively. 
School districts continued their success in the Court during the decade of the 
1950s. They won 73 percent of their cases. As the plaintiffs, school districts were 
involved in 19 cases, and they ~on 11 of the cases. School districts were sued by others 
much more then they sued others during this decade. As defendants in 72 percent of the 
cases, school districts won 38 of the 48 cases for a winning percentage of 79 percent. In 
losing only 18 of the 68 cases, roughly 26 percent, a fair evaluation would place school 
districts in the category of successful in litigating their positions before the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court (See Appendix A, Table XII). 
Finance Issues 
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Issues of school finance dominated this decade and .continued the trend of the two 
previous decades. Forty-two percent of the cases during the 1950s involved school 
finance issues. The thrust of these cases, as identified in the previous two chapters, 
focused on issues of the county excise board and its relation to approving school districts' 
estimates of needs. Railroad companies as plaintiffs played important roles in these 
cases. The role of the state in providing financial aid to local schools became more of a 
focus for litigation. The Court established much precedence in the area of county excise 
boards during the two previous decades, and this fact provided understanding for the 
reduction in the number of cases in this area during the 1950s. Likewise, the increased 
involvement of the state in providing direct financial support for schools in the form of 
aid and through legislative acts in the 1940s and 1950s (State Aid Laws and the Better 
Schools Amendment) helped to explain the beginning of such litigation in the Court in 
the 1940s and the continued trend in the 1950s. Of the 29 cases involving finance issues, 
eleven explored the area of taxation and the county excise board and six investigated 
areas of legitimacy of direct state aid to school districts (See Appendix A, Table X). 
These two school finance issues produced important precedence for schools. The 
Court continued to explore the legitimacy of the state in providing direct aid to schools 
and the legislation supporting such aid resulted in the most significant precedence in 
school law during the 1950s. 
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In the previous decade, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted several different laws 
that provided for, and directed, the Oklahoma State Board of Education to apportion 
funds to local school districts on the basis of a general formula. Specifically, the 
Oklahoma Legislature passed "State Aid" laws in 1940, 1942, and 1949, cit~d as 70 O.S. 
1940 Section 18, 70 O.S. 1942 Section 18, and 70 O.S. Supp. 1949 Section 18. The 
1950s began with another version of the State Aid law with the passage of 70 O.S. 1951 
Section 18. 
The basic premise behind these statutes was an effort by the state to equalize 
funding for schools. By using a basic formula, the state aid laws attempted to supplement 
the ability of a local school in meeting the financial requirements determined as needed 
for a school year. In basic terms, each piece of legislation defined for the State Board of 
Education and local school districts a formula for calculating "Minimum Program." 
While such legislation was ostensibly created in a manner intended for an 
unambiguous disbursement of state fonds to local schools, litigation over the meaning of 
the legislation creating the formula and the meaning of the definitions of the Minimum 
Program and Minimum Program Income resulted. The war over state aid occurred 
between local school districts and the State Board of Education. The battles over the 
amount of state aid properly disbursed to local school districts were, at times, fought in 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 
Two cases adjudicated during the 1950s provided important precedence in 
defining the formula and resolving differences of interpretation for local school districts 
and the Oklahoma State Board of Education. These cases focused primarily on the 
definition of the Minimum Program Income. State v. State Board of Education ( 195 5) 
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explored one of the more loosely defined portions of the State Aid Law of 1951 (70 O.S. 
1951 Section 18). As provided by the statute local school districts were to include in 
their calculations of the Minimum Program Income "all ... revenue which can legally be 
estimated by the county excise board." 
At issue in this case was the fact that the school district did not include in its 
estimate of needs for the 1952 fiscal year an amount of money it had received during the 
1951 fiscal year from a local resource. The local reso·urce in question was a disbursement 
of funds from the county sheriffs sale of confiscated liquor. In determining the amount 
of state aid to disburse, the State Board used ninety percent of the amount received in 
1951 as an estimate of the amount the school would receive in 1952. This amount 
reduced the amount of state aid the school district received dollar for dollar. The 
reasoning used by the state was that, since this revenue was received by the district the 
previous school year, it could be reasonably assumed it would receive a like amount the 
succeeding year. 
The school district and the Court disagreed with this conclusion. The school 
district reasoned that 
Regardless of the fact that the revenue was received from the sale of 
confiscated liquor in 1951, the probability that they would receive income 
from the same source in 1952 was so uncertain that it was not an item of 
income that could be legally estimated for the school year. 
While it was certain that the school district would receive revenue from levies the voters 
in the district had passed, for example, it was not nearly as certain for the district to 
estimate whether or not the local sheriff would confiscate illegal liquor and sell it for the 
proceeds to benefit the school district in the coming school year. The school district 
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argued that basing an estimate of needs or calculating the Minimum Program Income on 
such an assumption was unfair and unrealistic. 
The Court agreed with the school district. In its decision the Court rationalized 
that .. , 
We do not construe the statutes as imposing upon ~e State Board the 
mandatory duty to include in such estimates an item of income from a 
certain source for any current year solely because income was received 
from that source from the preceding year. There must be a reasonable 
probability that such source will produce a revenue for the current year to 
justify its inclusion in an estimate upon which the school district's 
financial program is to be based. 
While the statute in question (70 O.S. 1951 Section 18) grants the State Board the 
authority to use all revenue that can be '"legally estimated" to be received by a school 
district in building its budget for a school year, the Court, in this case, stipulated that it 
was unreasonable and was not the intent of the legislation to include revenue just because 
it was received previously. The Court agreed that there must be some reasonable 
expectation for the school district to receive the money. Otherwise, the State Board 
should not use the revenue in reducing the state aid to a school district. 
A second case dealing with state aid in the 1950s also established important 
precedent for schools. As mentioned above, the various State Aid Laws included in their 
definitions various sources of revenue that were included in the calculation of the 
Minimum Program Income. The State Aid Law of 1949 (70 O.S. 1949 Section 18) 
stipulated that "federal grants of aid and reimbursements" were exempt from inclusion in 
the calculation of the Minimum Program Income for school districts. In State v. State 
Board of Education (1953) the Court considered the practical application of this part of 
the State Aid statute. 
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During the 1950 fiscal year, the school district received revenue from the state 
through the Flood Control Act of 1941 (33 U.S.C.A. Cum. Supp. Section 701). 
According to the Flood Control Act, 75 percent of the revenue received by the United 
States for the lease lands acquired for flood control purposes were forwarded to the states. 
The Act further required the states to use the money for schools and roads in the counties 
in which the flood control property was located. 
In this case the State Board of Education reduced state aid to a school district that 
received funds as a result of the Flood Control Act. The amount of the reduction was 
dollar for dollar of the amount received as a result of the Flood Control Act. The State 
Board argued that it subtracted the revenue derived from the Flood Control Act from the 
amount of State Aid as was prescribed by statute. The Board also reasoned that it had 
done so in years past without complaint. 
The Court disagreed with the State Board and ordered the reapportionment of 
state aid to the school district excluding the amount of revenue received by the district as 
a result of the Flood Control Act. In its decision, the Court reasoned that the State Aid 
Law was "unambiguous and couched in plain language." Clearly, the Court ruled that 
"the phrase 'Federal grants of aid and reimbursements' as used in the statute" meant all 
money received by school districts originating in the coffers of the federal government in 
a direct or indirect manner. The fact that the money first passed through the treasury of 
the state should not impact the calculation of the Minimum Program Income of a school. 
As in the previous two decades the legitimacy of the estimates of needs filed by 
school districts with county excise boards continued as an area of protest in the Court by 
taxpayers. One case in particular settled whether or not a type of revenue received by 
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school districts in the state belong on an estimate of needs as a recurrent or non-recurrent 
source of revenue. In Mid-Continent Pipe Line Company v. Stephens County(1957), the 
Court interpreted the statute that determined the types of revenue for inclusion in a school 
district's estimate of needs. For the most part, school districts were required to include in 
their estimates of needs the amount of revenue needed to operate for a fiscal year. The 
estimate of needs was also required to identify the sources of revenue that would generate 
a sufficient budget to cover the costs for the fiscal year. From this estimate, the county 
excise board certified a rate of levy for collection for the fiscal year. The Mid-Continent 
Pipeline Company protested the fact that the school district did not include in its estimate 
a source of revenue collected the previous year. Had it included the source, a lesser rate 
of levy assessed by the county excise board would have resulted. 
At issue was the collection of revenue by a school district from oil and gas royalty 
and leases it owned. If included in the estimate of needs, a lower levy would be required 
for the district to meet its estimated obligations for the school year. The Mid-Continent 
Company argued that this revenue was required source for inclusion in the estimate of 
needs, but the school district disagreed. 
The Court held that such revenue was not identified in the statute defining the 
development of school districts' estimates of needs. In 68 O.S. 1955 Supp. 1953 Section 
286, the Legislature prohibited school districts from including in its estimate of needs 
"revenue from non-recurrent sources." The Mid-Continent Company argued that the 
revenue received by the school district could be seen as recurrent and predictable from 
one year to the next. The Court disagreed, however. In its decision, the Court stated that: 
We are of the opinion that the Legislature in preparing this act started out 
to name the non-recurrent sources, finding this difficult to do, found a 
better means of clarifying their intent by including the statement "or from 
any other such source not normally recurrent year after year and so made 
recurrent by Legislative Enactment." 
In the area of school finance issues, the Court also considered the legality of 
expending revenue received by school districts as a result of levies assessed by county 
excise boards for projects argued as not listed on the estimate of needs by a school 
district. While seeking a particular answer for a particular situation heard by the Court, 
the decision reached in this case established important precedent in the legitimacy of an 
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estimate of needs for school districts. School districts were required to list all items in the 
estimate of needs in which revenue generated from the proceeds of a levy would be spent. 
While seemingly an easy task, some bond issue descriptions inherently ran the risk of 
lacking clarity and exactness. The Oklahoma Supreme Court case, St. Louis-San 
Francisco Railroad Company v. Marshall County Excise Board (1958) provided direction 
and legality to the expenditure of bond funds in such cases. 
The Court reviewed the Constitution as it related to bond elections by school 
districts, specifically, the 195 5 amendment to Artice 10, Section 10 of the Constitution. 
This section of the Constitution provided for annual millage elections for the creation of a 
bond fund for the purpose of "erecting, remodeling or repairing school buildings, and for 
purchasing furniture." Also reviewed was Article 10, Section 19 that provides, in part, 
that "no tax levied and collected for one purpose shall ever be devoted to another 
purpose." The Court found that the school district was not out of compliance with either 
of the constitutional provisions. 
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The primary issue revolved around the manner in which the district completed its 
estimate of needs and whether or not the levy coHected violated the Constitution based on 
the completed estimate of needs. On the district's estimate of needs, no amount was 
estimated for the erection of a school building .. A $500 estimate each was made for 
remodeling, and for the purchase of furniture. The school district submitted claims later 
for $1,077.35 for the erection of a school building. The claimant in this case maintained 
that such was illegal because an estimate for the erection of a school building was not 
listed on the estimate of needs. 
The protesters in this case maintained that the failure to identify that the money 
would be used to erect a school building was the same as using the money for any other 
purpose not specifically itemized on the estimate of needs. They argued that the district 
was using the money to pay teacher's salaries, repair buses, and this equated to a violation 
of the Constitution.· That is, the expenditure made by the district with the money in 
question was not specified on the estimate of needs nor was it used for what was specified 
on the estimate of needs. 
The Court tersely disagreed with the protesters. In the opinion, the Court 
lamented: 
We think protestant's argument goes to absurd lengths in describing 
protestee's argument, and exaggerates the effect of the 1955 amendment of 
sec. 10, supra, as said amendments interpreted by the protestee. Granting 
agreement with the protestant that if the proceeds of such a levy were used 
for teacher's salaries and the other mention purposes entirely foreign to, 
and disassociated with, building funds and building fund purposes, such 
uses would be in violation of sec. 19, it, by no means, follows that the 
money's appropriation for any one of more of the purposes named in sec. 
10 - as it has been amended - would also constitute such a violation. And 
we see no reason in this State's present law for reversing the judgment 
herein appealed from. 
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The Court continued by rationalizing that the completion of the estimate of needs was 
simply an estimate of the use of funds. Stipulating precisely in terms of categories for the 
use of the money was an administrative task unrelated to informing the public about what 
the use of the money would be. The Cons'.itution stipulated the ways in whicl1 the money 
could be used. The form used by the district for completing its estimate of needs was a 
formality for the excise board to approve the millage levy. As long as the millage levy 
was passed by a legal election of voters, the expenditure of the money collected was at the 
discretion of the district so long as it was used for one of the areas identified in the 
Constitution. The Court ruled, as was written in the Constitution, the building fund 
money was properly used for erecting a school building. 
District Issues 
District issues were the second most litigated during the 1950s. Approximately 
forty percent of the cases involved issues surrounding the operation of a school district, 
including school property ownership, annexation, student transfers, and the liability of a 
. school district fora student injury. This percentage was consistent with the 1940s while 
the 1930s saw only 11 percent of its cases involve district issues. Seventy-two percent of 
the cases in this area of litigation surrounded the topic of school property ownership and 
school district annexations. 
During the decade of the 1950s the Court heard a plethora of cases involving 
protests of the ownership of school property. Eighteen of the cases heard by the Court 
settled an issue of property ownership. Two cases in particular produced valuable 
precedents for school case law. The first, Seba v. Independent School District No. 3 
(1953) settled the issue of"eminent domain" relating to school districts. The second, 
Merritt Independent School District No. 2 v. Jones (1959), settled the issue of"adverse 
possession" relating to school property. 
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The Seba case \vas the first heard by the Court that addressed the issue of whether 
or not a school could acquire property by certifying land as eminent domain. Eminent 
domain has been utilized throughout the history of our legal system as a legal practice by 
which government entities or other projects approved by government entities involving 
the betterment of a community or society forcibly, through court action, taking the 
property owned by a private party. The practice of eminent domain provided fair market 
value for the property. 
In this case, the Court considered whether or not a school district's need to build a 
gymnasium constituted a legitimate assertion of eminent domain. After passing a bond 
issue for the purchase of land and the building of a gymnasium, the school district 
commenced action to purchase a piece of land directly across the street from the school. 
The piece of land in question was to be used for the construction of the gymnasium and 
associated parking spaces. The owner of the property refused to sell the property to the 
school, and the school immediately sought relief in court to condemn the property and 
acquire it through the concept of eminent domain. 
The local district court approved the condemnation of the property on the basis 
that the land in question was appropriate for use as the site.for the gymnasium as it was 
connected to a major street, easily accessible to school staff and students as well as 
patrons, and it was immediately across the street from the school. The district court 
appointed appraisers who established the fair market value of the property at $2,750.00. 
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This amount was paid to the district court by the school district to be paid to the private 
owners of the property. 
On appeal to the Court, the plaintiffs (the private owners of the property) asserted 
that the school district had no legitimate need for the property as the school district Ov\ned 
property elsewhere. In its decision, the Court held that ... 
The ordinary rule in condemnation cases is that while the particular 
property sought to be condemned must be necessary for the proposed 
project, the condemnor's decision as to the necessity for taking particular 
property will not be disturbed in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse 
of discretion. 
Particular to this case, the Court stipulated that the school district did not act in a manner 
that was inappropriate in its desire for the land for the gymnasium. In fact the Court 
lamented that the plaintiffs failed to "show any spite, prejudice, or improper conduct on 
the part of the school board in its efforts to acquire the site of the gymnasium." 
Fundamental to this decision was the Court's application of the fair and equitable use of 
eminent domain by a school district in acquiring property for school uses. Particularly, as 
long as school districts conformed to the ordinary practices of eminent domain, the 
practice was legally extended to school districts by the Court. 
In the Merritt case, the Court considered the issue of "adverse possession" as it 
applied to conflicts over property and the ownership of property by school districts. In 
property disputes, adverse possession has been used as a legal way to otherwise 
unlawfully take land. Strictly ~efined, adverse possession was developed historically by 
case law and, at times, by statute as a method by which someone other than the title 
holder of land gained title to the land (Black, 1998). A key component in the successful 
acquisition of the land was determining who had had continuous possession of the land 
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for a specified period of time. Interestingly, the time period of continuous possession had 
to begin with the actual wrongful occupation of another's property. Historically, the 
underlying philosophy behind adverse possession was that the actual use of land was 
favored over disuse or simple abandonment of the land (Buswell, 1991 ). Acquiring 
property through adverse possession in Oklahoma, and more specifically taking the 
property of a public school district through adverse possession, involved the concepts 
described above as well as their practical application in the Court. In the Merritt case, the 
Court settled the issue of adverse possession as the concept applied to someone taking the 
land of an Oklahoma school district. 
In the Merritt case, the plaintiff filed suit in district court to acquire that title to a 
piece of land in Beckham County. The piece of land, according to the plaintiff, had been 
abandoned by the school district, as the school district had been broken up and 
disorganized. The piece of land in question was a two-acre lot that was properly 
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conveyed to the school district before statehood in 1905. After statehood, the Merritt 
school district was disorganized and made part of an adjoining school district in Roger 
Mills county. In claiming adverse possession, the plaintiff claimed that the Merritt 
School District removed the school building from the property 25 years prior to the court 
action. Beginning 20 years prior to the court action, the plaintiff asserted that he and his 
predecessors had been "in continuous, quiet, peaceable, open, and notorious possession of 
the land. This fact, according to the plaintiffs, supported their claim to a title by adverse 
possession, and the district court agreed. 
The Supreme Court found that the doctrine of adverse possession did not apply to 
school property. In its decision, the Court relied on two distinct findings. First, the court 
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noted the "general rule is that title by adverse possession may be acquired against all 
persons, except those exempted from the operation of the statute oflimitations.'; In 
Oklahoma, however, the Court noted "the statute of limitations is not operative against 
the state or its subdivisions where public rights are invc.Jved." In essence, the Court 
stipulated that the primary determining factor is whether or not the issue surrounding the 
adverse possession is a private or public right. School property was distinguished as 
public property in James v. Union Graded School District No. 2 (1942). In this case, the 
Court ruled "the ownership of school property is in the local district or school board for 
the public at large, and such property occupies the status of public property." With this 
issue settled, the Court rationalized that whether intentionally or unintentionally, a school 
district cannot abandon property or forfeit property to another by adverse possession, as 
property owned by a school district was owned in trust for the public. 
During the decade of the 1950s, the Court heard two cases involving the transfer 
of students from one school district to another: Duncan v. Askew (1952) and School 
District No. 22, Osage County v. Worten (1955). Both of these cases were brought to the 
Court on a writ of certiorari as both were concluded by the Court to have been decided in 
the district courts in error. Specifically, the Court agreed to hear both of these cases 
because the judges in the district courts misapplied the statutes concerning student 
transfers. 
In Duncan a parent of two school-age children filed with the county 
superintendent a request for a transfer of his children from School District No. 40 of 
Johnston County to School District No. 20 of Johnston County. The two school-age 
children had attended School District No. 40 through the eighth grade. School District 
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No. 40 did not provide educational services beyond the eighth grade. The purpose of the 
transfer to School District No. 20 was for the children to be able to attend the high school 
and graduate from high school. The county superintendent denied the transfers. On 
appeal to the district judge, the order of the county superintendent was reversc:d and the 
transfers were approved. Without notice to the school or the father of the children, new 
hearing with the district judge was held at the request of a group of citizens of School 
District No. 20. The district judge vacated his decision and voided the student transfers. 
On appeal, the Court examined the applicable statute concerning student transfers, 
70 O.S. 1951, Sections 8-2 and 8-3. The decision of the Court rested solely on the plain 
reading of the statute which provided for the mandatory transfer of a student, upon 
application to the county superintendent of schools, to an adjoining school district that 
provided grades not provided in the district of residence. In its decision, the Court 
stipulated that it was clear that the transfer should have been approved and the parties 
disapproving, the district judge and the county superintendent, were clearly outside the 
authority of the statute in disapproving the transfer. The Court stated: 
In the instant case, where it is shown that each petitioner had completed 
his formal education in the grades furnished by School District No. 40, the 
place of their residence, they were entitled upon proper application under 
the quoted statutes to a transfer to School District No. 20, in which district 
they could procure a high school education. Neither are respondents 
vested with a discretionary power under the statute, but their actions must 
be governed by the express mandate of the statutes. 
In the Worten case the parents of 11 students filed with the county superintendent 
applications to transfer from the School District No. 22, Osage County to School District 
No. 29 in Osage County. The county superintendent denied the applications for transfer. 
On appeal to the district court judge, the transfers were approved. The Court heard the 
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case on certiorari as elements of the controlling statute for student transfers were 
purported to have not been followed by the district court judge. 
The primary issue in this case was the particular location of residence of the 
students involved in relation to the location of the two school Jistricts. The students lived 
on the far outskirts of School District No. 22, and their horµes were contiguous to the 
boundaries of School District No. 29. In terms of distance, the students were subject to a 
school bus ride of five and one half miles to School District No. 22. It was a two-mile 
bus ride to School District No. 29. 
In deciding to grant the transfers, the district judge applied the following 
provisions of70 O.S. 1951, Section 8-3: 
Provided, that a child may be transferred from a district furnishing 
instruction in the grade he is entitled to pursue when the topography of 
such.district, or the health of the child as determined by a verified health 
certificate by a licensed physician, is such, in the judgment of the County 
Superintendent of Schools, that the best interest of the child cannot be 
served by the child's attendance in the district in which he resides. 
The district court judge granted the transfers based on the topography. notion in 
the above statute. In the argument, the district court argued that it was in the best interest 
· of the students to avoid the five and one-half mile bus ride to the district in which they 
resided. Granting the transfers would require the students to ride a school bus for only 
two miles to school. 
The Court found error in this application of the statute. In its decision, the Court 
stated that "unless the topography of the home district is such that the best interest of the 
child cannot be served.in his home district the County Superintendent and the District 
Court were without lawful authority to grant a transfer." Following the clear rudiments 
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and meaning of the statute was the job of the Court in this case. The Court also explained 
that this was the job of the lower court and the county superintendent. Finally, the Court 
tersely presented a sound question for it to answer: "Are the best interests of a child 
infringed upon by being required to ride an approved bus over an approved route a 
distance of five and one-half miles where it is possible by transfer to travel on two miles 
over an approved route on an approve route"? The Court answered sharply by stating, 
"We think not." The Court concluded that there was no appreciable difference in a two 
mile and a five and one-half mile bus ride, as such would not pass the muster of the 
legislative intent for approving student transfers. 
Case law in this area has varied with the Court. This has been particularly true 
due to the changing nature of the statutory lav,· concerning student transfers. Since the 
1930s, the rules concerning student transfers have been changed by legislative enactment 
six times - once in each of the following decades: 1940s, 1950s, 1970s, and 1980s. The 
statutory rules for student transfers were changed twice in the 1990s by the Oklahoma 
legislature. While the Duncan and Worten cases did not produce significant precedence 
in the area of student transfers, both cases contributed greatly to the overall understanding 
of the Corn1 regarding these matters. 
As mentioned previously in this study, where statutes were available for the Court 
to consider in deciding a case, the Court based its decisions on the clear and precise 
language of the statutes. In both Duncan and Worten, the Court clearly defined the 
method it would use in not only settling the issues in the cases, but in future cases. The 
issue of student transfers was clearly a statutory issue, and, despite the emotion, 
economics, or politics such an issue created, the job of the Court remained to be an 
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enforcer of statutes and, when necessary, an interpreter of statutes. The importance of 
these two student transfer cases in the 1950s was that they were the first of their kind and 
they gave insight into how the Court would decide future cases of a similar nature. 
Personnel Issues 
Personnel issues occupied 16 percent of the cases heard by the Court. Out of the 
eleven cases, ten were initiated by a school district while a school district was the 
defendant in only one case. This presented a sharp departure in terms of the roles districts 
have played in Supreme Court cases. As addressed above, school districts were sued 
significantly more than they filed legal actions as plaintiffs. Despite this fact, the school 
districts were successful as plaintiffs and in this area of litigation. School districts won 
eight of the 11 cases involving personnel issues and lost three of the cases as the 
defendants. 
The personnel issues adjudicated primarily concerned particular elements of a 
contract, the amount of money paid to school administrators and teachers, and the 
legitimacy of a board member to serve his term as a board member. None of these cases 
produced new precedence by the Court. One case did explore a new area, however. In 
Board of Education v. State (1953), the Court considered the liability of school board 
members and a superintendent for employing said superintendent who was not certified 
by the state to serve as a superintendent. 
Nineteen patrons of the Sayre School District brought suit against four of the five 
board of education members and the superintendent for violating several statutes 
concerning the hiring of a school superintendent. Pertinent to this case was the passage 
of the Oklahoma School Code in 1949. A particular statute in the Code, 70 O.S. 1951, 
Sections 1-20, changed the rules by which a board or education could hire a 
superintendent and a person could accept a position with a school district as a 
superintendent. The statute in question provided that it was 
unlawful for a member of the board of education of a school district to 
employee, approve, or vote for any person to perform services for such 
district unless the person employed [held] a valid certificate of 
qualification issued in accordance with the rules and regulations of the 
State. 
Similarly, the statute prescribed "it shall be unlawful for any person to serve, or to 
contract or agree to serve, as a superintendent, principal, or teacher unless such person 
holds a valid certificate of qualification issued by the State." 
82 
As a penalty for violating the provisions of the statute, the State mandated that the 
individual board of education members were liable for the cost of the superintendent's 
contract with payment going to the school district. Such liability, according to 70 O.S. 
1951, Section 4, was for "double the amount of all sums of money so paid." 
The interesting part of this case was the fact that one of the board of education 
members joined the 19 patrons in the suit as a "relator plaintiff," or an individual party 
adjoining himself to the other plaintiffs. This board member was a board member at the 
time the superintendent was hired and attempted to excuse himself from the case as a 
"relator" to the case. His attempt was backed by his desire to not be held liable with the 
other board members and to let the community know he was not an agreeable party to the 
hiring of the superintendent. 
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In its conclusion to this case, the Court interpreted the statutes relating to this 
matter as Constitutional and noted some fundamental rules as it interpreted the statute. 
First, the Court noted that boards of education are responsible for following the laws of 
the state. Prior to 1949, there were no statutory requirements for hiring a superintendent 
in terms of the certification qualifications needed by the superintendent. In particular, the 
Court stated 
the statutes determine public policy of this state, which is that boards of 
education may not knowingly hire and pay uncertified superintendents, 
and if such is done, the members of such board shall be liable for the 
return of the amount of public money thus expended. 
Second, the Court noted that the actions of a board of education are to be taken as actions 
of the board of education as a whole. An attempt by one or more board of education 
members to excuse himself from the actions of the board, when participating in those 
actions, after the fact was not a viable option for getting out of legal liability. The Court 
stated 
the school district is entitled to have the action prosecuted against all 
board members who knowingly participated in the alleged wrongful 
action, and, conversely, the liability being joint, the board members are 
entitled to have made party defendants all those who participated. 
Furthermore, the Court sharply stated "a guilty member of such a board cannot escape 
liability be becoming a relator against his fellow board members." 
In this case, the Court sufficiently settled the notion of whether or not it was legal 
to hire a non-certified person in the role of superintendent. While settling this issue, the 
Court also took time to note the ramifications for board of education members who 
violated the requirements in hiring a superintendent. If a clear message was intended, it 
was delivered: Hire certified superintendents or suffer the consequences. 
CHAPTERV 
OKLAHOMASUPREMECOURTCASELAW 
REGARDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS: REVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS FOR THE 1960s 
Introduction 
Oklahoma experienced several changes during the 1960s with the predominant 
change being political. Oklahoma's first Republican governor, Henry Bellmon, was 
elected to office in 1962 and he was succeeded by another Republican, Dewey Bartlett, in 
1967. Traditionally stooped. in populist sentiments and with a history of sending 
Democratic candidates to office, however conservative, the change to two consecutive 
Republican governors was uncharacteristic for the state (English & Calhoun, 1989). 
A good amount of political turmoil occurred in the state during the 1960s and 
education was not immune. Bellmon was elected on a promise of no new general tax 
increases for the state. Despite tax increases in individual areas, such as cigarettes and 
alcohol, Bellmon remained diligent to his promise (Baird & Goble, 1994). During 
Bellmon's first term, the teacher's union, the Oklahoma Education Association (OEA), 
demanded a $1,000 raise for every Oklahoma teacher. Without the ability to raise taxes, 
the legislation for the pay increase failed to make it through the legislature. In 
combination with the National Education Association, the OEA publicly proclaimed that 
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the state of Oklahoma's educational program was poor, and the state's refusal to address 
such issues was the cause for the state's rankings of 401h in the nation in per pupil 
spending and 37th in the nation in teacher pay (English & Calhoun, 1989). The state was 
"black-listed" again by the NEA and OEA in 1968 when Governor Bartlett vetoed 
legislation aimed at increasing salaries for state officials, including teachers, and 
providing for a statewide system for kindergarten (Baird & Goble, 1994). In 1969, 
however, the legislature passed, and Bartlett signed, a bill giving all teachers a $1,300 
raise. 
Another political nightmare characterized the state during the decade. The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court suffered terrible damage as a result of illegal activities by three 
of the justices. The Vice..,Chief of the Court, Nelson Com, was convicted of federal tax 
evasion in the early part of 1962. Two other Court justices fell soon after as Justice Com 
testified against them for accepting bribes. Justice Earl Welch resigned before 
impeachment proceedings had concluded. Justice N.B. Johnson was impeached from the 
Court. Both men were convicted of criminal charges in federal court (Duvall & Boeger, 
1985). 
Some major pieces of legislation were passed during the decade. After the 
Supreme Court was overtaken with scandal, the legislature addressed the court system in 
the state. The justice of the peace system was eliminated and a method for electing the 
judiciary, including the members of the Supreme Court, was created. Additionally, the 
legislature reapportioned the state for the election of its representatives. 
The Legislature re-considered the Oklahoma School Code that was created in 
almost twenty years later. In 1949, the State Department of Education was created and 
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declared the governing body of the public school system. In 1967, the Legislature re-
authorized the Oklahoma School Code and added emphasis to the role of the Department. 
Specifically, the Department was authorized to "adopt policies, rules, and regulations for 
the operation of the school system, provide for the formulation and adoption of curricula. 
and provide for the classification, inspection, and accreditation of all public schools" (70 
O.S. 1967, Section 1). In other words, the Department was given the legislative authority 
to interpret state laws and write regulations concerning the operation of all schools in the 
state. These regulations included all aspects of the operation of a school, including 
budgeting, accounting, curriculum, graduation requirements, teacher certification, student 
transfers, and the like. Power, along with the flow of state money to schools that began in 
the 1930' s (by the School Aid Law), was centralized by the state. 
Introduction of the Supreme Court Cases in the 1960s 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court heard thirty cases involving the public schools in 
the 1960s (See Appendix A, Tables XII & XIV). Issues addressed by the Court were: 
finance, district, personnel, and district v. district/other. 
Although all of these categories were represented in terms of litigation, little 
variation occurred in the cases in the 1960s. A few finance issues were adjudicated, 
including disagreements over the proper accounting methods used in completing the 
estimate of needs, the validity of paying a district's legal liability from a sinking fund 
levy, the liability of a school district paying for municipal road improvement bonds, and 
whether or not a school employee was entitled to workman's compensation. The sole 
personnel issue was a highly political one, and it involved the legality of an elected House 
of Representatives member receiving pay from the state as well as pay from a school 
district as a teacher. District issues litigated centered on three primary areas: school 
property, student transfers, and annexations. 
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The most significant case decided by the Court in the 1960s and possibly the most 
significant case decided by the Court was a case that fell outside of the above 
classifications, Oklahoma Farm Bureau v. State Board of Education (1968). Unique 
because it did not have a school district as the plaintiff or the defendant, the main impact 
of this case was it far-reaching implications for education in Oklahoma. The case 
determined the extent of the authority of the State Department of Education in accrediting 
school districts. 
The Court heard 30 cases, fewer than in any previous decades since the 1920s 
(See Appendix B, Figure 1 ). Eight cases addressed finance issues; nineteen cases decided 
issues concerning the operation, make-up, and organization of school districts; and each 
reviewed personnel law, decided an annexation issue between two school districts; and 
addressed the legitimacy of the State Department of Education in regulating Oklahoma's 
public schools. 
Oklahoma's public schools were successful in court as evidenced by school 
districts winning 71 percent of the cases. They were the plaintiffs in five of the 28 cases, 
and they won. School districts won four of the cases. 
Different from the 1930s when finance was the issue, specifically irregularities 
surrounding the filing and use of an estimate of needs, the 1960s was a decade of cases 
regarding student transfers (six cases) and annexations (nine cases), constituting 50 
percent of the educational issues considered by the Court. The remaining 50 percent 
addressed issues in similar numbers as in previous decades. 
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Despite the lack of diversity in types of cases or the number of cases heard by the 
court in the 1960s. s,:veral cases established important precedent in case law. Choctaw 
County Excise Board v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad (1969) addressed a finance 
issue of using a sinking fund levy to pay a judgment against a school district. As a 
district issue, Independent School District No. 4 v. State Board of Education (1969), 
decided whether or not an annexation was subject to laches. Also district issues relating 
to arguments over the interpretation of applicable statutes involving students transfers, 
Hines v. Independent School District No. 50, Grant County (1963), and the legality of 
busing parochial school students in public school buses, Board of Education of 
Independent School District No. 52 v. Antone (1963) were settled. A personnel issue 
involved the legality of a person receiving a teacher's salary and a Oklahoma House of 
Representatives member's salary simultaneously in State v. Board of Education of 
Dependent School District No. 38. 
Finance Issues 
Unlike in previous decades, school finance issues constituted only about a quarter 
of the cases decided by the Court. Districts were the defendants in seven of the eight 
cases. Most issues were settled in previous decades, and the opportunity for private 
protests to the estimates were reduced by the Court. 
The estimate of needs continued to be the most heavily litigated finance issue. 
Now the issues litigated more often than not concerned particular and fine points about a 
specific district's estimate of needs. In other words, these cases produced very little 
precedent while they settled the issue at hand. Other finance issues were liability in 
school vehicle accidents, liability of school districts in participating in municipal road 
bonds, issuing bonds approved by voters in a school district, the availability of 
workman's compensation for school district employees, and the legality of issuing a 
sinking fund levy to pay for a judgment against a school district. 
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Choctaw County Excise Board v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad, (1969) 
examined the appropriateness of a sinking fund levy issued by the Choctaw County 
Excise Board to satisfy a monetary judgment against the Choctaw School District. In this 
precedent-setting case, the St.Louis-San Francisco Railroad filed an appeal to prohibit the 
collection of a levy issued for the sinking fund. Prior to the appeal the District Court of 
Choctaw County ruled favorably for five petitioners for payment from the Choctaw 
School District for goods and services provided the district. As a consequence of the 
judgment, the excise board issued the levy to collect the required amount for payment 
from the sinking fund. 
The primary issue here was whether or not the sinking fund levy was appropriate 
considering that the school district did not appear in court to defend itself against the 
judgment. In other words, the judgment against the school district was a "default 
judgment." The Court found the judgment valid based on an analysis of what the Court 
considered a valid default judgment for a school district ( or other political subdivision of 
the state). In essence, the Court rationalized, that since the school district was properly 
summoned for the case, no appearance in court for a defense failed to rise to the need to 
negate the judgment. Secondly, the Court discerned that, at the time of the judgment, the 
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district court had before it the underlying facts of the case and heard evidence related to 
the case. The Court pointed out that the "judgment rolls in this case do not disclose that 
the judgment was rendered in consequence of the non-appearance of the defendant, but in 
consequence of the evidence presented." 
Applying the logic of the Court, the sinking fund levy was properly issued as the 
district court entered a proper judgment against the school district. This was done despite 
the failure of the school district to appear in court and after a proper summons was issued, 
the court heard evidence supporting the judgment, and the court had an understanding of 
the underlying facts. 
District Issues 
District issues constituted the largest percentage of cases heard by the Court 
during the 1960s. Sixty-three percent of the cases heard during the decade involved 
issues which surrounded the operation, functioning, and area of operation of school 
districts. School districts were the defendants in 89 percent of the cases in this area. 
Schools were the plaintiffs in only two of the cases. 
The most lit1gated issues in this area involved school annexations and student ~ 
transfers. During the three previous decades, conflicts over annexations were litigated 
frequently. Proportionately, the trend continued in the 1960s. The six student transfer 
cases litigated were the determination of legitimate title to school property, student 
bussing, and the right of a school district to close a school building. Important 
precedence was established by the court in the areas of annexations, student transfers, and 
student bussing. 
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Regarding school annexation, the Court determined the applicability of the legal 
requirement oflaches. In Independent School District No. 4 v. State Board of Education 
(1969), the Court heard an appeal by the Independent School District No. 4 to have an 
annexation order issued in 1949 set aside. That c.,rder split the district into two 
nonadjacent parts, both of which were separately annexed to other school districts. The 
school district desired to demonstrate that the original election held in relation to the 
annexation produced a result insufficient to approve the annexation. Since this was the 
case, the school district wanted its district re-instated according to its original 
configuration and status. 
The district court held that the result desired by the school district was not 
possible and denied the request, regardless of whether they were right or wrong about the 
actual annexation election. The Court was heavily persuaded in its decision by the fact 
that the area in question had been considered annexed to two other school districts for 
over 16 years - the State Treasurer, State Board of Education, the County Assessor, and 
the County Superintendent considered the area annexed to two other school districts in 
the sense that state aid, tax collections, school attendance zones, and estimates of needs 
had all been approved and put into effect for the area during the same period of time. As 
such, the Court reasoned that the theory of !aches was applicable to this case. According 
to the Court, 
the doctrine of laches is not ordinarily available against the government in 
respect to a public right;· however, in the public interest and on the ground 
of public policy, the state may be precluded from attacking the franchise of 
a municipal corporation on the ground of illegality in its incorporation 
where it has failed to raise the question for a considerable period of time. 
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In other words, the Court stipulated that the theory of laches did not apply to 
governmental agencies when the object was to protect a public policy or interest; rather, 
the theory of laches should not preclude "the enforcement of a public policy or interest." 
Concluding, the Court stated firmly that the ''plaintiff, by long acquiescence and 
continued recognition of the annexed area, [was] estopped from asserting an illegality of 
the 1949 election and annexation order of the Oklahoma State Board of Education." 
Hines v. Independent School District No. 50, Grant County (1963) examined 
student transfers. A student attended Dependent School District No. 21 in Grant County 
through the eighth grade which was the highest grade level offered by the school district. 
Then, the student applied for a transfer to Independent School District No. 20 in 
Caldwell, Kansas, a school district contiguous to Dependent District No. 21 offering a 
comprehensive high school but outside of Oklahoma. Independent School District No. 
50, also a contiguous district offering a comprehensive high school in Oklahoma, 
intervened and, through the Grant County Superintendent, denied the transfer request. 
The Grant County District Court sustained the decision to deny the transfer. 
In the appeal the plaintiff asserted that the applicable statutes in the case, O.S. 70 
1961, Sections 1-3, allowed for the approval of the transfer request and the decision to 
deny the transfer was an abuse of discretionary power. The law read as follows: 
1. A student residing in a school district that does not offer a grade in which 
the student is entitled to pursue was entitled to transfer to district that 
offered the grade level needed. Along with the transfer, the sending 
district was required to send to the receiving district the ordinary per capita 
student cost of the sending district. 
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2. A student desiring a transfer to a district in the state applied for the transfer 
to the county superintendent; those desiring transfers out of the state 
applied to the State Board of Education. An appeal procedure was 
provided for transfers denied by the County Superintendent. No appeal 
was provided for those denied by the State Board of Education. 
3. A student transfer could be approved by the State Board of Education, the 
sending district, and the receiving district if the transfer was determined to 
be in the best interest of the child. 
In its decision, the Court found that the transfer was denied because of a 
consistent application of a policy to not approve out of state transfers. The applicable 
statute required that the "best interest of the child" should control the decision for or 
against approval. Using a policy of blanket denials negated the statute. 
The use of a policy of blanket denials, reasoned the Court, was an abuse of 
discretionary power. In most circumstances the Court has not interfered with the exercise 
of discretionary power, especially in cases where such was provided to schools or state 
agencies by legislation. However, when the use of discretionary power was unreasonable, 
the Court must intervene. Specifically, the Court noted: 
As a general rule, where public officials are entrusted with discretionary 
power in certain matters, an exercise of such discretion will not be 
controlled by injunction, but injunction may be issued in a case of a gross 
abuse of discretion, where it appears that such action was exercised on 
grounds or for reasons clearly untenable, or to an extent clearly 
unreasonable. 
The logic of the Court concluded that the decision to deny the transfer was inappropriate 
because the best interest of the child was not considered. Specifically, the Court 
remarked that "the refusal to approve the transfer was clearly ... unreasonable and a 
manifest abuse of discretion." 
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The final district issues case produced an important precedent for the 
transportation practices of a school district. Could a public school district providing 
transportation to and from school to parochial school students? In Board of Education of 
Independent School District No. 52 v. Antone (1963), students attending a local parochial 
school were provided daily transportation by the public school district to attend a 
parochial school. 
In this case a resident taxpayer of the No. 52 School District, Mr. Antone, filed for 
an injunction in the district court to prevent the school district from continuing the 
practice of bussing 175 parochial school students. The district court granted the 
permanent injunction, and the school district appealed to the Court. 
The case involved the Midwest City School District, and the action against the 
district named the individual board of education members as well as the superintendent as 
defendants. The parochial students riding the school busses attended the St. Phillips Neri 
Parochial School. According to testimony, St. Phillips was a private school that received 
no public funding, and at least part of its curriculum included the practice of religion. In 
addition, the school conducted Mass each morning. 
The primary legal argument was that the "public school owned and operated 
school buses purchased with pu~lic funds collected through Federal, State, and Local 
taxes, and the transporting of students of the privately owned Catholic school constituted 
a violation of the State Constitution." The applicable section of the State Constitution, 
Article II, Section 5, stated that ... 
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, 
or used directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, 
church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the sue, benefit, or 
support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or 
dignitary, or sectarian institution as such. 
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The school district provided several arguments in their defens,~. First, the transportation 
was provided for the public welfare of the community and ~id not change the existing bus 
routes or otherwise create an additional expense for the school district. It was noted by 
the Court that this suggestion was based upon the argument that funds generated by taxes 
could be legally justified if the purpose of the expenditure was for the general welfare of 
the entire community and not for the singular purpose of aiding, supporting, or helping 
any religious institution. Furthermore, the school district argued that providing for the 
needy and providing for the transportation of students to school should not be regulated 
based on the question of whether or not such particularly aids a religion or a religious 
purpose. The consideration should be whether or not the purpose of the transportation 
provided for the •'general welfare of the community." 
In its decision, the Court did not accept the school district's arguments. 
Accordingly, the Court stipulated that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
the history of its creation did not match with the entanglement of public school resources 
with students attending a private, religious school. In its final analysis, the Court 
reasoned that the State Constitutional provision stipulated in this case prohibited the 
bussing plan of the Midwest City School District. The Court stated ... 
The law leaves to every man the right to entertain views as appeal to his 
individual conscience, and to provide for the religious instruction and 
training of his own children to the extent and in the manner he deems 
essential or desirable. When he chooses to seek for them educational 
facilities which provide secular and religious instruction, he is faced with 
the necessity of assuming the financial burden which that choice entails: 
Despite the rationale used or legal arguments posed, the Court agreed that the final and 
only determination in this case was a simple reading of the State Constitution. 
Personnel Issues 
Just one case involving a personnel issue was litigated in the Court during the 
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1960s. Despite only one case, the Court created important precedence. In State v. Board 
of Education of Dependent School District No. 38 (1964), the Court considered the 
legality of a teacher receiving a salary from a district and a salary from the state as an 
elected member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives simultaneously. The Court 
agreed to assume original jurisdiction since it posed "an important public question" to the 
state. 
The plaintiff, Mr. Garfield Settles taught in School District No. 38 of McCurtain 
during the 1963-64 school year. During that fiscal year, ending July 1964, Mr. Settles 
was also a member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives. The district refused to 
honor the salary stipulations of his teaching contract and did not pay him for his services 
for the school year. As a result, Mr. Settles, joined by the state, filed suit against the 
school district for a writ of mandamus directed to compel the school district to pay Mr. 
Settles the complete monetary value of his contract with the school district. 
At issue were two legal problems associated with the school district paying the 
teacher's salary. The first was an applicable section of the Oklahoma Constitution, 
Article V, Section 23. The section ofthe Constitution stipulated that 
no member of the Legislature shall, during the term for which he shall 
have been elected, or within two years there after, be interested, directly or 
indirectly, in any contract with the State, or any county or other 
subdivision thereof, authorized by law passed during the term for which he 
shall have been elected. 
The school district proposed that this section of the Constitution was applicable to Mr. 
Settles' salary as the 1963 Legislature, of which Mr. Settles was a voting member, 
appropriated support to the public schools of the state. School District No. 38 received 
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part of the appropriated funds through the state aid formula. Secondly, in October 1963, 
the Oklahoma Attorney General issued an official opinion on the issue of a teacher who is 
also a member of the legislature receiving compensation from a school district. The 
Attorney General determined that "no member of the legislature may receive 
compensation out of the general fund of any school district to which there has been 
apportioned by the State Board of Education out of appropriated funds any sum of money 
as state aid." It was soon after the publication of the Attorney General's opinion that the 
school district decided not to pay Mr. Settles according to the terms of his contract. 
Mr. Settles made the contention that he did not contract with the state to teach 
school. Rather, he contracted with the board of education, and the board of education 
would pay him the amount of his contract whether not state aid was received by the 
district. The Court argued that this was impractical as the revenue generated by the 
school district absent state aid would not have paid half of his salary much less any other 
staff member of the school. Furthermore, the Court noted that 70 O.S. 1961, Section 18 
provided that a school district was not obligated to fulfill the monetary portions of a 
teacher contract if appropriations from the state were not sufficient to meet the minimum 
salary program of the school district. In other words, Mr. Settle's salary and his contract 
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were directly related to the actions of the government. This fact, argued the Court, made 
Mr. Settle' s contract in violation of the law and would force the Court to find in favor of 
the school district. 
In its decision, the Court reasoned a way to both uphold the law of the state yet 
reach a solution based on practice in the state. It was noted. that since statehood it had 
been a common practice for teachers to serve in the state legislators at the same time they 
were being paid as teachers. Specifically the Court noted that ... 
While we are not bound to follow legislative and departmental 
constructions of constitutional provisions, justice will not permit us to 
ignore ... interpretations to the detriment of those who may have relied 
thereon. Accordingly our order must render justice as between the parties, 
and it should avoid confusion and disorder in those districts which have 
employed Legislator-teachers during the current school term. A writ of 
mandamus must be granted ... to avoid confusion and disorder. 
With this the Court upheld the writ and ordered the school district to pay the legislator 
according to his contract, and, by effect of the decision, ordered all other school districts 
in the state similarly situated to do the same. The Court did not end its decision with this 
as the final conclusion, however. The conclusion of the Court was to hold-harmless those 
teacher-legislators during the current school term and the succeeding school terms so to 
not "cause disorder." Thereafter, the plain language of the Constitution and the opinion 
of the Attorney General would guide this issue. The Court would not condone the 
practice of paying active members of the legislature who were also employed as school 
teachers and paid from school district funds. 
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Other Issues 
The primary purpose of the State Department, created in 194 7, was to carry out 
the regulations of the State Board of Education and enforce the statutory provisions of the 
legislature. The case, Oklahoma Farm Bureau v. State Board of Education (1968) 
challenged the constitutional grounds for the regulatory function and the legitimacy of 
actions taken by the State Department. A victory by the State Farm Bureau in this case 
would have changed the nature of the oversight available to the state in education and 
eliminated the supervisory function of the State Department of Education and the State 
Board of Education. The significance of this case was great as it firmly established the 
legal legitimacy of the role of the State Department in its regulatory function for the state. 
The context of this case was not only legal. Political, social, and economic factors 
lead to the legal battle that brought this case to the Court. From statehood through early 
1940s the number of school districts was an issue. The political and social factors 
involved in this fact were obvious. Local communities, whether incorporated or not, 
wanted local schools for their children to attend. A plethora of these schools were very 
small with an over-all attendance of less than 15 students in kindergarten or first grade 
through 8™ (for dependent districts) or 12™ grade (for independent districts). The 
economic factor in this situation was likewise obvious. Such a system of education was 
very expensive, especially in terms ofcapital projects such as buildings and personnel 
costs with very small class sizes and administrative costs. 
Beginning with the passage of the Oklahoma School Code in 194 7, the legislature 
installed requirements for the disorganization, annexation, and involuntary closing of 
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school districts, requirements that were amended twice in 1961 and 1967 and prior to 
Oklahoma Farm Bureau. The state expressed a need to reduce the number of highly 
expensive school districts in the legislation. Social and political forces were not 
necessarily supportive. especially in local communities. The Supreme Court solved the 
legal issues, however. 
The Court agreed to assume original jurisdiction in this case for two reasons. The 
first was that the "exigent situation invoke[ d] a need for determination of matters 
essentially publici juris, wherein it is presumed that the exercise of regulatory powers not 
granted by law are exercised." The legality of the State Department of Education to 
exercise regulatory power was questioned. Secondly, the Court rationalized that the issue 
presented would continue to be an issue of public interest and turmoil if not immediately 
addressed by the Court. 
In this case, the specific issue was whether or not the State Constitution and 
applicable statutes authorized the State Department of Education to withhold school 
accreditation on the basis of a school's failure to comply with or meet the rudiments of 
accreditation standards. In October of the 1968..:69 school year; the Department of 
Education issued its new set of accreditation standards. One of the standards required an 
average daily attendance of 15 students in the district's high school for it to receive 
accreditation (and therefore remain open as a school). The plaintiff in the case stipulated 
that the State Department could not issue a regulation that contradicted existing statutes 
concerning school standards or the State Constitution. 
In its final analysis, the Court reasoned that the State Constitution clearly provided 
for the regulatory function of the State Department through the State Board of Education. 
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Specifically, Article XIII, Section 5 provided that the "supervision of public school 
instruction [was] vested in the State Board of Education under [the] powers and duties 
prescribed by law. Despite the apparent confusion on the issue, the Court also stipulated 
and provided clarity by stipulating the supp(,rting statutes. The Court quoted 70 O.S. 
Sections 2A-4 as the supporting legislation required by the Constitution. In this statute 
the State Department of Education, through the State Board of Education, was authorized 
to: 
make rules and regulations for the classification, supervision, and 
accrediting of all public nursery, kindergarten, elementary, and secondary 
schools in the State. 
With this decision the Court closed the door on attacks on the State Department's 
regulatory power, even when it's regulatory power closed the doors of a school. New 
legislation later effectivelyreduced this power, however. 
CHAPTER VI 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASE LAW 
REGARDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS: REVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS FOR THE 1970s 
Introduction 
Politics in the state during the 1970s were mixed with corruption and the election 
and tenure of some of the most influential public officials in the state's history. After 
winning election to the House of Representatives 1946 and serving continuously, Carl 
Albert was named Speaker of the House in 1971. He retired in 1972 at the end of his 
current term and did not seek re-election. David Hall,·a Democrat, replaced the 
Republican Dewey Bartlett as Governor in 1971. Governor Bartlett was the second 
Republican Governor in the state, and, despite the change in the state's constitution in 
1968 providing for two consecutive terms as a governor, Bartlett was the first to lose such 
an opportunity. David Hall served one term as governor and began serving a prison term 
four days after leaving office for bribery (English & Calhoun, 1989). David Boren 
replaced Hall as Governor in 1975. After winning election to the U.S. Senate, Boren left 
office five days before the end of his term. George Nigh replaced Boren as Governor, 
finishing the five days ofBoren's term and winning two terms afterward. 
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In terms of Legislation, the 1970s proved to be a decade of abundance for new 
laws affecting education. Two laws created in the late 1970s influenced education and 
the Court, in particular. In 1978, the Governmental Tort Claims Act (known originally as 
the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act - 51 O.S. Supp. 1978, Section 151) provided 
the framework for which all of the state's agencies, including schools, could be sued for 
torts. The Act provided for immunity in some respects and provided the areas in which 
the state's agencies were liable. Subsequent to an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in 
1983, the legislature amended the Tort Claims Act to include the state's liability. 
Secondly, new legislation was created concerning teacher tenure and the process 
of non-renewing and terminating teachers. Prior to the legislation, most issues of teacher 
dismissal were directed to the Professional Practices Commission. The State Board of 
Education had also created policies for appeals in teacher dismissal. The Teacher 
Dismissal Act of 1977 (70 O.S. 1977, Section 6), however, provided a statutory 
framework for teacher dismissal and for issues to be addressed by the Court. 
Introduction of the Supreme Court Cases in the 1970s 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court heard 42 cases involving Oklahoma's public 
schools during the decade (See Appendix A, Tables XVII & XVIII). These cases were 
categorized into four categories according to the primary issues in each of the cases: 
finance, district, personnel, and district v. district/other. 
The cases involving finance included issues such as the legitimacy of bond 
elections and proceeds, the proper role of trust funds as applied to school districts, the 
liability of insurance companies in school-related accidents, and compliance issues with 
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the competitive bidding requirements. School district issues adjudicated included student 
transfer requirements, collective bargaining and teacher professional organization 
elections, student dress codes, use of school buildings by non-school employees, the use 
of a fact-finding chair in teacher association and administrative conflicts, annexation 
issues, and school accreditation. Personnel issues adjudicated included non:-tenured and 
tenured teacher nonrenewals and terminations, and superintendent's contracts. In cases 
that involved school districts as the plaintiff and defendant, issues such as annexation, 
student transfers, and the control of the annexed district and its finances were adjudicated. 
In terms if winning and losing in the Court, school districts were highly successful 
in the 1970s. Of the 38 cases involving public schools as the plaintiff or defendant, the 
schools won 27 (71 percent) of the cases (See Appendix A, Tables XIX & XX). School 
districts were the plaintiffs in 15 of the cases and the defendants in 23 of the cases. As 
the plaintiffs, school districts won 73 percent of the time. As the defendants, school 
districts won their cases 69 percent of the _time, losing only seven of the 23 cases. 
Finance Issues 
Comp~ed to previous decades, the number of cases involving finance issues 
decreased in the 1970s. Only seven of the cases concerned a finance issue. School 
districts were the plaintiffs in three of the cases and the defendants the other four. 
Different finance issues were adjudicated (See Appendix A, Table XVIII): school 
district insurance claims, the apportionment of federal funds to local school districts, the 
approval of bond fund elections and proceeds, the regulations surrounding the 
competitive bidding process, and the legitimacy of a charitable trust. Two of the issues 
were important cases for the Court. First was the Public Competitive Bidding Act (61 
O.S. 1971, Sections 1-2 and 61 O.S. 1974, Section 113) and the second concerned the 
legitimate allocation of bond funds for specific purposes. 
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In Haskell Lemon Construction v. Independent School District No. 12 of Edmond 
(1979), the Court addressed for the first time the Public Competitive Bidding Act as it 
related to a public school. The Haskell Lemon Construction Company filed suit to recoup 
over $10,000 lost to a contractor on a school district project. The contractor, the McBride 
Paving Company, failed to complete a project it had begun for the school district through 
the Haskell Lemon Construction Company. The lower court sided with the school district 
and the Haskell Company appealed to the Court. According to the Haskell Company, the 
failure of the school district to require the Haskell Company to provide to the district a 
statutory payment bond after winning the project bid released them from any obligations. 
As the project started, the Haskell Company provided the McBride Company 
supplies and materials for the project. Before completing the project, the McBride 
Company ran short of money and filed for bankruptcy. In court, the McBride Company 
was relieved of the debt of its contract with the Haskell Company. In the meantime, 
another contractor company was selected to complete the school building contract. Upon 
the completion of the project, the Haskell Company was not reimbursed for its costs. 
The individual members of the board of education were named as defendants as 
they were said to have failed in_ their duty in that they did not require the McBride 
Company to post a bond. The superintendent was likewise named as a defendant as he 
had promised payment to the Haskell Company from money remaining to be paid the 
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McBride Company. Instead, the money remaining was paid to the Vibra Whirl Company 
for completing the work. 
In its decision, the Court found that neither the board of education nor the 
superintendent was liable for the money lost by the Haskell Company. Relating to the 
board of education, the Court reasoned that ... 
the statutory payment bond was for the protection of the materialmen 
furnishing materials to public contractors, and to allow the [public entity] 
to make settlement with such contractor without becoming embarrassed 
by, or involved in, the multitude of small disputes which might arise 
between the contractor and his own creditors. The fundamental purpose of 
the statute is to save the public from all liability for liens for material and 
labor furnished on public improvements. 
The Court further explained that while the statute requires the contractor to provide a 
bond before beginning a public project, the failure of the contractor to do so does not 
mean that the school district becomes liable for the failure. In a terse statement the Court 
held ... 
that one who furnishes materials to a contractor which are used for the 
construction of public projects is charged with the knowledge of the 
statutory duty of the contractor to give a bond pursuant to [the law]. Ifhe 
furnishes such contractor materials before the bond is given, he does so at 
his own peril, and if he sustains a loss he cannot recover damages from the 
public entity because the proximate cause of the loss is his own negligence 
in not ascertaining whether the statutory payment bond had been given. 
The Court also found in favor of the superintendent regarding liability for the lack 
of a bond. It was argued that the superintendent was liable for payment to the Haskell 
Company as he made oral assurances to the company that they would be paid. Rather 
succinctly, the Court rejected this argument with the application of two statutes. The 
Court stated that according to 70 O.S. Section 117 the "superintendent [has] no authority 
to bind the school district by his assurances as the school board is the sole repository of 
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such authority. In other words, the board has the sole authority to obligate school 
money." Secondly, the Court noted that the "oral promises or contracts (by the 
superintendent) are invalid unless reduced to writing and subscribed by the party charged 
as stipulated by 15 O.S. Section 136.'' In other words. only the board of education can 
agree to a binding contract, and the contract must be written. 
In the second important case in the area of finance, In Re Application of Board of 
Education of Western Heights Independent School District ( 1977), the Court considered 
the constitutionality of a bond election and the sale of the bonds as such related to state 
law, specifically 62 O.S. 1976, Section 571, the Oklahoma Bond Issue Proceeds Act. 
This statute required a school district to post in public notices and on the election ballot 
each building use of the bond money as well as an assurance that at least seventy percent 
of the bond proceeds would be used for the listed purposes. 
The Western Heights Board of Education officially called for a bond election in a 
board meeting in October 1976. The Oklahoma Bond Issue Proceeds Act became 
effective on January 1, 1977. The actual bond election was held in March 1977 and 
central question in this case became whether or not it was legal, constitutionally, for the 
school district to sell the bonds, collect the proceeds, and expend the money on the 
projects. 
The Court found in favor of the school district. While certifying the 
constitutionality of the Oklahoma Bond Issue Proceeds Act, the Court maintained that, 
since the Western Heights Board of Education officially called for a bond election prior to 
the effective date of the Act, the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the bond 
issue. Specifically, the Court reasoned that Article V, Section 54 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution was applicable in this case. Section 54 states: 
Repeal of statute - Effect - The repeal of a statute shall not revive a statute 
previously repealed by such statute, nor shall such repeal affect any 
accrued right, or penalty incurred, or proceedings begun by virtue of such 
repealed statute. 
The most important part of Section 54, according to the Court, was the phrase 
"proceedings begun." The act of calling for a bond election by a school board is an 
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official act and one required for a bond election to take place. As this was the case, the 
Court noted that the bond issue, the election, and the proceeds and expenditure phases of 
school bonds fell under the law prior to the passage of the Oklahoma Bond Issue 
Proceeds Act. This fact alone made the process used by the Board valid. 
District Issues 
District issues were the most litigated in the 1970s. Twenty of the 42 (47 percent) 
cases adjudicated in the Court involved a district issue. School districts were the 
plaintiffs in eight of the cases and the defendants in the remaining 12. 
As in previous decades this category of cases involved a variety of issues: student 
transfers, accreditation of schools, school annexations, workers compensation and death 
benefits issues, teacher organization and school district negotiations, use of school 
buildings, and student dress codes. 
Three cases in this area of litigation produced important precedents. Hennessey v. 
Independent School District No. 4 (1976) addressed whether an organization not under 
the authority of the school district could use the district's facilities to conduct meetings. 
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The school denied access to the school facilities by the Parent-Teacher Association 
(PTA). Independent School District Number 8 of Seiling v. Swanson (1976) considered 
the legality of a school district's dress code. Specifically, the Court considered whether 
or not a school district could require a predetermined length of hair allowed for students 
to wear at school. And, Association of Classroom Teacher;s v. Independent School 
District No. 89 (1975), decided the correct course of action for deciding the chair of a 
negotiating impasse committee when agreement on the chair could not be reached 
between the school and the teacher association. 
At issue in the Hennessey case was whether or not the Hennessey PT A could 
legally use school facilities for its meetings and activities. Enacted in 1971, 70 O.S. 
1971, Sections 5-130, stipulated: 
The board of education of any school district may, under such regulations 
and conditions as it may prescribe, open any school building and permit 
the use of any property belonging to such district for religious, political, 
literary, cultural, scientific, mechanical or agricultural purposes, and other 
purposes· of general public interest and may make a reasonable charge to 
cover the cost of the use of such building and property. 
By affirmation, the legislation gave school districts the legal means to open up its 
property to non school purposes. 
The crux of the problem was the school district allowed other non-school 
organizations to use its facilities but did not allow the PTA such use. For example, the 
4-H Club, the Boy Scouts, Bible Lovers' League, Lions Club, and others were allowed 
access to school facilities. As a matter of practice, the request for use of the facilities by 
all organizations was made to and approved by, the superintendent. No requests prior to 
the PT A's had gone to the board of education. The PTA made several applications for 
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use of the school's facilities to the board of education. On each application, the request 
was denied. Even with use of the school's facilities by many organizations, the PTA had 
been the only organization denied access. After the first request by the PTA was denied, 
the board adopted the follov:ing facilities use policy: 
The Wellston School Board will not tolerate nor continue affiliation with 
any organization that it determines to be disruptive to or unsupportive of 
the school board or any part of the school system. The Wellston School 
Board of Education reserves the legal right under state law to, at any time, 
discontinue any affiliation it might have with any outside organization and 
refuse the use of school property when it should possibly determine such 
actions are warranted. Organizations as whole or organizations that allow 
their members to carry on in a fashion that attempts to exercise school 
board or administrative authority or interfere with the authority, exploit 
school children for personal gain, deal in personalities, or engage in 
frequent criticisms against the school system and the school personnel in 
particular, will not be tolerated and the use of school property by such 
organizations will be discontinued, and the school board will withdraw its 
approval of affiliation with such organizations. 
In addition to the above policy, the board adopted a form, to be completed by applicants. 
That stated the board's policy on use of the school's facilities. Signature of the applicant 
promised compliance with the policy. 
The Court found in favor of the PT A and against the school district for several 
reasons. The first and most obvious was that no evidence was presented that the PT A 
violated the policy. There was no evidence presented or statement by the board when it 
denied the use of the school that the PTA was unsupportive of the school system. More 
precisely, the superintendent of the district testified that he knew of no incident which 
could point out the PTA as unsupportive of the board or would be in violation of the 
policy. In evidence was the fact that the PT A had been very supportive of the school 
system and had sponsored many worthwhile activities for the students of the school 
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district. The only evidence found for the reason the board denied the request was that the 
teachers voted and a majority indicated thatthey had no interest in joining the PTA. 
Though supported by state and national organizations, the PTA carried no rule that 
required the membership of teachers for the local unit to be recognized. 
Additionally, the Court found that the other grounds in favor of the PTA are 
constitutional. Specifically, the Court found the policy of the board to be in violation of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as the policy violated freedom of speech and 
denied equal protection. Likewise, such a policy was in violation of the Oklahoma 
Constitution, Article II, Section 22. The Court noted that ... 
A regulation by a governmental body such as a school board which 
permits a public official or body to determine what expressions or views 
will be permitted or allows the board to engage in invidious discrimination 
among groups by sue of a statue granting discretionary powers and by a 
system of selective enforcement cannot stand. A government body may 
not restrict expressive activity because of its message. Board as 
instrumentality of state may not restrict speech simply because its find vies 
expressed by any group abhorrent. 
It was abundantly clear that the board's policy violated the law. The Court saw no avenue 
where the district's policy could pass the muster of the Court or constitutional tests. On 
the other hand, the Court stipulated that the statute, 70 O.S. 1971, Sections 5-130, was 
not in itself unconstitutional. In defense of the statute, the Court noted that: 
There is no doubt [the statute] gives the Board absolute discretionary 
authority as to whether or not to open a school building to activities and 
meetings of outside organizations. The only absolute discretion exercised 
however is whether to open the building to outside organizations or not to 
open it. Once the discretion has been exercised and the decision has been 
made to permit the use of property for any of the enumerated purposes, 
this it must not adopt a discriminatory and unconstitutional policy as to 
who will be allowed access to its facilities. 
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In a succinct fashion, the Court found that schools must decide to open their doors to 
outside organizations or not. Once the decision is made to open the doors, discretionary 
decisions as to allow access, certainly ones based on the message or opinions of the 
organization are violations of the law. 
The second precedent-setting case in this area, Independent School District No. 8 
of Seiling v. Swanson (1976), involved the dress code of Seiling Public Schools. Four 
students, all boys, were told by their principal that if they did not cut their hair to conform 
to the dress code within the succeeding five days, they would be suspended from school. 
In response to the upcoming suspension, the parents of the students requested and were 
granted a restraining order in the district court. The school district, in response, filed an 
appeal in the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Upon granting the appeal, the Court remanded 
the case to the district judge with directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing, make 
findings of fact, and report back to the Court. The district court judge did so and issued a 
permanent restraining order against the school district, thus ordering the school district to 
not suspend the students for violation of the hair length portion of the dress code. The 
school district responded by asking for a writ of mandamus with the Court. 
At the heart of the case was the dress code adopted by the Seiling Board of 
Education. As approved by the Board, the hair portion of the dress code for boys required 
that their "hair must be above the eyebrows, collars, and ears." In addition "their hair 
must be well-groomed at all times and their sideburns must be no longer than the bottom 
of their earlobes." 
The central issue addressed by the Court in this case was whether or not the 
school board "acted beyond the proper scope of the statutory power granted that board to 
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adopt regulations governing student behavior." In other words, the Court was very 
concerned with the relationship of the rules school boards adopted to its statutory 
function. Schools were granted the authority to adopt rules, including disciplinary codes 
and dress codes, that promoted and provided a reasonahlc connection to the educational 
function of the school. The rule-making function of the board was for the purpose of 
making rules that promoted its educational goals. 
The Court analyzed the dichotomy of what brings a student to school and the role 
of the school in providing disciplinary rules. On one side, students are required to be 
provided a free public education, as described in Article XIII of the Oklahoma 
Constitution. Children are required to attend school, as provided by the compulsory 
attendance statute, cited as 70 O.S. 1975, Section 10. While this is the case, the Court 
noted that a student's right to remain in school was not absolute. In a poignant statement, 
the Court noted that "any rule which would exclude [the student from school] must exist 
for a reasonable and necessary purpose." 
In making its decision, the Court relied heavily on the actual transcripts of the 
lower court's fact-finding mission. In the transcripts, the Court found that the students in 
question made good grades and had no history of inappropriate conduct at school. When 
asked whether or not the students felt their hair length impacted their learning, the answer 
was in the negative. The school failed to provide any evidence which demonstrated a 
connection between length of hair and learning. The school district also failed to 
demonstrate whether or not the student's hair length disrupted the learning of any other 
students at the school. As a summary, the Court wrote: 
The evidence showed that they were good students and that aside from 
hair code problems, they had not been involved in any disciplinary actions. 
The length of their hair had no effect on their desire or ability to learn and 
it did not have any effect on the learning processes of the other students. 
The length of their hair did not disrupt other students and, in fact, the only 
hair related disruption problems in the school came about from the 
enforcement of the code. 
Expert testimony from a clinical psychologist provided that no known relationship 
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between hair length and learning existed. In a damning statement, an administrator from 
another school district testified that his school "abandoned its hair code as the atmosphere 
created by its enforcement caused the school to resemble a police state more than a 
learning institution." 
Notwithstanding any constitutional protection of hair length, such as a speech or 
property right, as may have been argued and decided in this case, the Court relied on a 
· rather "nonconventional" means at arriving at a decision. While the Court did apply the 
facts in this case to law, it more precisely made an argument and rationalized a 
relationship between the state, the school and the student and the parent. As noted, the 
board has the legislated authority to make rules which support the learning function of the 
school. The Court rationalized in this case that the board failed to make a connection 
between it "hair rule" and the learning function of the school. In summation, the Court 
wrote: 
It is clear that the rights and interests of students and their parents are not 
absolute and that at times the very nature of our pubic school system 
demands that their interests yield to the authority of the school board. It is 
equally clear that the scope of the school board's power is not unrestricted. 
Only through the existence of a reasonable connection between the rule 
and a proper purpose of the educational function of the school can a 
balance of these competing interests be achieved. This necessary balance 
is one which will preserve the important rights of children and their 
parents, while recognizing the very real need of schools to have and 
enforce rules that insure proper discipline, efficiency, and well-being. 
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The last case for discussion in the area of district issues, Association of Classroom 
Teachers v. Independent School District No. 89 (1975), was important for two reasons. 
The issue was addressed for the first time, and the decision produced important 
precedent. In 1971, the Oklahoma Legislature formally addressed the issue of teacher 
association negotiations with school boards in 70 O.S. 1971, Section 590. To some 
degree, negotiations with school boards by teacher associations were not new to the 
1970s, but the level of the negotiations began to rise. The legislation enacted attempted 
to formalize the process. In the 1970s four Oklahoma Supreme Court cases were heard 
surrounding the issue of teacher association and school board negotiations. All of the 
cases required the Court to review the statute, 70 O.S., Section 509. The case discussed 
below was the most provocative as it required the Court to not only interpret the statute, 
but also rule on the internal negotiations agreement between the teacher association and 
the school board. 
In this instance the teacher association asked the Court to assume original 
jurisdiction and the Court agreed as it saw the outcome influencing the actions of many 
school districts. The impasse at question was holding up the contracts of over 1,000 
teachers in the Oklahoma City School District as well as the budgeting process of the 
Oklahoma City School Board. The Association of Classroom Teachers and the 
Oklahoma City School Board had reached impasse in their negotiations. As provided by 
statute, 70 O.S. 1971, Section 590 and the district's negotiations agreement, a committee 
was appointed to address the impasse. Both the board and the teacher association 
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members of the committee were selected. The problem was created when the two 
selected members of the committee could not agree on the third member and chair of the 
committee, as was required of them by statute and the negotiations agreement. 
At the heart of this case was the statute to formalize the negotiations process 
between teacher associations and school boards. 70 O.S. 1971, Section 509.7 read as 
follows: 
A procedure for resolving impasses will be developed by the Board of 
Education and the representatives of the professional or non-professional 
organization; if agreement cannot be reached, the items causing the 
impasse shall be referred to a three-member committee. This committee 
shall consist of one member selected by the representatives of the 
professional organization or the nonprofessional organization as the case 
might be, one member selected by the local board of education and the 
third member selected by the first two members, and this third member 
shall serve as chairman of the committee. This committee shall meet with 
the board of education or its duly designated representatives and the duly 
designated representatives of the professional or nonprofessional 
organization for the purpose of fact finding. Subsequently, this committee 
shall make recommendations to each of the above parties. 
The negotiations agreement in the district stipulated the process of selecting the 
third member of the impasse committee further and more precisely than did the statute. 
Per the negotiations agreement, the third member of the committee was selected as 
follows: 
Within ten (10) days of the call for fact-finding, a neutral advisory 
committee of three (3) persons shall be selected. The Board shall 
designate one member of said advisory committee, the Association shall 
select one member, and the two advisory members so selected shall then 
select a third member who shall become the chairperson of the committee. 
This third member may be selected from a list provided by the American 
Arbitration Association. 
Clearly, the statute and the negotiations agreement did not read the same. 
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The teacher association desired that the third member of the committee come from 
the list provided by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The school district 
wanted the third member to be a "prominent" citizen of Oklahoma City. The Oklahoma 
City School Board refused to consider anyone from the AAA list as th~ Board considered 
the wording of the negotiations agreement as "permissive rather than imperative." 
In a rather lengthy opinion, the Court first considered whether or not the board 
and the teacher association had complied with the statute. In essence; the Court found 
that such had been accomplished through the negotiations agreement in that both parties 
had agreed to a process to satisfy the statute. The negotiated agreement, while satisfying 
the statute, presented a new problem in itself. 
To best interpret and decide on the meaning of the negotiations agreement, the 
Court focused on the word "may" used to describe the appointment of a third member 
from a list provided by the AAA. The Court cited Black's Law Dictionary for a 
definition of "may." According to Black's, the Court wrote, 
Regardless of the instrument, whether constitution, statute, deed, contract, 
or whatnot, courts not infrequently construe "may" as "shall" or "must" to 
the end that justice may not be the slave of grammar. 
In other words, the Court considered the word "may" synonymous with "shall" in this 
context. 
In the application of this definition, the Court concluded that the Board and the 
teacher association both made ... 
mandatory the selection of one member of the tripartite fact-finding 
committee by each of the parties to the agreement and a mandatory duty is 
imposed upon the two appointees to select a third member. The parties to 
this action, recognizing this legal obligation, mutually agreed in writing 
that the third member "may" be selected from a list provided by the AAA. 
The clear intent of the parties had to be that in the event a third fact finder 
could not be agreed upon, resort be had to the American Arbitration 
Association for selection of the neutral. 
While the Court recognized that the essence of the statute was addressed in the 
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negotiations agre-~ment, the Board and the teacher association failed to agree on the bases 
of getting past an impasse. The Court recognized that the statute failed to stipulate a 
process for selecting the third member of the committee, but also noted that the 
negotiations agreement intended to provide for a process should difficulties in the 
selection occur. In the end, the only definition of the word "may" that could resolve the 
issue was used. 
Personnel Issues 
Eleven of the 42 cases involved a personnel issue (See Appendix A, Table XIX). 
School districts were the defendants in eight of the cases and the plaintiffs in three of the 
cases. 
Eight of the cases heard considered the legality of teacher dismissals (See 
Appendix A, Table XVIII). While remaining three cases addressed issues such as salary 
of county superintendents and whether or not an employee paid out of activity funds was 
eligible for injury benefits. The teacher dismissal cases litigated issues such as the 
Professional Practices Commission, the Open Meetings Act, procedural due process in 
non-renewal and termination of a teacher, the meaning of a tenure teacher, and whether or 
not it made a difference in tenure status if a teacher taught half-time and was paid with 
federal funds. 
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Three cases in particular produced important precedent in the area of personnel 
issues. Oldham v. Drummond Board of Education oflndependent School District No. 
I-85 (1975) considered the relationship of a teacher's non-renewal with compliance of 
the Open Meeting Law by the Board of Education. Independent School District No. 10 of 
Seminole County v. Lollar (1976) addressed the relationship of a half-tinie teacher who 
was employed by an annexed district for part of his tenure. And, Cavett v. Geary Board 
of Education (1978), determined whether or not the State Board of Education had any 
authority in hearing an appeal concerning a fired superintendent. 
The Oldham case was as much a case concerning the Open Meetings Law as it 
was a case about a teacher termination. During the 1973-74 school year, Oldham was 
employed by the school district as a teacher. In the March 1974 board of education 
meeting, the board voted without roll call or a written record ofhowthe members voted 
to not re-new Oldham's contract for the 1974-75 school year. Oldham filed suit in the 
district court claiming that his contract had not been terminated because action taken by 
the board in March was invalid since the board had violated the Open Meetings Law. 
The district court agreed and ordered the district to return Oldham to his job as a teacher 
for the 1974-75 school year. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the district court. 
The central issue was whether or not the board of education complied with the 
Open Meetings Law (25 O.S. 1971, Section 201) when the Board voted not to re-hire the 
teacher. According to the Opei:i Meetings Law, "any vote or action thereon must be taken 
in public meeting with the vote of each member publicly cast and recorded." 
Furthermore, the statute provides that "any action taken in violation of the above 
provisions shall be invalid." 
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The Court noted that actual proceedings of the school board in how it handled the 
teacher contracts during its March 1974 meeting. During the meeting "teachers were 
discussed separately and in alphabetical order, and after each teacher was considered, a 
board member would move to renew or not to renew." After a second was taken, a vote 
was taken "by a showofhands." No roll call was asked for in the votes, and no record 
was made as to how the members voted. In its conclusion, the Court simply stated that 
the statute "requires the vote of each individual member to be recorded." With a 
recording of the vote, "the action was invalid as required by the clear language of the 
statute." 
Of the three precedent setting cases in this area, the Lollar case was the most 
intriguing. This case tackled the issue of whether or not a half-time teacher who was 
employed by a district annexed to the current district could count the years taught in the 
former district for the attainment of tenure status. The Court answered in the affirmative 
on both issues. 
Concerning the issue of whether or not a half-time teacher could attain tenure 
status, the Court simply directed the respondents to the applicable statute. According to 
70 O.S. 1974, Section 6 "the failure of the board of education to renew the contract of any 
teacher who has completed three (3) years shall not be effective" for tenure status. The 
Court noted that the statute made no mention of half-time or full-time status. 
Likewise concerning the annexation issue, the Court found that 70 O.S. Supp. 
197 4, Section 6-122 was applicable. This statute noted that the "annexing district shall 
give said teacher credit for all tenure accumulated while teaching in the annexed district. 
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The Court found that the teacher had completed one year in the annexed district and three 
years in the new district, thus earning tenure status was awarded. 
In Cavett, Harry Cavett was the superintendent of Geary Public Schools. In 
January of his last school year, the Geary Boa id voted to re-hire Cavett for the next 
school year but never executed a contract. In April of the same year, the Board decided to 
inform Cavett that he would not be retained as the superintendent for the succeeding year 
and due notice was given him. In June, the Geary Board gave Cavett a hearing, and 
affirmed its decision to.not re-employ him as the superintendent. Cavett appealed to the 
Professional Practices Commission which found that Cavett was a tenured teacher and 
ordered his reinstatement. The Board appealed the decision to the State Board of 
Education. The decision of the State Board of Education, after hearings, was that Cavett 
was not a tenured teacher. As such, he should not have been awarded a hearing before 
the Geary Board of Education in June. Likewise, since he was not a tenured teacher, no 
appeal was authorized to the State Board of Education. The action of the State Board had 
the effect of sustaining the action of the Geary Board of Education. 
In all areas, this case was a bit extraordinary. Like many cases, the Court decided 
the case on the least common denominator. Without commenting on the authority of the 
Geary Board of EducatioQ. to provide Cavett a hearing, without deciding on the 
determination of the Professional Practices Commission that Cavett was or was ~ot a 
tenured teacher, and without providing a determination of whether or not the State Board 
has the authority to hear an appeal about a fired superintendent, the Court simply 
addressed the issues of timing and the requirements of a contract. 
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In its decision, the Court ruled that, considering the only applicable statute 
available, Cavett was .not a tenured teacher. The Court noted that Cavett was not entitled 
to tenure teacher status as he was not employed for a fourth year by the Geary Board of 
Education. The Court cited 70 O.S. 1974, Section 6 as the authority on the issue. The 
statute required that, if a teacher was not offered a contract after three years of teaching, 
tenure status was not granted. Though the Geary Board voted to re-hire Cavett in 
January, no contract was executed. By statute, only a written contract with a board of 
education is binding. Since Cavett had no written contract, the Board's notification to 
him by April 10, as required by 70 O.S. 1974, Section 9, that he would not be re-hired, 
terminated his tenure status. 
In this case, the Court managed to uphold the firing of a superintendent without 
answering the questions of law. In essence the Court applied teacher tenure laws to an 
administrator who was not really protected by the tenure laws. It is interesting to not that, 
at the time of the decision, 70 O.S. 1974, Section 9 had already been repealed and 
replaced with more accurate language as to the classification of tenure status among 
teachers and the definitions of administrators and superintendents. 
CHAPTER VII 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASE LAW 
REGARDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS: REVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS FOR THE 1980s 
Introduction 
The Court heard 42 cases involving public schools during the decade of the 1980s 
(See Appendix A, Tables XVII & XVIII). The number of cases heard in the 1980s was 
the same as in the 1970s. Though the Court heard the same number of cases for two 
decades in a row, a good number of significant cases were heard in the 1980s. Likewise, 
the public school-s were highly successful in winning cases, both as the plaintiff and 
defendant, in the 1980s. 
The cases were categorized into four issue areas: finance, district, personnel, and 
other. The dominant number of cases (17 of 45) were finance related (See Appendix A, 
Table XXIII). A public school was the plaintiff in five of the cases and the defendant in 
the remaining 12 cases. In the area of district issues, public schools were involved in 
litigation in the Court in 13 of the 42 cases. A public school was the plaintiff in four of 
the cases and the defendant in nine of the cases. The number of personnel issues litigated 
in the 1980s rose. Ten of the 42 cases of the cases involved a personnel issue. In all of 
these cases a public school was the defendant. In the last category, "other issues," two 
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cases were heard. Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma v. State (1987) involved a 
group of interested parties filing suit against the state for alleged disparities in the means 
by which local districts were able to generate revenues. Spencer Development Company 
v. Independent School District No. 1 (1987) involved the insurance company of one 
school district filing suit against another school district for breach of contract. 
The public schools were successful in terms of winning cases during this decade. 
School districts won 28 of the 40 (70 percent) of the cases with a public school as the 
defendant or plaintiff (See Appendix A, Tables XXIII & XXIV). As the plaintiff, public 
schools won seven cases and lost only one. As the defendant, school districts won 21 
cases and lost 11. In terms of percentages, as the defendants in cases, the public schools 
won 64 percent of the time. As the plaintiffs, the public schools won 88 percent of the 
time. 
Finance Issues 
The Court considered the issues of property tax refunds, breach of contract by a 
school district concerning a construction project, the validity of bond elections, the 
appropriate distribution of nonprotested tax proceeds in a county, the appropriate 
distribution of interest earned on tax revenues by the county, the legitimacy of a 
Workman's Compensation claim by a student, the legal determination of fair cash value 
of private property in a county, and the legitimacy of the financing method employed by 
the State for its public schools. As with most of the preceding decades a plethora of 
finance issues were addressed by the Court. 
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The Court considered three important cases and all three produced standing 
precedent for the public schools. The first, Beacon Realty Investments Company v. 
Cantrell (1989), addressed the method of determining the fair .cash value ofreal property 
by the county assessor. The second, Beall v. Altus Public Schools (1981 ), addressed the 
legitimacy of a Workman's Compensation claim by a student. The third, Fair School 
Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State (1987), considered the method of the State in 
financing the public schools in Oklahoma. 
In the Beacon case, taxpayers in Tulsa County filed suit in the Tulsa District Court 
in an effort to get a refund on the ad valorem taxes they had paid. Specifically, they filed 
suit against the County Treasurer and the County Assessor. The Tulsa Public School 
district was named in the suit as it was a primary beneficiary of the tax money and had 
received a good portion of it. The central question in the case was this: 
May a county assessor lawfully increase the fair cash value of a taxpayer's 
property for ad valorem tax purposes without notice if at the same time the 
assessment percentage is reduced to a figure that leaves assessed valuation 
the same as for the previous year? 
Several taxpayers argued that this was against the law. As such, the taxpayers wanted a 
refund on the ad valorem taxes they had paid for the 1981-82 fiscal year. During the year, 
the county assessor had increased the fair cash value of the property in the county by 66 
percent and decreased the assessment ratio from 25 to 15 percent. No notice of this 
change was given, and the taxpayers did not find out until their tax statements arrived in 
the mail. 
In terms of changing fair cash value of property without notice, the Court agreed 
that it was invalid. In making this decision, the Court cited 68 O.S. 1981, Section 2435. 
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This statute noted that the county assessor was obligated to "do all things necessary, 
including the viewing and inspecting of property" in order to determine the value of 
property. However, the statute continued by stating that, if the county assessor increases 
"the valuation over the assessment for the preceding year, the county assessor shall notify 
in writing the person in whose name any such property is l~sted, giving the amount of 
such valuation as increased." The statute seemed fairly clear. 
The defendants in this case argued that the statute addressed the "assessed 
valuation" process of the county assessor. In other words, as long as the assessed 
valuation was not increased, regardless of the determination of the fair cash value, no 
notice was required. Again the Court relied on simple judgment and a simple reading of 
the statue. The Court cited Black's Law Dictionary in stating that "assessment" meant 
"the total of the cost apportioned against a particular property." In other words, 
regardless of the increase or decrease in the fair cash value or the assessed valuation or 
the assessment percentage, if the cost of the tax bill went up, notice was required. 
The taxpayers won this case. After seven years oflitigation, the Court found that 
$59,000 was owed to 23 taxpayers. The cost of the litigation to the state and the cost of 
attorney fees were not given. 
In the Beall case, the Court considered the legitimacy of a Workman's 
Compensation claim made by a student. The student, a sophomore at Altus High School, 
was injured during the school day while working on a construction project as part of his 
carpentry class. The construction project was a joint venture between the school and a 
contractor. As had been done in previous years, the teacher contracted with a private 
individual for a construction project. In this project, the private individual purchased 
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property and all materials associated with the project. In return, the shop class built the 
house and was paid one dollar per square foot. The payment was stated to be for 
replacement of tools and wear and tear on the school's tools. The project was described 
by the teacher to be educational in nature as it provided actual experience in the 
construction of residences. The record did not show whether or not the private individual 
sold the house or profited from the house. 
The basic defense to this case by the school was that the student was not entitled 
to Workman's Compensation as he was not an employee at the time of the accident but a 
student in a class. The Workman's Compensation Court denied the student's claim, 
citing 80 O.S. 1971, Section 3 and 85 O.S. 1971, Section 3, specifically noting that the 
student was not entitled to a claim as he was not an employee paid "wages" at the time of 
his accident. 
The Court of Civil Appeals overturned the Workman's Compensation Court and 
granted the claim of the student. The Court of Civil Appeals found that despite 80 O.S. 
1971, Section 3 and 85 O.S. 1971, Section 3, "wages are not essential to be an employee" 
and finding the student to be an employee of both the school and the contractor 
benefitting from the construction project. 
The Court disagreed with the finding of the Civil Appeals Court. In its decision, 
the Court maintained that "for the workman's compensation law, the contract must be to 
labor for agreed 'wages,' and that term is defined in the law [80 O.S. 1971, Section 3]." 
In sustaining this argument, the Court wrote ... 
The word "hire" connotes payment of some kind. Compensation decisions 
uniformly exclude from the definition of "employee" workers who neither 
receive nor expect to receive any kind of pay for their services. Although 
the performance and acceptance of valuable service normally raises an 
implication that payment for the services is expected, this implication does 
not arise when the circumstances negative such an expectation. 
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The Court refused to consider the student an employee since he would not receive wages 
for his work. In summation, the Court rukd that "upon review of the record we find that 
the student did not prove he was in the class embraced by the Workman's Compensation 
Act." Specifically, the Court noted that there was "no evidence that the student received 
wages as defined by 85 O.S. 1971, Section 3." The Court concluded that no wages 
equaled no contract and no contract for labor equaled no benefits entitlement to a 
Workman's Compensation claim. 
In the third precedent-setting case, Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. 
v. State (1987), the Court heard an appeal from the Fair School Finance Council of 
Oklahoma which had as its purpose the goal of demonstrating that the state's funding 
methods for Oklahoma's schools were unfair and unconstitutional. In terms of 
classification, this case was categorized as an "other" in this study as technically, one 
school district was not the plaintiff or the defendant. This case was more of a state issue 
as a whole. Its objective was to question a state issue, specifically the state's system of 
funding public schools. 
The Fair School Finance Council was a consortium made up of public school 
districts in the state as well as interested parties. The focus of the case centered on the 
disparities that existed between the abilities of the various school districts in the state to 
raise funds locally. Wealthy districts, according to the plaintiffs had the ability to raise 
significantly more money through local property taxes, at the 35 mill levy allowed by law, 
than other districts who were not so wealthy. This fact, combined with money received 
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by districts through the state aid formula produced more money per student for wealthier 
districts than other districts. The state aid formula was equalized; that is, all districts 
received the same amount of money per student through the state aid formula. Schools 
with high property values or in counties where the county assessor set valuations high 
were able to generate more money per student than others. 
After an analysis of the funding sources available to schools, including local 
revenues, state revenues, and federal revenues, the Court answered the question raised as 
to whether or not the state's system of financing school constituted a violation of the U.S. 
Constitution or the Oklahoma Constitution. The Court recognized the apparent problems 
created by the ability of some school districts to raise more money locally than others. 
The system created by local property taxes established these obvious inequities. In 
rationalizing this reality, the Court noted that, while disparities did exist, no violation of 
the Constitution was found. Specifically, the Court stated that ... 
While we are aware of the inequities demonstrated in this case, 
nevertheless we reject the plaintiffs assertion that these render the present 
school financing system unconstitutional. Article 10 of the state 
constitution created the system of ad valorem taxation which was then 
vitalized in 68 O.S. 1981, Section 2401. No allegation was made ... that 
this system as designed is unconstitutional or intended to create inequities. 
Rather, the plaintiffs attacks should better be directed at the county 
assessors, the Oklahoma Tax Commission and the State Board of 
Equalization. If the practices of these officials or agencies are deficient, 
then these may be challenged in a proper suit. Moreover, there is an 
obvious and substantial difference between such deficiencies and the relief 
which the plaintiffs seek in this case. The fact that there may be flaws in 
the administration of the ad valorem tax does not support a claim that the 
entire school finance system is unconstitutional simply because some of its 
revenues are derived from those taxes. 
The fact that local revenues were generated from property taxes was not in itself reason to 
rule the state's system was unconstitutional. In fact, the state constitution created the 
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system. The Court pointed the blame on the apparent discrepancies which existed in the 
valuations and rates of property taxes put into action by the various state agencies in the 
various counties. In essence, the Court ruled that the system was not broken; the 
functionari~s of the system may have been broken. 
The key argument for demonstrating that the state's system of financing the public 
schools was unconstitutional was that the system created unequal educational 
opportunities. In essence, the fact that some schools were able to spend more per student 
due to the ability to raise more money locally made the system unconstitutional. The 
Court rationalized that this was not the case. In its conclusion, the Court wrote: 
The plaintiffs do not allege that they or their children are completely 
denied an education. Nor do they allege that the education they are able to 
provide or receive is in any way an inadequate one. In fact, the plaintiffs 
admit that "no school children in this State are in imminent danger of 
receiving a wholly inadequate education." Despite this, the plaintiffs seek 
to strike down an entire state-wide school financing system simply because 
it is unable to provide as much money per pupil as do the wealthier 
districts. Because we find that neither the United States nor the Oklahoma 
Constitution requires the school funding regime to guarantee equal 
expenditures per child, at least where there is no claim that the system 
denies any child a basic, adequate education, we must decline to. disturb 
the law. 
While the Court recognized the discrepancies in the state's school finance system, itis 
apparent that since the ad valorem process was in the Oklahoma Constitution, the Court 
was not able to determine the funding systems were unconstitutional. 
District Issues 
In the area of school district issues, the Court heard 13 cases. Many different 
issues were litigated in this area. These issues included: 
1. A boundary dispute between two school districts. 
2. The annexation of federal property into the attendance area of a school 
district. 
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3. The prevention of selling property owned by two individuals to a school 
district. 
4. The viability of a school district increasing the requirements for 
participating in school activities and the relationship of that decision by 
the board to the Open Meetings Act. 
5. Whether or not a school district is subject to city zoning laws. 
6. Whether or not a teacher association should be recognized by a board as a 
negotiating unit and the relationship of bargaining units to the board. 
7. Whether or not student transfers were valid. 
8. Various issues related to tort liability of school districts. 
School districts were the plaintiffs in four of the cases. In the remaining nine cases · 
school districts were the defendants. School districts won ten of the cases. 
Two cases produced important precedent. DeLafleur v. Independent School 
District No. 11 of Tulsa County ( 1986) addressed the issue of the legitimacy of 
authorization cards signed by teachers in a school districts and their relationship to 
whether or not a school district must recognize a teacher association as the official 
bargaining unit of a school. Two cases involving this issue were litigated in the Court 
during the 1980's. The other was Maule v. Independent School District No. 9 of Tulsa 
County (1985). 
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In DeLafleur, the Owasso Education Association filed suit in district court seeking 
a mandamus that would require the Owasso Board of Education to recognize the Owasso 
Education Association as the official bargaining unit for the teachers in the district. 
Specifically, the Association wanted the Owasso Board to either consider the signatures 
on the teacher's authorization cards for membership in the Association or call for an 
official election to determine the Association as the official bargaining unit for the 
teachers in the district. 
The Court noted that a board of education has a clear responsibility and duty in 
recognizing bargaining units, as was prescribed in 70 O.S. 1981, Section 509. Since the 
board has a duty to recognize such a unit, the board must also recognize a legal method in 
certifying that such a unit has been requested and formed by the teachers. The issue of 
the authorization cards, according to the Court was addressed in the existing statutes. The 
Court wrote that the board was "without discretion" in this manner if a majority of the 
teachers had signed the authorization cards. Also prescribed by 70 0 .S. 1981, Section 
509, argued the Court, was the statutory duty to recognize the authorization cards. 
Specifically, the statute states that "the local board of education shall recognize a 
professional organization that secures authorization signed by a majority of the 
professional educators designating said organization as their representative for 
negotiations." By failing to even consider the legitimacy of the authorization cards 
presented to them, the Board in Owasso simply failed in its statutory obligation. 
In this case, the Court did not mandate the Owasso Board of Education to 
officially recognize the Owasso Education Association as the bargaining unit. The Court 
did, however, require the Board to consider the signed authorization cards and then 
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conduct itself according to statute. After considering the authorization cards, the only 
conclusion for the Bo_ard was to recognize the Association as the official bargaining unit. 
In the area of district issues, the most cases litigated in the Court came from 
claims filed against public school districts under the Tort Claims Act. As discussed in 
Chapter VI, the Tort Claims Act was passed in 1978. Its intent was to identify the areas 
in which a state agency could and could not be held liable for damages in a civil suit and 
put limits on that liability. Five cases were heard by the Court in the early 1980s (See 
Appendix A, Table XXII). Of these five cases, one in particular was the most significant: 
Herweg, by and through Standard v. Board of Education of Lawton Public Schools 
(1983). 
The Herweg case was important as it answered a very central and significant 
question for public schools. This central issue was whether or not the Tort Claims Act 
holds harmless or releases school districts from liability from all causes of action related 
to interscholastic high school athletes. The particulars of this case were that a student 
athlete at Lawton Junior High broke his leg at football practice. The student, through his 
parents, claimed that the coaches were negligent toward the student as the manner in 
which they managed practice resulted in the broken leg. The school district and the 
coaches were named in the suit. 
In its decision the Court identified the key portion of the Tort Claims Act that was 
pertinent to this case. The Tort. Claims Act listed certain exemptions from liability for the 
state and its agencies. In this case, the Court identified the following exemptions 
according to 51 O.S. 1981, Section 155 (20): 
A political subdivision or an employee acting within the scope of his 
employment shall not be liable if a loss results from ... (20) Participation 
in or practice for any interscholastic athletic contest. 
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The Court made it clear that it would make decisions, as it had in the past, based on the 
clear and unambiguous language of the statutes .. In its read in~ of the statute in this case, 
the Court reasoned that there was no liability for the injury. 
Personnel Issues 
Ten cases concerning personnel issues were heard by the Court in the 1980s. In 
all ten of the cases, the public schools were the defendants. The school districts won 
seven of the cases. Among the issues litigated in the Court were the following: 
1. Nonrenewal of a tenured teacher's without a pretermination hearing. 
2. Discontinuing an extra-duty coaching assignment by the board. 
3. The timeliness of notifying a teacher of her nonrenewal. 
4. The nonrenewal of a tenured teacher's contract on the grounds of 
incompetency and willful neglect of duty. 
5. The due process afforded a non-tenured teacher in the case of a 
nonrenewal. 
6. Whether or not a superintendent was entitled to a termination hearing and 
whether or not he was a tenured teacher. 
7. Whether or not a non-tenured teacher must have the opportunity to 
improve before termination or non-renewal and if a board must state its 
reasons for the termination of a probationary teacher at the conclusion of a 
due process hearing. 
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One case in particular, Childers v. Independent School District No. of Bryan 
County (1981), pondered whether or not a school board complied with the proceaural due 
process requirements, and if the justifications for nonrenewing a tenured teacher were 
valid. 
In Childers, the Court tackled one of the most significant personnel cases in its 
history. In 1977, the Oklahoma Legislature created the Teacher Evaluation Act, also 
referred to as the Teacher Termination Act, cited as 70 O.S. 1977, Section 6. This act 
was created for the purpose of improving the nature and skill of teaching in Oklahoma. It 
also had a purpose of providing for a standard measure of evaluation and system of 
terminating or nonrenewing a teacher in a school district. As the Court noted in its 
decision, the legislation had as a purpose a legal means by which school districts must 
follow to fire a teacher. Such decisions were not as formal before the legislation, and the 
statute was an attempt to formalize and bring a process to such decisions. The Childers 
case was the first test of the new statute, as it operated fully, in the Court. 
The Court considered two substantial questions in this cases: 
1. Did the school district comply with the procedural due process provisions 
of the Teacher Evaluation Act of 1977? 
2. Did the evidence justify the nonrenewal of the teacher for the statutory 
grounds of incompetency and willful neglect of duty? 
As provided by the Teacher Evaluation Act, the teacher was afforded a due process 
hearing after the board notified the teacher that his contract would not be renewed. 
According to statute, a Hearing Panel was assembled. After review of the case and all 
evidence presented, the Hearing Panel upheld the decision of the Board to nonrenew the 
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teacher's contract. The teacher appealed this decision to the district court, as provided by 
statute, and the district court overturned the Hearing Panel and reinstated the teacher. 
The school district filed an appeal with the Court. 
The specifics of the case and the evidence gathered by the Hearing Panel were 
important to the decision of the Court. Conc_eming the procedural due process provisions 
of the Teacher Evaluation Act, the Court found that the district had fully complied. On 
two separate occasions during the school year, the teacher was evaluated, as prescribed by 
law and the local evaluation procedures, and he was given the opportunity to respond. 
The specific behaviors for which the teacher received the negative evaluations were 
conflict with superiors and other teachers, poor classroom discipline and control, and the 
failure to follow school rules and regulations. At each time of his evaluation, the teacher 
was told of these. 
In making its decision in this case, the Court relied on the wording of the statute 
and the process conducted by the school according to the statute. IIi the case of 
procedural rules, the Court found that the district had adequately provided the teacher 
evaluations. Two official evaluations were conducted during the school year and 
according to the timelines enumerated in the· statute. Both indicated poor performance for 
willful neglect of duty and incompetence. 
The Court defined both willful neglect of duty and incompetency in its decision. 
The Court noted that willful ne~;lect of duty was synonymous with "knowingly neglecting 
one's duty." Using this reference, the Court noted that a teacher knows his job is to 
control his classroom. The failure to do such would equate to knowingly or willfully 
neglecting one's duty. Regarding incompetency, the Court noted that it is "the inability 
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or the failure to perform the job or task at the level or degree of performance set·by or 
expected by the employer." The Court also noted that another way to look at it was the 
"failure to perform one or more of the essential parts of the job." 
The fact that the record demonstrated numewus occasions in each of the 
categories of violations of rules and regulations, conflict beJween the teacher and his 
superiors, and the lack of classroom discipline convinced the.Court that the statutory 
charges of willful neglect of duty and incompetency by the teacher were proven by the 
district. 
The last portion of the Teacher Evaluation Act that the district had to meet was 
the section of the Act which requires the district to provide a "reasonable time to 
improve, not to exceed two months" and "a reasonable effort to assist" the teacher in his 
improvement. The Court rationalized that both of these provisions were met by the 
district as the last evaluation conducted with the teacher was in February, a full month 
before the recommendation to the Board that the teacher's contract not be renewed. The 
Court rationalized that this was plenty of time for the teacher to improve. 
Concerning the issue of providing assistance to the teacher for his improvement, 
the Court argued that this was a requirement of the statute. However, according to the 
Court, "the nature of the problems may very well have a definite bearing on what can 
reasonably be expected from the administration in the way of assistance." The Court 
noted that the problems of the teacher did not really lend themselves well to assistance or 
"a program for improvement." In other words, the nature of the problems were entirely 
able to be fixed by the teacher with a program for improvement. The teacher was told 
during his evaluations that he was uncooperative with his superiors, he did not follow 
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school rules, and his classroom was not disciplined. These are things, according to the 
Court, that the teacher can fix with only the assistance of being told to fix them.' 
Finding that the district complied with the procedural due process requirements of 
the Teacher Evaluation Act, the Court upheld the nonrenewal of the teacher. The Court 
also found the evidence of the statutory grounds of willful neglect of duty and 
incompetency to be substantiated as well, especially as the Hearing Panel found them. 
The Court noted that its job was to review the findings of evidence of the Hearing Panel. 
As long as the judgments and findings of the hearing panel were reasonable, the Court 
noted that the statute required it to follow that decision. 
CHAPTER VIII 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASE LAW 
REGARDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS: REVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s 
Introduction 
During the decade of the 1990s, the Court heard 26 cases involving the public 
schools. From 1930 through the 1990s, this was the smallest number of cases heard by 
the court. The predominant reason for the decrease in the number of cases heard by the 
Court was the increasing reliance on the Court of Civil Appeals by the Court (Mann, 
2001). While the Supreme Court continued to hear civil appeals cases, as that remained 
its primary objective, in this decade the Court assigned more cases to the Court of Civil 
Appeals than any other decade, and this trend began in the late 1980s (Pacific Reporter, 
Second Edition). This was due to the ever increasing number of appeals filed in the state, 
not just in education-related cases, but in civil cases in general (Mann, 2001 ). 
The 26 cases heard during this decade were categorized by the topic of the case, as 
were the cases discussed in the previous chapters of this study. The cases were separated 
in three categories: finance, district, and personnel. Unlike most of the previous decades, 
no cases were litigated involving a school district versus a school district or properly fit 
into an "other" category. Eight of the cases considered issues of a financial nature. 
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Issues involving district policies, procedure, make-up, property, attendance, and 
functionirig made up 34 percent of the cases. Nine cases addressed issues involving 
school personnel. 
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Unlike any decade since the 1930s the school district was the defendant in all of 
the cases. The school districts were successful in terms of~nning their cases, albeit at a 
far less percentage than previous decades. School districts won 58 percent of their cases. 
Of the 26 cases during the 1990s, school districts lost 11. 
The beginning of the decade was the ending of the tenure of Governor Henry 
Bellmon's second time in the office. Though a Republican, Bellmon's tenure focused on 
the improvement of education and educational funding in the state. Culminating this 
effort was the passage ofHB 1017. In this bill were many changes to educational policy 
and funding mechanisms. One of the most dramatic parts of the legislation included the 
Teacher Due Process Act of 1990. 
While only a piece of the overall legislation over education in 1990, the purpose 
of the Teacher Due Process act was to replace the seemingly archaic and ineffective 
processes of the Teacher Evaluation Act of 1977. The major emphasis of the act was _to 
clarify the due ·process procedures afforded teachers in cases of termination or 
nonrenewal. The new legislation also repealed parts of the Teacher Evaluation Act that 
were cumbersome and ineffective, such as the requirement that a Hearing Panel hear 
appeal cases of terminated teachers. 
Various changes to the Oklahoma School Code occurred during the 1990s, 
primarily through the reauthorization of the code. Such changes included clarifying the 
procedural due process rules for student suspensions, the requirement of the board of 




The Court heard a total of eight cases involving finance issues during the 1990s. 
Among the issues addressed by the Court were: 
1. Whether or not the timeliness of a deposit for a Workman's Compensation 
claim was valid for dismissal of the case. 
2. Whether or not the timeliness of filing a Workman's Compensation claim 
through the U.S. Postal Service was valid for dismissal of the case. 
3. Whether or not a second election for a bond issue was valid after it had 
failed in a general election. 
4. Whether or not a school district could be billed for the cost of the county 
assessor in revaluating the property within the school district. 
5. The validity of a Workman's Compensation claim. 
6. The validity of a bond election. 
One case in particular produced important precedent in the area of finance during 
the 1990s. In Re: Matter of Tax Levy of Ardmore (1998) addressed two important 
issues. The first was whether the Oklahoma Constitution or statutes prohibit the calling 
of a second bond election in the same calendar year as a previously failed bond election. 
The second was whether or not 45 days was adequate notice of a special election for a 
bond levy. 
142 
Considering the first issue, the Court found no prohibition in the Constitution or 
statutes for conducting two bond elections, when the first failed, in the same year. The 
Court reasoned that a review of the applicable section of the Constitution was as far as the 
Court needed to look. The Constitution provides for the rights of the voters to ddermine 
the outcome of tax levies. The Constitution failed to speak to the number of times an 
election may be called. Specifically, Article 10 fails to deny emergency elections called 
by a board of education. The Court reasoned that ... 
There is nothing in [Article 10] that prohibits a special election on the 
questions of the "emergency levy" or the "local support levy" should the 
levies fail to pass at the general election. Additionally, the intent of 
[ Article 1 O] is found from the clear language of the provision, and we are 
not at liberty to look beyond. 
The Court reasoned that without a specific statement limiting special elections, the 
Constitution does not prohibit them. The Constitution states that elections must be held 
for taxes to be collected. As to the statutory requirements of the election, the Court noted 
that 70 O.S. Section 13 A expressly allows for emergency elections as a "school district 
may call a special election for the purpose of voting on any matter or question authorized 
by law." 
At issue was also the timeliness of the special election. The special election was · 
held 46 days after the board call for the election. As noted by the Court, the statutes were 
not clear on the number of days notice that must be given prior to the special election. 
According to 26 O.S. Supp. 1992, Section 12, the general rule was that a school board 
must call for a special election at least sixty days prior to the election. The statutes 
allowed for an exception of 45 days as provided for a runoff election for school board 
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members 26 O.S. Supp. 1992, Section 12. This presented a quandary as there was no 
runoff election at the time of the bond levy election. 
The Court noted that the legislative intent in this matter was the primary concern. 
The Court noted the exact wording of the statute, which was "only 45 days notice is 
required if a special election is to be held on the date of the annual school runoff 
election." The Court reasoned that such a runoff election does not have to be called only 
for a board position. Other issues, such as bond levy elections that are called for a special 
election may also be held on this date. In its conclusion the Court stated its decision 
firmly. 
A constitutional right needs no legislation to put it into force. Without 
infringing oh the rights of the voters under Article X, the Legislature 
enacted a procedural process for the election on questions of a building 
fund levy. Title 70, section 5 and title 26, section 13A affirmatively 
recognized the right of a school board to call a special election on the 
question of a building fund levy. Nowhere in either statutory provision is 
the right to call an election on the question of a building fund levy 
restricted because the question failed at a previous election. The April 1, 
1997 election did not violate either of these statutory provisions. 
District Issues 
Nine cases litigated in the Court involved district issues. In all of these cases, the 
district was the defendant. Six of the nine cases involved whether or not the school 
district was liable under the Tort Claims Act. Other issues addressed included student 
transfers, whether or not school districts must pay for a part of the cost of the revaluation 
of the property in the school district, and school annexations. 
Two cases in the area of tort liability produced important precedent in this area of 
litigation. Reynolds v. Union Public Schools (1998) addressed whether or not the school 
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district was liable for the injuries suffered by a visitor to the school during a school 
activity. Curtis v. Board of Education of Sayre Public Schools (1995) considered whether 
or not the school could be held liable under the Tort Claims Act for an injury suffered by 
a student during a physical education class. 
In Reynolds, Johna Reynolds attended a performance at Union High School's 
auditorium. While in the auditorium, a ring surrounding a light fixture fell and hit Ms. 
Reynolds on the head. Her injuries required a visit to the emergency room and stitches. 
After the. injury, Ms. Reynolds sued the school district under the Tort Claims Act. 
The primary reason the district court found in favor of the school district. The 
primary reason was that the court found that the school district was exempted from 
liability for this type of accident under the exemption of "inspection powers or functions" 
of the district. In other words, it was not reasonable for the district to know that the light 
fixture would fall on someone as the district was not required under normal and ordinary 
inspection functions to inspect the light fixture daily, just routinely. 
The evidence at the trial presented that the school district regularly changed the 
light bulbs in the district about once per month. During this time, the fixtures were 
inspected. Some maintenance employees testified that they had seen light fixture rings 
hanging and some on the floor. Another maintenance worker testified that all had been 
repaired. The contention of the plaintiff was that the school premises were negligently 
kept by the school district. 
The Court found that the most reasonable application of the Tort Claims Act was 
51 O.S. 1991, Section 155. This section of the statute stated: 
The state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or claim 
results from inspection powers or functions, including failure to make an 
inspection, review or approval of any property, real or personal, to 
determine whether the property complies or violates any law or contains a 
hazard to health or safety, or fails to conform to a recognized standard. 
The Court found that regardless of the claim ofthe plaintiff, the above :-;tatute was the 
issue at hand. Whether negligent inspection or negligent maintenance, the exemption 
applied. The Court rationalized the combination of the two in its conclusion: 
In an attempt to avoid the inspection exemption, Reynolds attempts to 
frame her claim as negligent maintenance. While negligent maintenance 
encompasses a broader category of potential liability, if the negligent 
maintenance is based on the failure to discover or negligent inspection, 
then the school is exempt from liability. 
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The Court noted that for this reason the lower court made the correct verdict. The school 
was exempt from liability. 
In Curtis, the Court considered whether or not the school could be held liable 
under the Tort Claims Act for an injury sustained by a student during physical education 
class. During the school day the student was assigned to physical education. On the day 
he was injured, the class was playing softball. The student was instructed to play catcher 
but was not supplied with a catcher's mask. The student was struck by a bat and severely 
injured. 
The claim of the plaintiff under the Tort Claims Act was that the school was 
negligent in not providing the student a catcher's mask to play catcher in a softball game. 
The district court found in favor of the school district, citing the interscholastic activity 
exemption of the Tort Claims Act as a requirement for immunity on the part of the school 
district in this case. The Court of Civil Appeals overturned the district court. In its 
decision, the Court stated that 51 O.S. 1991, Section 155(20) applied only to 
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interscholastic or substantially similar athletic contests. The crux of the decision was 
based on the ruling that "the competitive activities in which student participation is 
required as part of the educational curriculum do not fall within the immunity protection 
of51 O.S. 1991. Section 155. 
The Court disagreed with this finding. In finding that school districts were not 
liable under the exemptions of the Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained during physical 
education, the Court defined further the extent of the statute. The Court ruled that ... 
The "other" athletic contest mentioned in Section 155(20) refers to an 
athletic contest different or distinct from an "interscholastic" athletic 
contest conducted between or among schools. · The phrase "athletic 
contest" connotes an athletic or sports competition where participants 
strive for superiority or victory. Thus Section 155(20) encompasses 
participation in or practice for any athletic or sports competition where 
participants strive for superiority or victory, whether interscholastic or not, 
sponsored by or on the property of the state or political subdivision. A 
physical education class softball game, sponsored by the public school and 
conducted on school property falls with the parameters of Section 15 5(20), 
and the school is shielded from liability for losses resulting therefrom. 
This 5-4 decision made .it that a school could not be held liable for all injuries at 
competitions of an athletic nature at school. 
Personnel Issues 
Nine cases involving a personnel issue were litigated in the Court during the 
1990s. In all nine cases, the school district was the defendant. The school districts won 
five of the cases and lost four of the cases. Six of the cases were litigated based on the 
Teacher Due Process Act of 1990, one on the Teacher Tenure Act of 1977, one involved 
a support staff member, and one involved a superintendent who was not rehired. 
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One case in particular established important precedent. Scheer v. Independent 
School District 1-26 (1997) queried the notion of temporary contracts for teachers. As a 
part of the Teacher Due Process Act, modified by the legislature in 1994, the legislature 
created another type of contract school districts could utilize in employing tea,~hers. This 
contract was entitled a "temporary contract." The stated purpose of this contract, cited in 
70 O..S. 1994, Section 6, was for school districts to have the ability with the cumbersome 
requirements of due process to nonreemploy ineffective teachers. Additional, school 
districts were able to use temporary contracts in times of financial distress. In cases 
where a school district could no longer afford to employ the teacher, the temporary 
contract was not required to be renewed. 
In its decision, the Court held for the school district by certifying that the teacher 
was not tenured and the use of a temporary contract was valid. After three years of 
teaching in the district, the teacher was offered a temporary contract under the condition 
she would end her employment at the end of that fourth year, and she accepted. The 
previous three years the district had evaluated the teacher negatively and conducted 
several plans for improvement. The teacher was not offered a continuing contract but a . 
temporary contract as a last resort for the teacher to improve. 
After the fact, the teacher contended in her case that the temporary contract year 
constituted her fourth year. Since she completed three years and signed a contract for a 
fourth year, she considered her~elftenured. The school district disagreed and failed to 
offer her a fifth year contract at the end of her fourth. 
In reaching its decision, the Court analyzed the definitions of teachers according 
to the Teacher Due Process Act. A "career teacher" was one who had completed three or 
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more complete consecutive years in the same school district under a "written contract." 
A "probationary teacher" was one who had completed fewer than three consecutive years 
under a "written contract." A "teacher" was defined as "a duly certified or licensed 
person who is employed to serve as a couliselor1 librarian, or school nurse or in any 
instructional capacity." The Court argued that under the definitions, the teacher was not 
tenured. The main point with the Court was that she was not tenured when she signed the 
temporary contract. School districts are required by the same statute to notify teachers 
prior to April 10 of each year whether or not they will be reemployed for the next year. 
The teacher in this case was offered and signed a temporary contract prior to April 10 of 
her third year of teaching. 
The Court further explained that the fourth year of teaching could not be 
considered a year to grant tenure as temporary contracts would not count toward tenure 
status. Specifically, the Court noted the applicable statute: 70 O.S. Supp. 1991, Section 
6-101.23(A)(3). This statute stated that "teachers who are employed on temporary 
contracts are exempt from the tenure laws." Since the teacher was employed by a 
temporary contract and she had not attained tenure status prior to entering the contract, no 
tenure status could have been earned. 
CHAPTER IX 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASE LAW REGARDING 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: CONCLUSION & FINDINGS 
FOR THE YEARS 1930 THROUGH 1999 
Introduction 
The proper administration of a public school requires the knowledge of the 
applicable laws in a state. Laws concerning public schools have been ubiquitous in 
Oklahoma and the nation, from regulations and policies of governmental agencies to the 
statutory law created by the legislature. The most important interpreter of law and one of 
the most important creators of law in the State of Oklahoma is the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court. As the Court reviewed the law in cases, it provided interpretation. The Court's 
decisions often created new law because of its interpretation of polices and regulations, 
statutes, and the Oklahoma Constitution. The Court's job has been to interpret the 
Oklahoma Constitution, then provide final meaning to each statute or state policy 
considered. This process of review and interpretation has produced a multifarious array 
oflaw concerning public schools. The Court's case law has defined the nature and 
procedures of operating public schools with the same authority as state policy and 
statutes. This has been particularly true during the period of time of this study, from 1930 
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to 1999. Without knowledge of the case law and decisions of the Court, the public school 
administrator lacks the complete legal framework for operating a public school. · 
' . 
Case Volume in the Supreme Court from 1930-1999 
The mere fact that the Supreme Court routinely heard cases involving Oklahoma's 
public schools demonstrated the importance of public school administrators 
understanding the decisions. From 1930 to 1999, the Court heard 352 cases involving 
public schools. This averaged to approximately five cases per year. Figure 2 (Appendix 
B) provides an illustration of the number of cases heard by the Court in each of the 
decades. While mathematically an average of five cases per year were heard, the Court 
became entangled in education issues more frequently during periods oftime than others. 
Fifty-six cases were heard in 1930s. The decades of the 1940s and 1950s saw an increase 
in the number of cases to 88 and 68 respectively. The decades of from the 1960s to the 
1990s, the number of cases decided by the Court declined with 30 in the 1960s, 42 each 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and 26 in the 1999s. In the decade of the 1930s 16 percent of the 
336 cases were heard as compared to 25 percent in the 1940s, 19 percent in the 1950s, 
nine percent in the 1960s, 12 percent in the 1970s, 12 percent in the 1980s, and seven 
percent in the 1990s (See Appendix B, Figure 3). Mathematically, most of the cases 
decided by the Court during the period of this study took place from 1930 to 1959. The 
creation of the Civil Court of Appeals in 1960 and the increasingly reliance on that court 
by the Supreme Court helps to explain the lower percentages heard by the Supreme Court 
from 1960 to 1999. 
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Issues Litigated in the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
Many issues were addressed by the Court fro!ll 1930 to 1999. All of these issues 
were separated into one of four categories: finance, district, personnel, and district v. 
district/other (See Appendix A, Table XVII). The Court heard 115 cases involving the 
issue of finance. This represented 46 percent of the cases heard by the Court. Issues 
surrounding the operation of a school district were the second most litigated in the Court. 
Eighty-seven, constituting 39 percent of the cases, involved district issues. There were 29 
cases involving school district personnel. This constituted 11 percent of the cases. In the 
last category, district v. district/other, the Court heard 11 cases. This area constituted four 
percent of the cases. 
In the area of school finance, the Court considered a Wide variety of issues. The 
following 53 issues were litigated in the 154 finance cases heard by the Court: 
1. Estimate of Needs. 
2. Inclusion of five percent indebtedness in sinking fund. 
3. Recovering money deposited in wrong account by county treasurer. 
4. Validity of vendor contracts. 
5. Legitimacy of warrant issued in excess of funds available. 
6. Collection of erroneous taxes and legality of refund. 
7. Separate schools' inclusion in the estimate of needs. 
8. Correctness of appropriations based on estimate of needs. 
9. Purchasing insurance policy for three years in one year. 
10. Requirement for excise board to set millage levy based on estimate of 
needs. 
11. Payment of transfer fees from one district to the next. 
12. Role of excise board in approving supplemental appropriations. 
13. Legality of purchasing items not listed by district in estimate of needs. 
14. Legal use of fund surplus due to tax protest. 
15. Requirement of including bond indebtedness in estimate of needs. 
16. The correct calculation of uncollected taxes in correlation to the five 
percent maximum indebtedness requirement. 
17. Misappropriation of funds. 
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18. Constitutional application of statutory change in five mills maximum to 15 
mills. 
19. Application of transfer fees in estimate of needs. 
20. Illegal expenditure of funds by board of education members. 
21. Using separate school funds to offset administrative costs of district. 
22. Process of enjoining school bonds by taxpayers. 
23. Bondholder request for placement of unpaid bonds in sinking fund. 
24. Legitimacy of school district using proceeds from sale of building 
purchased with bond money. 
25. Application of laches in the collection of bonds. 
26. Validity of contract on purchase of goods from vendor. 
27. Recovery of taxes by protest. 
28. Placement of surplus bond funds on succeeding year's estimate of needs. 
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29. The application of an unpayable warrant. 
30. Using current fiscal year funds to pay for previous fiscal year obligations. 
31. Review of property valuation process in determining amount of levy. 
32. Recovering excise tax paid on gasoline for school busses. 
33. Accumulation of bond money from one fiscal year to the next for same 
project. 
34. Compelling a school district to appropriate dated debt in current general 
fund rather than sinking fund. 
3 5. Using bond funds from an annexed school district. 
36. Election process for bond levy. 
37. Legitimacy of including in a school bond money to pay for city street 
improvement bonds. 
38. Calculation of ADA in state aid formula. 
39. Legitimacy of temporarily closed district to issue levy to pay for transfer 
fees. 
40. Determination of the minimum program in the state aid formula. 
41. Determination of discretionary function of state in appropriating state aid. 
42. Determination of discretionary function in how school districts list uses of 
bond funds. 
4 3. Acceptance of bid by school district. 
44. Use of federal funds received by school districts in calculating state aid'. 
45. Payment for services not approved by board of education. 
46. Whether or not posting of estimate of needs negates the estimate of needs. 
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4 7. Calculation of number of students for determination of state aid. · 
48. Use ofrecurrent revenue in estimate of needs. 
49. Determination of whether or not capital outlay is a current expense. 
50. Transfer of funds from building fund to general fund. 
51. Liability for unpaid street improvement bon~s on street on school 
property. 
52. Validity of use of sinking fund for judgment against school district. 
53. Liability of school distric;ts under the Tort Claims Act. 
District issues were the second most litigated by the Court. In 123 cases, the 
Court considered 31 different issues. The following were the district issues heard by the 
Court: 
1. Election requirement for bussing students. 
2. Election of board of education member. 
3. Process for consolidating school districts. 
4. Process for annexing school districts. 
5. Process for closing school districts. 
6. Rules regarding transfer students. 
7. Determining school boundaries. 
8. Transportation fees of transfer students. 
9. School district boundaries at time of statehood. 
10. Ownership of building on school property. 
11. Distribution of school property upon annexation. 
12. Closing of a school by a school district. 
13. County superintendent's authority in school annexations and 
consolidations. 
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14. Discretionary power of school districts to determine the schools students 
attend in a district. 
15. Discretionary power of school district to determine location of school. 
16. Legitimacy of property purchase with involvement of school board 
member in sale. 
17. Determination of qualified electors in annexation election. 
18. Determination of whether or not state statute concerning school 
detachment was constitutional. 
19. Requirement for posting prior notice in school annexations and 
detachments. 
20. Safe railroad crossing near school. 
21. Disposition of property after annexation. 
22. Quieting title to property occupied by a school district. 
23. Quieting title to property occupied by a taxpayer. 
24. Qualification of African Americans as electors in a school district. 
25. Change in status of district from dependent to independent. 
26. Application of eminent domain to school districts. 
27. Bussing of parochial school students. 
28. Conditions of transfer of student-based on grade level offered by sending 
school district. 
29. Application of adverse possession in school district property. 
30. Application oflaches to school annexation issue. 
31. The timeliness and legality of bond elections after one has failed. 
While personnel issues constituted only 11 percent of the cases heard by the 
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Court, a variety of issues were presented. Many different personnel issues were litigated 
in 59 cases. The following were the personnel issues addressed by the Court: 
1. Legitimacy of excise board reducing a teacher's salary in the estimate of 
needs. 
2. Validity of teacher contracts negotiated prior to the beginning of the fiscal 
year, July I51. 
3. Whether or not a county superintendent has the authority to remove a 
board of education member. 
4. Breach of contract by teacher. 
5. Funding superintendent contract with separate school funds. 
6. Number of board of education members in city schools as opposed to 
independent school districts. 
7. Validity of superintendent's contract voted on prior to beginning of fiscal 
year. 
8. Ratification of support employee contract. 
9. Approval amount in estimate of needs opposed to listed amount of teacher 
salary in contract. 
10. Makeup of school board based separate school and makeup of students. 
11. Validity of oral employment contract. 
12. Termination of teacher based on stipulations of contract. 
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13. Validity of school districts adding to the amount paid to teachers above 
contract. 
14. Workman's compensation related to school districts. 
15. Replacement of board of education member after resignation. 
16. Applications of due process proceedings for terminated and nonrenewed 
teachers under the Teacher Tenure Law and the Teacher Due Process Act. 
17. The due process requirements for support employees. 
Sixteen cases were categorized as district v. district/other. This constituted four 
percent of the cases heard by the Court. This category included cases that pitted one 
school district against another. The category also included cases that did not have a 
school district as a plaintiff or defendant but addressed an issue involving the public 
schools. The following issues were addressed in the district v. district cases: 
1. Disposition of funds deposited in the wrong account by the county 
treasurer. 
2. School annexation validity. 
3. Determination of school district boundaries. 
4. Appropriateness of transfer fees. 
5. Disposition of property in separation of district into two school districts. 
6. Legal implications of detachment of part of school district. 
Cases that did not involve a school district as the plaintiff or defendant considered the 
following issues: 
1. Regulatory function of the State Department of Education. 
2. Role of the state in school annexations. 
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Success Rates of the Public Schools in the Supreme Court 
Oklahoma's public schools were successful in the Court in the years 1930 to 
1999. In other words, the public school \Vl,n far more cases than they lost. Public school 
districts won 238 of the 336 cases (See Appendix A, Table XXXI). This represented at 
70.83 winning percentage. Considering the fact that school districts were the defendants 
in 67.66 percent of the cases, this was a phenomenal achievement. The obvious premise 
behind those filing suit against a school district was to correct a perceived legal wrong 
committed. Overwhelmingly, school districts demonstrated that they acted according to 
law and were able to articulate their legal positions in the Court much more successfully 
than those who filed suit against them. 
Among the categories developed in this study, school districts were plaintiffs and 
defendants in each one of them (See Appendix A, Table XXIV). In the area of finance 
issues, school districts were the plaintiff in 28 percent and the defendant in 72 percent of 
the cases. School districts were the plaintiff in 40 percent of the district issues category. 
In the personnel area, school districts were the defendants in 74 percent of the cases. 
In terms of the cases in which school districts were the plaintiffs, school districts 
won 76 of the 109 cases. This represented 69.72 percent of the cases. In terms of the 
cases in which schools were the defendant, school districts won 162 of the cases. This 
represented a 71.37 winning percentage. 
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Precedent-Setting Cases Decided by the Court from 1930-1999 
The Court decided a wide variety of precedent-setting cases during the 70-year 
period of this study. As indicated above, the Court considered a good number of different 
issues. Many of the issues litigated were particular to the schools or individuals involved· 
or addressed particular questions of law not generally applicable to other districts. While 
the selection of precedential cases in this study provided the basic answer to the research 
question, it must be understood that the bias of the researcher, along with the process of 
content analysis, provided room for argument. The selection of the cases as precedential 
was based on a thorough reading of the entire case law prior to 1930 and inclusive of the 
years from 1930 to 1999. Another researcher may have concluded differently. The Court 
produced important case law in the following cases. 
1. State ex rel. Joint School District No. 102 v. Excise Board of Payne County 
(1932). The Court examined the role and authority of the county excise board in 
approving a school district's estimate of needs was established. Clearly, the excise board 
must approve the estimate of needs and a rate of levy to meet the estimate of needs as 
approved by the voters. 
2. State ex rel. Board of Education v. Morley (1934). This case determined the 
role of the county excise board in approving a supplemental estimate of needs of a school 
district. The role of the excise board was not to place value judgments on the need but to 
determine the correctness of the completed form and the levy to meet the need. 
160 
3. Board of Education v. Fry (1932). The Court considered the impact of the 
estimate of needs as it related to the separate schools. The excise board lacks authority to 
arbitrarily reduce the estimate of a separate school, as the law required a "separate but 
equal" educational system. 
4. Burton v. School District No. 78 (1936). The role of the excise board was not 
to impart discretion in its approval or lack of it. The excise board did not have the 
authority to reduce a teacher's salary itemized on the estimate. 
5. Stockton v. Excise Board of Payne County(1932). Timing was important in. 
challenging the decisions of an excise board. Once the school year has passed, it was too 
late to change the decision of the excise board to reduce the estimate of needs. 
6. Pottawatomie County v. Chicago R. I. & P. RY. Company(1934). A school 
district could not appropriate a portion of the superintendent's salary from the funds of a 
separate school. The law provided for the payment of the superintendent's salary from 
the general fund only. 
7. Wilkinson v. Hale (1939). A teacher contract entered and approved by the 
board of education prior to the beginning of a new fiscal year was invalid. Court also 
found the Teacher Tenure Law of 1937 was unconstitutional. 
8. Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City (1939). This case specifically 
removed the power of the county superintendent in approving or disapproving school 
district detachments as it was determined this was a state function. 
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9. School District No. 1 v. School District No. 2 (1934). The legal method was 
stipulated for determining school district boundaries for those districts in conflict and also 
existed prior to statehood. 
10. State ex rel. Board of Education v. State Board of Education (1949). The 
application of the state aid law required the state to reduce state aid based on local 
revenues. 
11. Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. State Board of Education (1946). 
The ADA calculation used in the state aid formula should include the students attending 
the separate schools. 
12. American Asbestos Products Company v. Independent School District no. 14 
(1945). Board of education members who obligate school district funds on their own, 
without the proper approval of the board ~s a whole, are personally liable for the 
expenditure. 
13. Oklahoma City v. Kum (1941). It was appropriate for school districts to 
utilize bond funds for equipping and furnishing a building built with the bond money. 
14. Lone Star Gas Company v. Bcyan County Excise Board(l 943). It was legal 
for school districts to accumul~te money in multiple bond issues for the expenditure of 
the bond money on the purpose for which the money was generated. 
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15. Musick v. School District No. 41, et.al. (1940). The exercise of discretionary 
power by the county superintendent was appropriate in determining the schools the 
African American and white children would attend. 
16. Spann v. Cresswell (194 7). A school district was authorized to dispose of 
property acquired through annexation. Such was within the discretionary powers of the 
board of education. 
17. Edwards v. Board of Education (1946). School districts were not restricted 
from paying teachers more than stipulated in their contracts as long as the application was 
equitable and the funds were available. 
18. State v. State Board of Education (1955). The Court examined a type of 
revenue received by a school district and whether or not is should offset the amount of 
state aid received from the state. Revenues that were not reasonably thought to be 
received from one year to the next should not be used to offset the amount of state aid 
appropriated. 
19. State v. Stat Board of Education (1953). The Court considered whether or not 
revenue received by a school district through the appropriation of federal programs 
should offset the amount of state aid appropriated to a school district. Statutes prohibited 
reducing the state aid based on federal programs and grants. 
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20. Mid-Continent Pipe Line Company v. Stephens County (1957). The Court 
ruled that revenue that could not be anticipated from one year to the next should not be 
included as revenue on the estimate of needs. 
21. St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Company v. Marshall County Excise Board 
(1958). A school district was not in error for using bond money to erect a school building 
when it listed to remodel a school building on the estimate of needs. 
22. Seba v. Independent School District No. 3 (1959). The Court considered the 
application of eminent domain to a school district attempting to build a gym on property 
owned by a private individual. The Court found that eminent domain applied to public 
schools. 
23. Merritt Independent School District No. 2 v. Jones (1959). The concept of 
"adverse possession" was applicable to a school district wishing to take back a piece of 
its property and quiet title to the property. 
24. Duncan v. Askew (1952). Transfers for students who had completed the 
grades offered by their resident school district were entitled to a transfer to an adjoining 
school district that offered the grades needed, even when the adjoining school district was 
out- of-state. 
25. School District No. 22 v. Worten (1955). The Court considered an 
interpretation of the transfer statutes. Common sense must rule and the difference 
between a two-minute bus ride and a seven-minute bus ride provides no basis for a 
transfer just because one district is closer to the home of the students. 
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26. Board of Education v. State (1953). Board of education members who 
knowingly contract with a superintendent not properly certified were liable for all costs 
related to the contract of the superintendent. 
27. Choctaw County Excise Board v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad (1969). 
The school district appropriately issued to the excise board a levy for the sinking fund to 
pay a judgment against the school district. Despite revenue to pay the judgment, the 
Constitution and statutes of the state require payments for judgments originate from the 
sinking fund. 
28. Independent School District No. 4 v. State Board of Education (1969). 
Laches apply to annexation orders. The plaintiffs who wished to nullify an annexation 
election held illegally were barred from the protest due to twelve years passing between 
the election and their application for a protest. 
29. Hines v. Independent School District No. 50 (1963). The Court found an out-
of-state transfer valid. A school district outside of the state and contiguous to a school 
district from which a transfer was requested was the best choice for the student 
considering the wording of the statute. 
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30. Board of Education of Independent School District No. 52 v. Antone, ( 1963). 
The practice of a school district providing parochial school students transportation to and 
from their school was unconstitutional and not authorized by state law. 
31. State v. Board of Education of Dependent School District No. 38 (1964). The 
Court authorized the current members of the State Legislature who were also employed 
by the public schools as teachers to receive compensation for their work as teachers. 
After the current year, the practice was prohibited by statute. 
32. Oklahoma Farm Bureau v. State Board of Education (1968). The State 
Department of Education has the Constitutional and statutory authority, through the State 
Board of Education, to regulate, accredit, and supervise the public schools of the state. 
33. In Re Application of Board of Education of Western Heights Independent 
School District (1977). The Court found in favor of the district. The issue at hand was 
the requirement to post on the election ballot the fact that seventy percent of the bond 
money voted on would go toward the items listed on the ballot. As a new law requiring 
such a posting had been passed before the election was held, the Court found the new law 
valid but approved the district's election and bond money as the board called for the 
election prior to the new bond law became effective. 
34. Hennessey v. Independent School District No. 4 (1976). It was contrary to 
law to not allow the PT A access to its facilities. The district was allowed to open its 
facilities to organizations outside the school district, but once it did it could not 
discriminate as to who was allowed access and who was not. 
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35. Independent School District Number 8 of Seiling v. Swanson (1976). The 
Court overturned the dress code of the school district, citing that it was unconstitutional 
to enforce a hair length policy. Such was a violation of the 1st and 141h Amendments and 
the school made no connection to learning or whether or not long hair worn by boys 
disrupted school. 
36. Oldham v. Drummond Board of Education oflndependent School District 
No. I-85 (1975). A teacher's contract must be reinstated as the vote taken on the contract 
was not recorded or pronounced in an open meeting. This violated the requirements of 
the Open Meetings Law. 
37. Independent School District No. 10 of Seminole County v. Lollar (1976). A 
half-time teacher was nonrenewed. The school maintained that a half-time teacher could 
not attain tenure status under the Teacher Tenure Act of 1977. Three consecutive years, 
followed by being hired for the fourth, constituted tenure for a half-time teacher. 
38. Beacon Realty Investments Company v. Cantrell(1989). It was a violation of 
statutes for the county assessor to raise the fair cash value of property while also lowering 
the valuation rate. In essence this created an increase in the valuation of property without 
notice. The statutes require notice to taxpayers in advance of an increase in taxes due to 
an increase in the valuation of property. 
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39. Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State (1987). The system 
the state had created for financing its public schools was not a violation of the 
constitution. The state financed schools with the same state aid formula. The fact that 
local schools could raise more money through local property taxes was not 
unconstitutional as all students in the state, regardless of geographic location, received the 
basic education afforded by the constitution. 
40. DeLafleur v. Independent School District No. 11 of Tulsa County (1986). 
Authorization cards signed by members of the teaching staff of a district are legitimate 
according to statute as a means of certifying to the district and board for a bargaining unit. 
Authorization cards or a private election are the methods allowed by statute. 
41. Childers v. Independent School District No. of Bryan County(1981). The 
district had complied with the procedural due process rights of a teacher it had 
nonrenewed through his evaluation, notice, opportunity to improve, and a timeframe to 
improve. The Court defined willful neglect of duty and incompetency. 
42. Reynolds v. Union Public Schools (1998). A light fixture falling on the head 
of a visitor to the school was not an act of liability on the school's part. The school was 
exempt from liability by the "failure to inspect" exemption in the Tort Claims Act. 
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43. Curtis v. Board of Education of Sayre Public Schools (1995). The s~hool was 
not liable for the injury suffered by a student during physical education class. The 
interscholastic competition exemption of the Tort Claims Act applied to physical 
education classes. 
44. In Re: Matter of Tax Levy of Ardmore (1998).· It was not unconstitutional 
for a school district to call for a second bond election after the first failed during the same 
year. Secondly, the Court found that such special or emergency election could be called 
45 days after the first. 
45. Scheer v. Independent School District 1-26 (1997). Temporary contracts 
were valid contracts for schools to offer teachers by statute. A temporary contract cannot 
count the year on the temporary contract as a year for tenure status if the year in question 
is the fourth. As the Court found the teacher and the district agreed to the fourth year as 
and the contract a temporary contract. 
The 45 cases identified produced important precedent for the case law of 
educational issues in the Oklahoma. Ranging from finance to personnel issues, the Court 
interpreted the Constitution and statutes in Oklahoma as well as applied reason to issues 
that caused conflict. 
Not every case before the Court produced important precedent, though all of them 
are carried the legal weight of precedent. Some cases were so particular to the school 
districts involved or the issue litigated that the consequence of the Court's decision did 
not transcend the case itself - Kirk v. Union Graded School District No. 1, for example. 
Other cases, while seemingly trivial in nature, turned out to be very interesting and, at 
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times noteworthy- State v. Board of Education of School District No. 38, for example. 
The important part of this study centered on the precedent setting cases. This was the 
focus of the study. The most surprising finding in the study, however, was the large 
number of cases heard by the Court in a 70-year period. 1t was obvious by the numbers 
alone that the Court has played an important role in educational issues in Oklahoma. 
Even if the decisions made by the Court did not produce important precedent, the 
ubiquitous involvement of the Court in education was precedent-setting enough. On 
average, the Court considered five education-related cases per year since 1930. To the 
researcher, this represents a very intense connection between the state's highest court and 
the state of education. Figure 2 (Appendix B) represents the graphical picture of the 
reality of educational litigation in the state. However, more cases concerning education 
have been adjudicated at the federal level since the 1960s, and this face may have 
influenced the decrease in the number of cases heard by the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
beginning in 1960. 
Recommendations for Practitioners 
The school administrator is responsible for knowing the law. Educational law 
comes from a variety of sources. At the federal level there are statutes, agency 
regulations, the U.S. Constitution, and decisions of the federal courts, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Issues such as students' rights, religion and schools, and teachers' rights 
have been adjudicated at the federal level since 1960 and continue to be adjudicated in the 
federal courts. At the state level, laws come from the state legislature, agency 
regulations, the Oklahoma Constitution, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court. This study 
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has demonstrated that many important issues involving Oklahoma's public schools have 
been addressed by the state's highest court. Everything from district policies to the 
termination of teachers and the financing of schools from the states have been litigated in 
the Court. The school administrator who fails to recognize the law created by the Court 
fails to understand the total landscape of laws that govern Oklahoma's schools. 
Specifically, this research suggests that practitioners of educational administration should 
heed the following: 
1. Appreciate the role the Oklahoma Supreme Court has had in the 
formulation of educational law in Oklahoma. 
2. The vast majority of the cases decided by the Court were decided per the 
rudiments of statutory law, as interpreted and defined by the Court. 
School administrators must become familiar with statutory law. With such 
familiarity, the school administrator stands a good chance of finding 
himself the subject of a Court case. 
3. In the absence of a Constitutional issue, the Court has over and over relied 
upon a strict reading of statutes. Where there is no room for interpretation, 
the Court has relied solely on the explicit meaning of statutes. Knowledge 
of statutes is paramount to success as a school administrator. Recognizing 
the letter of the law will aid in success. 
4. The development of school policy that follows the guidelines of state 
statutes has supported the schools in the Court. The failure to follow the 
policy has cost districts decisions in the Court. 
5. Develop policy and follow policy. 
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Recommendations for Further Study 
The area of school law is a vast place where one can quickly get lost. The area of 
law has increasingly become a specialty, one considered difficult to understand by those 
outside of the legal profession. Studying educational law, while providing new ways of 
understanding its significance, its trends, and its development de-mystifies, to a certain 
degree, the law. The more it is studied, the less the law seems to be something for 
lawyers only. Practicing school administrators must know the law. Ignorance will land 
the administrator in court - probably on the losing end of a legal issue. This study was 
restricted to the decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. There are two other courts 
that routinely make·decisions affecting the operation of public schools that also require 
study. 
1. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals was created to relieve the number 
of cases heard by the Supreme Court. The number of cases heard by the 
Civil Appeals Court has increased significantly since the 1980' s. An 
analysis of the Court's education-related decisions would supplement this 
research and offer a broader understanding of the total role of the appellate 
courts in Oklahoma regarding public schools. 
2. Since 1950, the U.S. Supreme Court and its appellate courts have 
increasingly heard cases that involve the policies, students, teachers, and 
administrators of public schools. Issues surrounding student publications, 
discipline, dress code, speech, and conduct have been litigated in the 
federal court system. Teacher termination, school finance, textbooks, and 
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compulsory education laws have been litigated in the federal courts as 
well. Many other issues join these in the federal court system. As a 
compliment to this study, a corollary research project would be to review 
and analyze the court cases heard by the federal comis involving 
Oklahoma's public schools. 
3. Since the passage of the Tort Claims Act, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
has heard many cases surrounding the liability of schools in tort cases. A 
study specifically addressing these tort cases, including those heard in the 
Civil Court of Appeals, would be interesting. 
4. A case study of two or three like cases heard by the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court would make a good research project. The research could focus on 
the particulars of the cases from the district level through the appellate 
system, including interviews with the parties in the cases. 
5. A result of this study was the finding that many of the cases that found 
their way to the Oklahoma Supreme Court could be traced to the passage 
of a specific piece of legislation within a few years before the case. The 
research could focus on a piece of legislation and trace the specific court 
cases generated from it, including cases at the district and appellate levels. 
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OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1930s 
Case Name Date Citation Decision for 
Decided School/Other* 
Excise Board of Marshall Cnty. et al. v. Sch. Dist. 1932 10 P.2d 643 SP 
No. 34 
Board of Educ. v. Fry 1932 10 P.2d 402 SP 
Dixon et al. v. Johnson 1932 11 P.2d 477 OD 
In re State Question No. 168 Taylor v. King 1932 11 P.2d 158 NIA 
KC Southern RY. Co. et al. v. Board of Educ. 1932 13 P.2d 115 OD 
Mccarter v. Spears County Supt. et al. 1932 11 P.2d 489 SD 
Sch. Dist. No. 34 v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 34 1932 9 P.2d 771 ss 
State ex rel. BOE v. Excise Brd. of Payne Cnty. 1932 7 P.2d 473 SP 
State ex rel. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 102 v. Excise 1932 8 P.2d 58 SP 
Brd. 
Stockton v. Excise Brd. of Payne County 1932 8 P.2d 57 NIA 
Tonini v. Sch. Dist. No. 17 Seminole Cnty. 1932 8 P.2d 67 SD 
Anderson v. Miller 1934 45 P.2d 499 N/A 
Barton v. Haight Co. 1934 37 P.2d 968 SD 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. Castle 1934 33 P.2d 190 OD 
BOE v. Brd. of Commissioners of Muskogee 1934 35 P.2d 453 OP 
Cnty. 
Edwards v. Board of Commissioners of Okla. 1934 36 P.2d 6 SD 
Cnty. 
KC Southern RY. CO. v. Excise Brd. of LeFlore 1934 36 P.2d 493 SD 





















TABLE I (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1930s 
Case Name Date Citation Decision for 
Decided School/Other 
Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Chicago R. I. & RY. CO. 1934 29 P.2d 587 OD 
Randolph v. State ex rel. Awtrey 1934 37 P.2d 648 SD 
Reynolds v. Tankersley 1934 29 P.2d 976 OD 
Sch. Dist. No. 84 of Pottawatomie. County v. 1934 32 P.2d 897 ss 
Asher Sch. Dist. No. 112 
School Dist. No. 1 v. School Dist. No. 2 1934 39 P.2d 78 ss 
School Dist. No. 34 v. Trice 1934 32 P.2d 906 OP 
School Dist. No. 58 v. Sch. Dist. No. 56 1934 38 P.2d 919 ss 
State ex rel. BOE v. Morley 1934 34 P.2d 258 SP 
State ex rel. King v. White 1934 39 P.2d 69 SD 
Union Graded Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. Ford 1934 37 P.2d 258 SD 
BOE of Okla. City v. Excise Brd. of Okla. Cnty. 1935 53 P.2d 565 SP 
BOE of Ringling v. State ex rel. Benton Co. 1935 46 P.2d 325 OD 
Excise Brd. of Okla. Cnty. v. Continental Oil Co. 1935 49 P.2d 540 SD 
First National Bank of Wichita v. BOE of City of 1935 49 P.2d 1077 SD 
Enid 
Mannsville Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 7 v. Williamson 1935 49 P.2d 749 SP 
Means v. Cons. School District 1935 42 P.2d 809 SP 
Oklahoma Pipeline Co. V. Excise Brd. of Carter 1935 42 P.2d 499 SD 
Cnty. 





















TABLE I (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1930s 
Case Name Date Citation Decision for 
Decided School/Other 
St. Louis-S.F. R. CO. v. Choctaw Cnty. Excise 1935 48 P.2d 312 SD 
Brd. 
Board of Education v. Montgomery 1936 60 P.2d 752 SD 
Burton v. School District No. 78 1936 61 P.2d 1065 SD 
Excise Brd. of Tulsa Cnty. v. BOE 1937 68 P.2d 827 SP 
In re School District No. 62 1937 69 P.2d 367 ss 
Kirk v. Union Graded Sch. District No. 1 1937 68 P.2d 769 OP 
School Dist. No. 79 v. School Dist. No. 78 1937 67 P.2d 30 ss 
Brians v. Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 5, Okmulgee Cnty. 1938 79 P.2d 798 SD 
Lowden v. State 1938 78 P.2d 1059 OP 
Stanolind Pipe Line Co. v. Tulsa Cnty. Excise 1938 80 P.2d 316 SD 
Brd. 
Board of Educ. of Okla. City v. Cloudman 1939 92 P.2d 837 OP 
Brooks v. Shannon 1939 86 P.2d 792 SD 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 12 v. Union Graded Sch. 1939 94 P.2d 549 ss 
Dist. 
Dowell v. Brd. of Education of Okla. City 1939 91 P.2d 771 SP 
Excise Board of Lincoln Cnty. v. St. Louis 1939 93P.2d 1031 SD 
Kay County v. Atchison T. & S.F. RY. CO. 1939 91 P.2d 1087 SD 
Missouri-Kansas-Texas RR. CO. v. Cowden 1939 86 P2d 776 SD 





TABLE I (Continued) 
OKLAHOMASUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1930s 
.Case Name Date Citation Decision for 
Decided School/Other 
State ex rel. Dawson v. Dinwiddie 1939 95 P.2d 867 ss 
Wilkinson v. Hale 1939 86 P.2d 305 SD 
*Key for "Decision" Column: The first letter designates to the winner in 
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the case. "S" = School; "O" = Other {Taxpayer, Agency, Business, etc.). "N/A" = A school 
was not a plaintiff or defendant in the case yet the case concerned public schools. "SS" 
= a school v. a school. The second letter indicates whether the school was a plaintiff 
{ "P") or defendant { "D") . 
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TABLE II 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1930s 
Case Name Court's 
Decision 
Excise Board of Marshall AFFIRMED 
Cnty. et al. v. Sch. Dist. No. 
34 
Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
ESTIMATE OF NEEDS & SCHOOL WON MANDAMUS COMPELLING 
MILLAGE ELECTION EXCISE BOARD TO APPROVE MILLAGE PER 
ELECTION DESPITE NON AGREEMENT 
WITH ESTIMATE OF NEEDS. 
Board of Educ. v. Fry AFFIRMED ESTIMATE OF NEEDS DISTRICT OPERATED SEPARATE SCHOOLS 
AND EXCISE BOARD HAD ADJUSTED THE 
ESTIMATE OF NEEDS FOR THE SEPARATE 
SCHOOL. COURT RULED EXCISE BOARD 
COULD NOT ADJUST ESTIMATE OF NEEDS. 
Dixon et al. v. Johnson AFFIRMED BUSSING STUDENTS - LAW SCHOOL HAD CALLED THREE ELECTIONS. 
In re State Question No. 168 DENIED 
Taylor v. King 
AT THE TIME REQUIRED ALL FAILED. COURT SAID 4TH WILL NOT 
60% TO APPROVE BUSSING OCCUR DUE TO NO TIME TO GET IT DONE 
STUDENTS ON SUSSES. BEFORE ESTIMATE OF NEEDS IS DUE. 
LEGITIMACY OF ATIN 
GENERAL TO CHANGE 
WORDING OF PETITION 
FOR BALLOT 
COURT AGREED WITH ATIORNEY 
GENERAL THAT HE MAY CHANGE 
WORDING TO CONFORM WITH LAW AND 
MEANING. 
KC Southern RY. Co. et al. REVERSED CALCULATING EXISTING COURT REASONED THAT DISTRICTS MUST 
v. Board of Educ. FUNDS IN SINKING FUND IN INCLUDE OUTSTANDING WARRANTS FROM 
5% ALLOWED BY STATE SINKING FUND WHEN DETERMINING TOTAL 
FOR INDEBTEDNESS INDEBTEDNESS TO CONFORM TO 5% 
Mccarter v. Spears County REVERSED VALIDITY OF ELECTION OF 
Supt. et al. CLERK AT ELECTIOIN 
Sch. Dist. No. 34 v. Joint REVERSED LEGITIMACY OF ERROR BY 
Sch. Dist. No. 34 COUNTY TREASURER IN 
State ex rel. BOE v. Excise AFFIRMED 
Brd. of Payne Cnty. 
State ex rel. Joint Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED 
No. 102 v. Excise Brd. 
DEPOSITING MONEY IN 
WRONG ACCOUNT 
AUTHORITY OF EXCISE 
BOARD TO REDUCE LEVY 
OF ALLOWED 15 MILLS 
ESTIMATE OF NEEDS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
COURT FOUND THAT PERSON HOLDING 
OFFICE WAS CORRECT WINNER. 
ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE BOARD HAD 
ASKED TO BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT 
BUT HIS NAME WAS NEVER WRITIEN ON 
COURT REASONED THAT ERROR DID 
OCCUR BUT PLAINTIFF DISTRICT COULD 
NOT RECOVER DUE TO EXPIRED TIME 
LIMITS. 
COURT REASONED THAT EXCISE BOARD 
MUST APPROVE 15 MILL LEVY IF IT 
PRODUCES THE ESTIMATE OF NEEDS 
SUBMITIED. MAY REDUCE IF !TWILL NOT 
PRODUCE THE ESTIMATE. 
COURT FOUND THAT EXCISE BOARD MUST 
APPROVE MILLAGE LEVY WITHIN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS, VOTED. ON, AND 
SUBMITIED BY DISTRICT ON ESTIMATE OF 
NEEDS. 
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Stockton v. Excise Brd. of AFFIRMED TEACHER SALARY AND SUIT BY TEACHER. EXCISE BOARD HAD 
Payne County ESTIMATE OF NEEDS REDUCED ESTIMATE OF NEEDS AND 
REDUCED SALARY OF TEACHER. COURT 
FOUND THAT EXCISE BOARD MUST 
APPROVE IF IN ESTIMATE AND VOTED. 
Tonini v. Sch. Dist. No. 17 AFFIRMED VALIDITY OF CONTRACT CONTRACT WAS APPROVED BY 
Seminole Cnty. WITH VENDOR SUPERINTENDENT BUT NEVER APPROVED 
Anderson v. Miller 
BY BOE AFTER JULY 1 OF FISCAL YEAR. 
CONTRACT VOID. 
AFFIRMED VALIDITY OF SALARY PER TAXPAYER BROUGHT SUIT THAT 
TEACHER CONTRACTS TEACHERS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO 
SALARY AS SUPERINTENDENT 
NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS. COURT FOUND, 
BOE RATIFIED AFTER JULY 1. 
Barton v. Haight Co. REVERSED OUSTER OF BOE MEMBERS COURT FOUND THAT THE OUSTER BY BOE 
BY COUNTY SUPT MEMBERS BY COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT 
AND LOWER COURT WAS ILLEGAL AS 
THEY WERE ELECTED OFFICIALS AND MAY 
BE RECALLED BY ELECTION ONLY. 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. AFFIRMED EMPLOYEE PAY/CONTRACT COURT REMANDED TO DISTRICT COURT 
15 v. Castle TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF SALARY TO 
BOE v. Brd. of 
Commissioners of 
Muskogee Cnty. 
Edwards v. Board of 
Commissioners of Okla. 
Cnty. 
KC Southern RY. CO. v. 
Excise Brd. of Leflore 
AFFIRMED ISSUE OF WARRANT IN 
EXCESS OF FUNDS IN 
FUND 
TEACHERS AS THEY DID NOT BREACH 
CONTRACT AND DISTRICT OWED ON 
CONTRACT. 
COURT REASONED THAT IT WAS. THE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DISTRICT TO 
IMPOSE ADDITIONAL TAXES FOR SINKING 
FUND WHEN IT INCURS DEBT; CANNOT 
PAY FROM OTHER FUND. 
DENIED PAYMENT OF ERRONEOUS TAXPAYER DID NOT LIVE IN DISTRICT BUT 
TAXES WAS ASSESSED AND PAID TAXES TO 
AFFIRMED ESTIMATE OF NEEDS-
INCLUSION OF SEPARATE 
SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. COURT FOUND IN FAVOR OF 
DISTRICT AS TAXPAYER WAITED TOO 
LONG TO TRY TO RECOVER. 
RR COMPANY FILED SUIT IN PROTEST OF 
TAXES BECAUSE DISTRICT DID NOT 
ITEMIZE SEPARATE SCHOOL IN ESTIMATE 
OF NEEDS. COURT SAID NOT A 
REQUIREMENT. 
Morley v. State ex rel. Board AFFIRMED APPROPRIATIONS AND COURT FOUND FOR DISTRICT AS EXCISE 
of Education ESTIMATE OF NEEDS BOARD IS REQUIRED BY LAW TO APPROVE 
APPROPRIATIONS BASED ON LEGITIMATE 
ESTIMATE OF NEEDS. 
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Pottawatomie Cnty. v. AFFIRMED SALARY OF 
Chicago R. I. & RY. CO. SUPERINTENDENT FOR 
SEPARATE SCHOOLS 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT RULED THAT DISTRICT CANNOT 
PAY FOR SEPARATE ADMIN FOR 
SEPARATE SCHOOL. SUPERINTENDENT 
MUST BE ONE IN THE SAME PAID FOR BY 
BOE FROM BUDGET. 
Randolph v. State ex rel. DENIED DISTRICT PURCHASED COURT DENIED TAXPAYER'S CLAIM, 
Awtrey INSURANCE POLICY FOR ESTABLISHED HE HAD NO BASIS TO SUE. 
THREE YEARS IN ONE 
YEAR. TAXPAYER SUED. 
Reynolds v. Tankersley REVERSED INJUNCTION FOR SCHOOL WON AT LOWER LEVEL. COURT 
Sch. Dist. No. 84 of Potta. AFFIRMED 
Cnty v. Asher Sch. Dist. No. 
112 
CREATING CONSOLIDATED SAID THAT THE ELECTION QUESTION HELD 





STUDENTS TO ANNEX 
ADDRESSED TRANSPORTATION WHICH IS 
A GIVEN. 
RESIDENTS OF ANNEXED DISTRICT WERE 
UNAWARE THAT NEW DISTRICT MAY 
CHARGE FOR TRANSPORTING STUDENTS 
TO ANNEX. COURT SAID PETITION MUST 
BE FREE OF CONDITIONS. 
School Dist. No. 1 v. School AFFIRMED ORIGINAL SCHOOL AT ISSUE WAS THE DEFINITION OF A 
Dist. No. 2 DISTRICT BOUNDARIES AT TRACT OF LAND IN THE CITY LIMITS 
TIME OF STATEHOOD AND ANDWHETHER OR NOT ANNEXATION WAS 
CURRENT ANNEXATION NECESSARY AS ITWAS IN DISTRICT AT 
School Dist. No. 34 v. Trice AFFIRMED DISTRICT WANTED TO 
School Dist. No. 58 v. Sch. AFFIRMED 
· Dist. No. 56 
State ex rel. BOE v. Morley AFFIRMED 
State ex rel. King v. White DENIED 
COMPEL EXCISE BOARD TO 
SET CERTAIN MILLAGE 
LEVELS AND 
APPROPRIATIONS 
TRANSFER FEES FROM 
ONE DISTRICT TO 
ANOTHER 
EXCISE BOARD DENIED 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
APPROPRIATIONS 
LEGITIMACY OF MAKE UP 
OF CITY BOARD OF 
EDUCATION 
TIME OF STATEHOOD. 
DISTRICT WANTED EXCISE BOARD TO 
VOTE THE MAXIMUM 15 MILL LEVY TO 
OBTAIN INCENTIVE MONEY FROM THE 
STATE. COURT ORDERED NOT 
NECESSARY SINCE VOTERS APPROVED. 
COURT REASONED THAT IT WAS 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOR A SCHOOL TO PAY 
TRANSFER FEES TO ANOTHER PUBLIC 
SCHOOL. 
COURT REASONED THE LEGISLATURE 
LEFT THE EXCISE BOARD WITHOUT 
AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE NECESSITY OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS. 
EXCISE'S JOB IS TO DETERMINE 
COURT DETERMINED THAT BOE WHICH 
EXISTED PRIOR TO 1927 LAW WHICH 
CHANGED THE MAKE UP OF BOARDS IN 
CITY SCHOOLS WAS ENTITLED TO STAY 
THE SAME. 
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Union Gradeed Sch. Dist. REVERSED PURCHASE OF ITEMS NOT 
No. 5 v. Ford LISTED IN 
APPROPRIATIONS BY 
EXCISE BOARD 
BOE of Okla. City v. Excise AFFIRMED MILLAGE LEVY LEVEL PER 
Brd. of Okla. Cnty. ESTIMATE OF NEEDS. 
AUTHORITY OF EXCISE 
BOARD TO SET MILLAGE 
LEVEL 
BOE of Ringling v. State ex AFFIRMED MISAPPROPRIATION OF 
rel. Benton Co. FUNDS. ISSUE OF 
WARRANTS IN EXCESS OF 
BANK ACCOUNT 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
SUIT WAS FOR ITEMS PURCHASED. 
COURT SAID DISTRICT DID NOT HAVE TO 
PAY BECAUSE IT WAS NOT IN 
APPROPRIATIONS AND SUPERINTENDENT 
NOT AUTHORIZED TO BUY FOR SCHOOL. 
DISTRICT WANTED MILLAGE LEVEL AT 
RA TE VOTED ON BY DISTRICT AND ASKED 
FOR IN ESTIMATE OF NEEDS. EXCISE 
BOARD HAD REDUCED. COURT ORDERED 
LEVEL ASKED BY DISTRICT. 
COURT RULED THAT DESPITE ERROR BY 
BANK IN NOT TRANSFERRING MONEY TO 
ACCOUNT, WARRANT WAS AN 
INAPPROPRIATE EXPENDITURE. 
Excise Brd. of Okla. Cnty. v. DENIED USE OF SURPLUS IN COURT REASONED THAT SURPLUS 
Continental Oil Co. GENERAL FUND DUE TO SHOULD NOT BE INLCUDED IN ESTIMATE 
First National Bank of AFFIRMED 
Wichita v. BOE of City of 
Enid 
Mannsville Cons. Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED 
No. 7 v. Williamson 
Means v. Cons. School AFFIRMED 
District 
Oklahoma Pipeline Co. V. AFFIRMED 
Excise Brd. of Carter Cnty. 
Poindexter v. BOE of Ind. DENIED 
Sch. Dist. No. 39 
TAX PROTEST AS ASSETS OF NEEDS DUE TO NOT KNOWING THE 
IN ESTIMATE OF NEEDS OUTCOME OF THE PROTEST. MAY OR MAY 
NOT BE ASSET. 
FAILURE OF DISTRICT TO DISTRICT HAD NOT INLCUDED THE BOND 
INCLUDE BOND INDEBTEDNESS IN PREVIOUS 10 YEARS. 
INDEBTEDNESS IN COURT SAID OWNER OF BONDS COULD 
ESTIMATE OF NEEDS NOT GET RELIEF IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE 
DISTRICT COULD INCLUDE IN FUTURE. 
WHETHER OR NOT COURT REASONED THAT SUCH CANNOT 
UNCOLLECTED TAXES BE CONSIDERED AN OFFSET AND ARE NOT 
COUNTED AS OFFSET CURRENT ASSETS PRIMARILY BECAUSE 
WHEN CONSIDERING 5% THEY CANNOT BE CONVERTED TO CASH 
DEBT LIMIT EASILY. 
USE OF TRACT OF LAND COURT HELD THAT TRACT SHOULD BE 
PREVIOUSLY DETACHED INCLUDED IN VALUATION DUE 
BUT RE-ATTACHED IN DETACHMENT OF TRACT HELD VOID BY 
VALUATION COURT IN OTHER DECISION. 
ISSUE OF 1927 COURT AGREED WITH DISTRICT THAT IT 
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT MAY INCLUDE THE NECESSITY FOR ITS 
OF INCREASE OF 5 MILL TO SHARE OF THE COUNTY, CITY, AND 
15 MILL LIMIT SCHOOL 15 MILL LEVY IN EXCESS OF 5 
MILLS IF AVAILABLE AND NEEDED. 
VALIDITY OF TAXPAYER SOUGHT TO VOID 
SUPERINTENDENT SUPERINTENDENT CONTRACT SINCE IT 
CONTRACT WAS VOTED UPON DURING A PREVIOUS 
FISCAL YEAR. COURT REASONED SCHOOL 
YEAR HAD PASSED AND MOOT POINT. 
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St. Louis-S.F. R. CO. v. 




AFFIRMED LEGITIMACY OF ESTIMATE 
OF NEEDS FILED WITH 
EXCISE BOARD 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT REASONED THAT MILLAGE LEVY 
WAS PROPERLY VOTED ON AND SCHOOL 
PROPERLY COMPLETED AND FILED 
ESTIMATE OF NEEDS, DESPITE DISLIKE 
FOR ITEMS IN ESTIMATE. 
Board of Education v. REVERSED CONTRACT WITH SUPPORT COURT REASONED THAT SUPPORT STAFF 
Montgomery EMPLOYEE - WRONGFUL MEMBER DID NOT HAVE A CONTRACT 
TERMINATION SINCE ITWAS NOT RATIFIED BY THE BOE. 
SUP'T SIGNED BUT NOT BOE. 
Burton v. School District No. REVERSED TEACHER CONTRACT AND COURT REASONED THAT, SINCE EXCISE 
78 SALARY BOARD APPROVED LESSER AMOUNT IN 
Excise Brd. of Tulsa Cnty. v. AFFIRMED 
BOE 
COMPELLING EXCISE 
BOARD TO APPROVE 15 
MILL MAXIMUM 
In re School District No. 62 REVERSED RIGHT OF DISTRICT TO 
APPEAL TO COUNTY SUP'T 
CONCERNING CHANGING 
ITS BOUNDARIES 
ESTIMATE OF NEEDS FOR SALARY, 
TEACHERS MUST ACCEPT IT DESPITE 
WHAT CONTRACT DIRECTS. 
COURT REASONED THAT COUNTY, CITY, 
AND SCHOOL 15 MILL LEVY WAS 
PROPERLY VOTED AND SUBMITIED TO 
EXCISE BOARD. SUCH CANNOT REDUCE IF 
PROPERLY SUBMITIED. 
COURT REASONED THAT CHANGING A 
SCHOOL'S BOUNDARY DOESN'T JUST 
AFFECT THE ACREAGE OF A DISTRICT, IT 
AFFECTS THE DISTRICT - STUDENTS, 
BUDGET, ETC. 
Kirk v. Union Graded Sch. REVERSED OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY SCHOOL EMPLOYEE HAD BUil TA GYM ON 
District No. 1 BUil T ON SCHOOL SCHOOL PROPERTY AND PAID FOR IT. 
PROPERTY BOE HAD RATIFIED IN BOE MEETING. 
School Dist. No. 79 v. 
School Dist No. 78 
AFFIRMED SPLIT OF DISTRICT INTO 
TWO PARTS: EQUAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF 
BUILDINGS, OTHER 
Brians v. Cons. Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED TEACHER CONTRACT -
No. 5, Okmulgee Cnty. VALIDITY AS TO 
Lowden v. State AFFIRMED 
RATIFICATION 
LEGITIMACY OF RAIL 
COMPANY TO MOVE 
OPERATIONS TO AVOID 
TAXES 
COURT FOUND EMPLOYEE OWNED 
BUILDING. 
ONE SCHOOL DISTRICT WANTED PAYMENT 
OF $1500 DUE TO THE OWNERSHIP ON 
BUILDING TO OTHER DISTRICT. COURT 
AGREED ON ISSUE OF EQUITY. 
TEACHER WAS HIRED BY SUPT BUT 
CONTRACT WAS RATIFIED PRIOR TO 
ESTIMATE OF NEEDS AND JULY 1 OF 
SCHOOL YEAR IN QUESTION. 
COURT REASONED THAT BUSINESS MAY 
LOCATE WHERE IT DEEMS BEST SUITED 
TO COMPANY DESPITE IMPACT ON TAXES 
IN GOVERNMENTAL AREA 
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Stanolind Pipe Line Co. v. AFFIRMED LEGITIMACY OF ESTIMATE PIPE COMPANY ALLEGED THAT DISTRICT 
DID NOT PROPERLY FILE ESTIMATE OF 
NEEDS BECAUSE ITS ESTIMATE OF 
TRANSFER FEES WAS WRONG. COURT 
DISAGREED. 
Tulsa Cnty. Excise Brd. OF NEEDS IN AREA OF 
TRANSFER FEES 
Board of Educ. of Okla. City AFFIRMED ILLEGAL EXPENDITURE OF PREVIOUS BOARD HAD EXPENDED MONEY 
v. Cloudman FUNDS BY BOE MEMBERS - ON NATIONAL CONFERENCE AND WAS 
Brooks v. Shannon 
NOT IN ESTIMATE OF NOT IN ESTIMATE OF NEEDS. COURT SAID 
NEEDS EXPENDING BUDGET IS DISCRETIONARY 




COURT REASONED THAT IT WAS A 
DISCRETIONARY POWER OF AND 
INDEPENDENTS WERE LEGISLATIVELY 
GIVEN POWER TO ACT AS INDEPENDENT 
AGENTS NOT NEEDING AN ELECTION. 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 12 v. REVERSED TRANSFER OF STUDENTS COURT REASONED THAT, AFTER SOME 
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS WERE 
TRANSFERRED, PARENT WANTED 
ELEMENTARY TRANSFERRED TOO. 
Union Graded Sch. Dist. FROM DEPENDENT TO 
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 
COURT SAID OKAY THAT TUITION WAS 
Dowell v. Brd. of Education AFFIRMED COUNTY SUPT'S COURT REASONED THAT SUCH 
of Okla. City AUTHORITY TO DETACH DETACHMENT WAS VOID AS DETACHMENT 
Excise Board of Lincoln 
Cnty. v. St. Louis 
AREA AND CREATE NEW AND CREATING NEW DISTRICT WAS A 
SCHOOL DISTRICT DECISION TO BE MADE BY ELECTORS. 
AFFIRMED ESTIMATE OF NEEDS 
AND CALLING FOR $300 FOR 
REVERSED ADMINISTRATION COST OF 
IN PART SEPARATE SCHOOL; 
SINKING FUND FUNDING 
COURT SAID MONEY FORADMIN. OKAY; 
SINKING FUND ESTIMATE REVERSED 
BECAUSE IT MISCALCULATED ITS TAX 
LEVIES AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
ANNEXED AREA'S DEBTS. 
Kay County v. Atchison T. & REVERSED LEGITIMACY OF DISTRICT INCLUDED BAND UNIFORMS IN 
S.F. RY. CO. PARTICULAR ITEMS ESTIMATE OF NEEDS. COURT REASONED 
INCLUDED IN ESTIMATE OF THAT IT IS THE BOE THAT DETERMINES 
NEEDS LEGITIMACY OF MATERIALS TO BE 
Missouri-Kansas-Texas RR. AFFIRMED INCLUSION OF PROPERTY 
CO. v. Cowden IN ESTIMATE OF NEEDS 
FOR MILLAGE AT TIME OF 
FILING 
PURCHASED. 
COURT REASONED THAT ANNEXED 
PROPERTY WAS PROPERLY ADDED TO 
ESTIMATE EVEN THOUGH THE ELECTION 
OCCURRED AFTER JULY 1 BUT ESTIMATE 
WAS FILED IN TIME. 
School Board of Cons. Dist. AFFIRMED OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY COURT REASONED THAT ORIGINAL 
No. 36 v. Edwards IN ONE DISTRICT AFTER DISTRICT OWNS BULDING AND MAY SELL 
CONS. FAILED THEN NEW IT TO PAY OFF EXISTING DEBT CAUSED 
CONS. OCCURRED. AFTER CONS. FAILED. 
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State ex rel. Dawson v. 
Dinwiddie 







PETITION FOR NEW 
DISTRICT AND COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT'S 
OBLIGATION TO DO SO 
TEACHER CONTRACT 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT REASONED THAT TO CERTIFY A 
PETITION AND CALL FOR AN ELECTION 
WAS NOT DISCRETIONARY BUT 
STATUTORY OBLIGATION IF DONE 
CORRECTLY 
TEACHER WAS NOTIFIED PRIOR TO JULY 1 
FOR JOB FOR NEXT YEAR. BOE NEVER 
RATIFIED. NO WRONGFUL TERMINATION 
DUE TO INVALID CONTRACT OR NO 
CONTRACT. 
TABLE III 
ISSUES AND PERCENTAGES LITIGATED IN THE 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT: 1930s. 
CATEGORY -Total NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER NUMBER PERCENTAGE DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT 
Number of Cases = 56 OF CASES OF CASES PLAINTIFF PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
Finance Issues 31 55.36% 15 26.79% 16 
Personnel Issues 11 19.64% 1 1.79% 10 
District Issues 6 10.71% 1 1.79% 3 










OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES WON AND LOST 
BY OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 1930s 
CATEGORY NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Cases Won By School Districts 41 77.36% 
Cases Lost by School Districts 12 22.64% 
189 
Fifty-six cases were adjudicated in the 1930s. Three cases involving public school issues 
did not include school districts as the plaintiff or defendant. 
Cases Won by Districts as Plaintiff 19 35.85% 
Cases Won by Districts as Defendant 22 41.51% 
Cases Lost by Districts as Plaintiff 5 9.43% 





















OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1940s 
Case Name Date Decided Citation Decision for 
School/Other* 
Fox v. Sedan Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 9 1940 103 P.2d 946 OD 
Hullum v. R.J. Edwards Inc. 1940 103 P.2d 527 SD 
In re Alteration of Sch. Dist. Boundaries 1940 105 P.2d 536 SD 
In re Bowling 1940 106 P.2d 824 OD 
Lowden v. Texas County 1940 103 P.2d 98 SD 
Musick, Cnty. Sup't. v. Sch. Dist. No. 41 1940 98 P.2d 590 OP 
Smith v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Marshall Cnty. 1940 102P.2d131 OD 
Stanolind Pipe Line Co. v. Jefferson County 1940 114 P.2d 925 SD 
State ex rel. Grimes v. BOE 1940 99 P.2d 876 SD 
Stringer v. Ross 1940 100 P.2d 438 SD 
Wall v. State ex rel. McConnell 1940 103 P.2d 925 OD 
BOE of Duncan v. Johnston 1941 115 P.2d 132 SD 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 41 v. Dacus 1941 117 P.2d 508 OP 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Jasper Sipes Co. 1941 109 P.2d 829 OP 
Ervin v. Seikel 1941 119 P.2d 563 SD 
Lennon v. Sch. Dist. No. 11, Greer Cnty. 1941 113 P.2d 382 OP 
Lowden v. Luther 1941 120 P.2d 359 SD 






















TABLE V (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
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Case Name Date Decided Citation Decision for 
School/Other 
Nordman v. Sch. Dist. No. 43 1941 121 P.2d 290 SD 
Okla. Cnty. Excise Brd. v. Kum 1941 115P2d113 SD 
Petitioners of Sch. Dist. No. 112 v. Linn 1941 121 P.2d 608 SP 
Pottawatomie County v. Standish Pipe Line Co. 1941 115 P 2d 118 SD 
Sch. Dist. No. 44 v. Brd of Cnty. Commissioners 1941 120 P.2d 975 OD 
Standish Pipe Line Co. v. Cleveland County 1941 114P.2d945 SD 
Williamson v. Board of Educ. of Woodward 1941 117 P.2d 120 SD 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. C-41 v. Keen 1942 127 P.2d 184 OD 
Cummings v. Board of Education 1942 125 P.2d 989 SP 
Heubert v. Keen 1942 127 P.2d 180 SD 
Lowden v. Stephens County Excise Board 1942 126 P.2d 1023 OD 
McCoy v. Hall 1942 131 P.2d60 SD 
Roland Union Graded Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 1942 124 P.2d 400 OD 
Thompson 
Sch. Dist. No. 37 v. Latimer 1942 126 P.2d 280 OP 
State ex rel. Bowen v. Scruggs 1942 127 P.2d 152 SD 
Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Tulsa County 1942 131 P.745 SD 
Wright v. Stapp-Zoe Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 1 1942 123 P.2d 281 SD 





















TABLE V (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1940s 
Case Name Date Decided Citation Decision for 
School/Other 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Mills 1943 139 P.2d 183 SD 
Edmond Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 12 v. Oklahoma Tax 1943 135 P.2d 57 OP 
Commission 
Ensley v. Goins 1943 138 P.2d 540 SD 
Grand River Dam Auth. v. BOE of Wyandotte 1943 147 P.2d 1003 SP 
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Bryan County Excise Brd. 1943 141 P.2d 83 SD 
Overstreet v. Sch. Dist. No. 57 1943 141 P.2d 265 SD 
Petitioners of Sch. Dist. No. 9 v. Jones 1943 140 P.2d 922 SP 
Public Service Co. v. Parkinson 1943 141 P.2d 586 NIA 
Roberts v. Paschall 1943 138 P.2d 834 OD 
Ron Cons. Sch. Dist. v. Arnett Cons. Sch. Dist. 1943 141 P.2d 998 NIA 
Russett Sch. Dist. No. C-8 v. Askew 1943 141 P.2d 575 OP 
School District. No. 50 v. Keen 1943 136 P.2d 394 OP 
Stanolind Pipe Line Co. V. Lincoln County 1943 139 P.2d 598 SD 
Wilson v. City of Hollis 1943 143 P.2d 633 OD 
Berryman v. Howell 1944 149 P.2d 505 SD 
Cooperton Cons. Sch. Dist. v. Roosevelt Cons. 1944 147 P.2d 447 NIA 
Sch. 
Johnston v. Board of Educ. 1944 148 P.2d 195 OD 






















TABLE V (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
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Case Name Date Decided Citation Decision for 
School/Other 
Ray v. Board of Education of Pond Creek 1944 153 P.2d 233 OD 
State ex rel. Brown v. Board of Education 1944 152 P.2d 262 SD 
Alma Cons. Sch. Dist v. Fox Cons. Sch. Dist. 1945 456 P.2d 607 NIA 
American Asbestos Products v. Ind. Sch. Dist. 1945 164 P.2d 619 SD 
No. 14 
BOE of Burbank Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 20 v. Allen 1945 156 P.2d 596 SP 
BOE of Chickasha v. City of Chickasha ex rel. 1945 155 P.2d 723 OD 
Chicago R.I. & R. RY. v. Vogel 1945 156 P.2d 620 SP 
Claiborne v. Joint Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 7 1945 156 P.2d 602 SP 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 48 v. Union Graded Sch. 1945 156 P.2d 609 NIA 
Dist. No. 7 
Jones v. Heubert 1945 156 P.2d 605 SD 
Maynard v. Parman 1945 156 P.2d 606 SD 
BOE of Oklahoma City v. State BOE 1946 169 P.2d 295 SP 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. Panther Oil & Grease 1946 168 P.2d 613 SD 
Mfg. 
Edwards v. Board of Education 1946 169 P.2d 1015 SD 
Fairview Sch. Dist. No. 78 v. Burkhalter, County 1946 173 P.2d 452 SP 
Treasurer 
Harden v. BOE, Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 22 1946 173 P.2d 429 N/A 
Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Creek County 1946 169 P.2d 744 SD 
Excise Board 



















TABLE V (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CIT A TIO NS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1940s 
Case Name Date Decided Citation Decision for 
School/Other 
Thompson v. Freeney 1946 170 P.2d 233 OD 
Cruzan v. Kirk 1947 181 P.2d 842 SD 
Harden v. Morris 1947 179 P.2d 144 SD 
Ind. Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 7 v. Bowen 1947 183 P.2d 251 OP 
Spann v. Creswell 1947 176 P.2d 803 SD 
State ex rel. BOE v. State BOE 1947 196 P.2d 859 OP 
State ex rel. Graham v. Monsey 1947 176 P.2d 1021 SD 
BOE v. State BOE 1948 200 P.2d 394 SD 
Fidelity Pheonix Ins. Co. v. BOE Rosedale 1948 204 P.2d 982 SP 
Kirk v. Harjo Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 5 1948 196 P.2d 854 SD 
State ex rel. Chapel v. State Board of Education 1948 198 P.2d 412 OP 
Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Tulsa Cnty. Excise Brd. 1948 199 P.2d 822 SD 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 93 v. Dixson 1949 210 P.2d 669 SP 
George v. Randels, Cnty. Supt. 1949 207 P.2d 248 SD 
James v. Union Graded Sch. Dist. No. 2 1949 207 P.2d 241 SD 
Standish Pipe Line Co. v. Okmulgee County 1949 203 P.2d 877 SD 
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*Key for "Decision" Column: The first letter designates the wmner m the case. ··s" = School; "O" = Other (Taxpayer, 
Agency, Business, etc.). "NIA"= A school was not a plaintiff or defendant in the case yet the case concerned public 




OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1940s 
Court's 
Decision 
Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
195 
Fox v. Sedan Cons. Sch. REVERSED TAXPAYERS SOUGHT TO FOUND DISTRICT DID NOT GAIN 1/3 OF QUALIFIED 
Dist. No. 9 ENJOIN ISSUANCE OF ELECTORS ON PETITION FOR BOND ELECTION AS 
BONDS BY DISTRICT REQUIRED AND AS WAS SAID WAS GAINED 
Hullum V. R.J. Edwards AFFIRMED BONDHOLDER COURT FOUND THAT ACT OF 1933 MANDATES TWO 
Inc IN PART; REQUESTED DISTRICT TO CASES IN DEALING WITH DISTRICTS AND 
REVERSED PLACE ON ESTIMATE OF AUTHORIZES TWO OTHERS IN SETTLING DEBT 
IN PART NEEDS FORS LEGISLATIVELY THESE OPTIONS ARE AT THE 
INKING DISCRETION OF THE DISTRICT AND NOT TO BE 
FUND FOR DEBT OF MANDATED BY THE COURT 
In re Alteration of Sch. AFFIRMED ANNEXATION OF DISTRICTCOURT FOUND ANNEXATION VALID AS ORDERED BY 
Dist. Boundaries TO OTHER DISTRICT COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT 
In re Bowling REVERSED STATE SOUGHT TO COURT FOUND ERROR IN DISTRICT COURT'S 
REMOVE BOE MEMBERS ACTION BY DENYING DEMURER AND REMANDED TO 
AFTER GRAND JURY TRIAL COURT 
INQUIRY 
Lowden v. Texas County AFFIRMED PROTEST OF TAX LEVY 
AS CALCULATIONWAS 
BASED ON PROPERTY 
NOT IN DISTRICT 
COURT FOUND TAX LEVY APPROPRIATE AS 
DETERMINED BY EXCISE BOARD AND COURT OF 
TAX REVIEW DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO 
DETERMINE BOUNDARIES, JUST LEGALITY OF TAX 
Musick, Cnty. Sup't. v. REVERSED ISSUE OF DESIGNATING COURT FOUND THIS IS THE LEGAL DECISION OF 
Sch. Dist. No. 41 WHICH SCHOOLS IN THE THE SCHOOUCOUNTY SUPERINTENDENT 
DISTRICT SERVE AS 
COMMON AND SEPARATE 
Smith V. Sch. Dist. No. 1, REVERSED VALIDITY OF TEACHER COURT FOUND TEACHER CONTRACT WAS VALID AS 
. Marshall Cnty. CONTRACT COUNTY SUPT HAD SIGNED IT AFTER JULY 1 ST. 
TEACHER WAS ABLE TO RETAIN JOB 
Stanolind Pipe Line Co. v. AFFIRMED PROTEST OF TAX LEVIES COURT FOUND THAT DI.STRICT LEVIES IN SINKING 
Jefferson County & BY SCHOOL DISTRICT FUND FOR THE PURPOSE OF SATISFYING BOND 
REVERSED DEBTS ARE VALID AS LAW PROVIDES. REVERSED 
State ex rel. Grimes v. AFFIRMED CREATION OF A SPECIAL 
BOE BUILDING FUND AFTER 
SALE OF BUILDING PAID 
FOR BY BOND MONEY 
AREA OF MISCALCULATION OF $500 
COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT MAY DECIDE FATE 
OF PROPERTY PAID FOR WITH BOND MONEY AND 
MAY USE THE PROCEEDS OF SALE FOR SIMILAR 
USES 
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Stringer v. Ross 
Wall v. State ex rel. 
McConnell 
BOE of Duncan v. 
Johnston 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 41 
v. Dacus 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 97 
v. Jasper Sipes Co. 







NOT FIND ANNEXATION 
OF DISTRICT IN "BEST 
INTEREST" OF CHILDERN 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT SUSTAINED COUNTY SUPT'S ACTIONS AS 
WITHIN STATUTORY LIMITS AND AFFIRMED ORDER 
TO NOT ANNEX 
AFFIRMED COUNTY SUPT REFUSED COURT FOUND THAT COUNTY SUPT DID NOT HAVE 




OF AREA AND NOTICE OF ANNEXATION MUST BE PLACED IN 5 
PLACES IN THE AREAS AFFECTED AND 
ATTACHMENT TO OTHER MANDA TORY DUlY OF COUNTY SUPT TO POST 
DISTRICT NOTICES 
LACHES ISSUE IN COURT FOUND THAT BOND HOLDER HAD 
COLLECTION OF BONDS SUFFICIENT TIME TO COLLECT ON BONDS. GIVEN 
TIME WAS TOO LONG, IN THIS CASE 10 YEARS 
LEGITIMACY OF COUNTY CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DETACHMENT LAW WAS 
SUPT IN CALLING FOR AFFIRMED 
ELECTION FOR 
DETACHMENT 
VALIDITY OF CONTRACT COURT FOUND CONTRACT VALID AND DISTRICT 
ON SALE OF GOODS MUST PAY DEBT 
AFFIRMED BOE MEMBERS WERE COURT FOUND THAT IN THE CREATION OF A 
SEPARATE SCHOOL THE STATUTES REQUIRE A 
BOE TO REFLECT THE RACE OF THE SCHOOL 
OUSTED BY COUNTY 
SUPT AS A RESULT OF 
CREATION OF SEPARATE 
SCHOOLS 
Lennon V. Sch. Dist. No .. DISPOSITION TAXPAYERS DID NOT LIKE COURT RULED IN FAVOR OF THE DISTRICT CITING 
11, Greer Cnty. OF LOCATION OF SCHOOL THAT LOCATION OF SCHOOL HOUSE WAS 
PROPERTY HOUSE DISCRETIONARY 
Lowden v. Luther 
McGowen v. BOE of 






RECOVERY OF TAXES 
UNDER PROTEST BY 
TAXPAYER 
TAXPAYER SOUGHT TO 
PREVENT ANNEXATION 
AFTER ELECTION 
MAY COLLECT TAXES AS ANNEXED PORTION FELL 
UNDER VALID STATUTE: 70 OKLA. STAT. ANN. 772 
TAXPAYERS HAD NO AUTHORITY TO OPPOSE 
ACTION AS THEY WERE NOT 
RESIDENTS/QUALIFIED VOTERS OF AFFECTED 
AREA 
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Nordman v. Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED RECOVER OF BOND BY COURT FOUND LIMITATIONS OF TIME HAD EXPIRED 
No. 43 BONDHOLDER FOR COLLECTION OF BOND 
Okla. Cnty. Excise Brd. v. REVERSED RELATION OF SURPLUS IN COURT FOUND SURPLUS IN BUILDING FUND MAY BE 
Kurn BUILDING FUND TO USED FOR EQUIPPING A NEW BUILDING AND DOES 
ESTIMATE OF NEEDS FOR NOT HAVE TO BE RETAINED FOR CARRYOVER FOR 
NEXT YEAR NEXT YEAR'S ESTIMATE OF NEEDS 
Petitioners of Sch. Dist. REVERSED VALIDITY OF ANNEXATION COURT FOUND COUNTY SUPT WAS WITHIN 
No. 112 V. Linn AS COUNTY CONFINES OF LAW AS PETITION FOR ELECTION ON 
SUPERINTENDENT ANNEXATION WAS NOT CONDUCTED AS 
ORDERED TO VACATE PRESCRIBED BY LAW 
ANNEXATION 
Pottawatomie County v. REVERSED VALIDITY OF ADDITIONAL 
Standish Pipe Line Co. LEVY FOR ERECTING 
BULDINGS AS PROVIDED 
BY LAW TO INCLUDE 
EQUIPPING BUILDING 
COURT FOUND THAT THE INTENT OF THE 
LEGISLATURE AND THE IMPLICATION WAS TO 
INCLUDE EQUIPPING A NEW BUILDING AS A 
NATURAL RESULT OF ERECTING A NEW BUILDING 
Sch. Dist. No. 44 V. Brd AFFIRMED WARRANT ISSUED BY WARRANT MUST BE PAID AS FUNDS EXIST TO PAY 
of Cnty. Commissioners SCHOOL MARKED WARRANT 
UNPAYABLE 
Standish Pipe Line Co. V. AFFIRMED PROTEST OF EXCESSIVE COURT FOUND NO VIOLATION OF ANNEXATION FOR 
Cleveland County TAXES PART OF BUSINESS PROPERTY OR LEVY ASSESSED 
BY EXCISE BOARD AND SUCH FELL WITHIN 15 MILL 
LIMIT 
Williamson V. Board of AFFIRMED EMPLOYMENT OF SUPT FOUND CONTRACT WITH DISTRICT INVALID 
Educ. of Woodward AND CONTRACT BECAUSE IT WAS ORAL RATHER THAN WRITIEN AS 
CONTRACTS WITH SCHOOLS ARE REQUIRED TO BE 
WRITIEN. PAY IS LEGAL ONLY FOR TIME WORKED 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. C-41 DENIED 
v.Keen 
Cummings v. Board of Reversed 
Education 
ORIGINAL ACTION IN 
SUPREME COURT IN 
AUTHORITY OF 
ANNEXATION 
Validity of Purchase of 
Property by District 
COURT FOUND THAT PROPERTY OF ANNEXATION 
WAS NOT INCLUDED IN PROHIBITION OF 
ANNEXATION PROPERTY WITHIN SCHOOL. 
COURT FOUND THAT PURCHASE OF PROPERTY BY 
DISTRICT MAY BE VOIDED AS BOARD MEMBER 
CONSPIRED WITH THE VENDOR TO SUPPORT THE 
PURCHASE FOR A 10 PERCENT COMMISSION 
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Huebert v. Keen 
Lowden v. Stephens 







Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
ORIGINAL ACTION IN COURT APPROVED ANNEXATION. COURT DENIED 
SUPREME COURT BY SUFFICIENCY OF COUNTY SUPT IN THAT A HEARING 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO WAS NOT PROVIDED AS IS PRESCRIBED BY LAW 
DETERMINE VALIDITY OF WHEN 25% OF QUALIFIED VOTES ASK FOR HEARING 
ANNEXATION IN ANNEXING DISTRICT 
AFFIRMED PROTEST OR TAXES FOR COURT SUSTAINED THE MOTION AS THE DISTRICT 
& UNPAID OBLIGATIONS HAD APPROPIRATE FUNDS TO PAY DEBT WITHOUT 
REVERSED FROM PRIOR FISCAL LEVY 
IN PART YEAR 
AFFIRMED LEGITIMACY OF 
ANNEXATION 
COURT FOUND SIGNATURES ON PETITION CALLING 
FOR THE ANNEXATION ELECTION VALID AND 
DECISION OF COUNTY SUPT TO APPROVE 
ANNEXATION VALID 
Roland Union Graded AFFIRMED LEGITIMACY OF SCHOOL COURT FOUND BONDS APPROVED AT A RATE 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 V. BONDS DIFFERENT THAN STIPULATED 
Thompson 
Sch. Dist. No. 37 v. 
Latimer 
AFFIRMED CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
STATUTE AFFECTING 
DETACHMENTS: 70 O.S. 
1941 890.1 - 890.8 
COURT FOUND STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY NOT 
PROVIDING FOR A REVIEW OF ANNEXATION BY A 
TRIBUNAL COURT 
State ex rel. Bowen v. AFFIRMED ALLEGED ILLEGAL COURT FOUND WARRANTS WERE PAID IN GOOD 
Scruggs PAYMENT OF WARRANTS FAITH so INDIVIDUALS HAD NO LIABILITY 
Texas-Empire Pipe Line AFFIRMED 
Co. v. Tulsa County 
ACCUSATION OF 
EXCESSIVE GENERAL 
FUND LEVY BY 
INADEQUATE VALUATION 
OF PROPERTY 
COURT FOUND THAT PROCESS OF VALUATION AND 
ASSESSMENT OF LEVY FOLLOWED PROCESS OF 
LAW AND AFFIRMED COURT OF TAX REVIEW 
Wright v. Stapp-Zoe AFFIRMED ACTION BY TAXPAYERS COURT FOUND THAT INTEREST ON BONDS DOES 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 1 TO PREVENT ISSUANCE NOT HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE BOND LIMIT OF 
OF BONDS 5% OF THE DISTRICT VALUATION 
BOE V. Baldwin REVERSED TAXPAYER SOUGHT TO COURT FOUND THAT SELLING OF SCHOOL BUSES 
PREVENT SCHOOL FROM WITHIN LEGAL AUTHORITY OF SCHOOL AND 
SELLING SCHOOL BUSES INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED BY 
AND PREVENT CLOSING . DISTRICT COURT 
OF SCHOOL BEFORE END 
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Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 4 V. REVERSED DISMISSAL OF TEACHER; COURT FOUND THAT TEACHER VIOLATED THE 
Mills VIOLATION OF CONTRACT CONFINSE OF THE CONTRACT AND TERMINATION 
Edmond Ind. Sch. Dist. 
No. 12 v. Oklahoma Tax 
Commission 
Ensley v. Goins 
Affirmed 
DENIED 
Grand River Dam Auth. v. AFFIRMED 
BOE of Wyandotte 
Lone Star Gas Co. v. AFFIRMED 
Bryan County Excise Brd. 
RECOVERY BY DISTRICT 
OF GASOLINE EXCISE TAX 
ON GAS USED IN SCHOOL 
BUSES 
ORIGINAL ACTION IN 
SUPREME COURT TO 
INQUIRE INTO COUNTY 
SUPT'S AUTHORITY IN 
ANNEXATION CASE 
SUIT TO RECOVER 
DAMAGES TO SCHOOL 
PROPERTY CAUSED BY 
ACTIONS OF DEFENDANT 
FISCAL YEAR LEGALITY 
OF 5 MILL LEVY FOR 
ERECTING SCHOOL 
BUILDINGS 
Overstreet v. Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED TAXPAYER SOUGHT TO 
No. 57 PREVENT DELIVERY OF 
SCHOOL BONDS 
Petitioners of Sch. Dist. GRANTED VALIDITY OF ANNEXATION 
No. 9 v. Jones AS ORDERED BY COUNTY 
Public Service Co. v. Reversed 
Parkinson 
Roberts v. Paschall REVERSED 
SUPT 
RECOVERY OF TAXES 
UNDER PROTEST 
RELATIVE TO VALIDITY OF 
SCHOOL ANNEXATION 
PROTEST OF TAXES 
LEVIED 
WAS HELD AS VALID 
COURT FOUND THAT ITWAS THE LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT FOR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, SCHOOLS, 
TO PAY THE TAX 
COURT FOUND THAT COUNTY SUPT HAD 
AUTHORITY TO APPROVE ANNEXATION AS 
PROCESS OF LAW, INCLUDING THE ELECTION FOR 
THE ANNEXATION, HAD TAKEN PLACE 
COURT FOUND THAT GRDA WAS LIABLE FOR 
DAMAGES CAUSED BY BACK-UP OF WATER IN THE 
DISTRICT 
COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT MAY ACCUMULATE 
BOND LEVIES FOR PURPOSES WHICH THEY WERE 
GENERATED FROM ONE FISCAL YEAR TO THE NEXT 
COURT FOUND THAT CIRCULATION AND PETITION 
WAS CONDUCTED AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW 
FOUND LOWER COURT EXCEEDED ITS 
JURISDICTION AND ORDERED ANNEXATION 
REVERSED 
COURT FOUND THAT PRE-EXISTING DEBT OF 
ANNEXED SCHOOL DISTRICT SHOULD NOT BE 
JOINED WITH NEW DISTRICT AS PRE-EXISTING 
DEBT IS THE OBLIGATION OF ANNEXED PORTION 
COURT HELD THAT SCHOOL DISTRICT, WHICH HAD 
EXPENDED TAXES, WHETHER OR NOT CONDUCTED 
PROPERLY, HAD STOOD THE TEST OF TIME, SO TAX 
WAS VALID 
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Ron Cons. Sch. Dist. v. REVERSED 




Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND THAT COUNTY SUPT DID NOT POST 
WRITTEN NOTICE OF ANNEXATION ELECTION AS 
PRESCRIBED BY LAW 
Russett Sch. Dist. No. C- AFFIRMED ACTION TO PREVENT THE COURT FOUND IN THIS CASE THAT AN AREA 
8 V. Askew DETACHMENT OF AN AREA PREVIOUSLY ATTACHED MAY NOT BE DETACHED 
School District. No. 50 v. DENIED 
Keen 
FROM A DISTRICT 
ANNEXING PORTION OF 
DISTRICT WITH PROPERTY 
ONIT 
COURT FOUND THAT PROPERTY OF ANNEXATION 
WAS NOT INCLUDED IN PROHIBITION OF 
ANNEXATION PROPERTY WITH A SCHOOL 
BUILDING OF A SCHOOL DISTRICT AS PROPERTY 
IN QUESTION DID NOT EXTEND TO WHERE 
SCHOOL BUILDING WAS LOCATED 
Stanolind Pipe Line Co. AFFIRMED PROTEST OF EXCESSIVE COURT FOUND THAT TO REQUIRE DISTRICTS TO 
HAVE ALL WORK DONE THAT NEEDED DONE IN 
FISCAL YEAR WAS IMPRACTICAL. CARROVER OF 
GENERAL FUND TO PAY FOR WORK LEGAL 
V. Lincoln County TAX LEVY FOR GENERAL 
Wilson v. City of Hollis 
FUND 
REVERSED PETITIONER SOUGHT 
PAYMENT BY SCHOOL FOR 
BONDS HELD BY 
REQUIRING DISTRICT TO 
INCLUDE DEBT IN ITS 
COURT HELD THAT WRIT OF MANDAMUS COULD 
NOT BE UPHELD TO COMPEL DISTRICT TO 
INCLUDE SUCH DEBT IN ESTIMATE OF NEEDS AS 
PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER DEBT THROUGH 
LEGITIMATE MEANS, BY JUDGMENT IN SINKING 
FUND, AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW 
Berryman v. Howell AFFIRMED JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURT FOUND THAT RQUIRED NUMBER OF 
SUPT IN QUALIFIED ELECTORS (A MAJORITY) SIGNED A 
ANNEXATION/DETACHMENT PETITION AND THOSE WHO SIGNED PETITION MAY 
NOT WITHDRAW SIGNATURES AFTER THE 
OF DISTRICTS COUNTY SUPT POSTS WRITTEN NOTICE FOR 
ELECTION. 
Cooperton Cons. Sch. AFFIRMED APPROPRIATION OF BOND COURT FOUND DISTRICT THAT INCOPORATED THE 
Dist. V. Roosevelt Cons. FUNDS AFTER ANNEXATION AREA WITH THE BOND WAS ENTITLED TO THE 
Sch. BOND PROCEEDS 
Johnston v. Board of REVERSED RETIREMENT OF STREET THE COURT AGREED W/PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE 
Educ. BONDS BECAUSE LACH ES HAD NOT OCCURRED BECAUSE 
WRIT GRANTED YEARS EARLIER WAS NOT 
SATISFIED 
Mid-Continent Pipe Line AFFIRMED LEGITIMACY OF ELECTION COURT FOUND ELECTION WAS CONDUCTED AS 
Co. V. Seminole County FOR BOND LEVY PRESCRIBED BY LAW AND SUFFICIENT QUALIFIED 
Excise Board VOTERS VOTED IN FAVOR OF LEVY 
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Ray V. Board of REVERSED RECOVERY OF VALUE OF COURT FOUND TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR AND 
Education of Pond Creek CONTRACT FOR AWARDED COMPENSATION AS STIPULATED BY 
State ex rel. Brown v. AFFIRMED 
Board of Education 
DISMISSED SUPT CONTRACT MINUS PAID AMOUNTS 
ACTION BY STATE 
AGAINST DISTRICT TO 
RECOVER PENAL TIES 
IMPOSED 
COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT WAS LEGAL IN ITS 
APPROPRIATION OF SEPARATE SCHOOL FUNDS 
FOR PURCHASE OF BUSES. WARRANTS WERE NOT 
DRAWN TECHNICALLY RIGHT BUT NO FOUL WAS 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT. 
Alma Cons. Sch. Dist V. REVERSED ISSUE OF ANNEXATION COURT FOUND THAT AFTER NUMBER OF NAMES 
Fox Cons. Sch. Dist. BY COUNTY SUPT CAME OFF PETITION FOR CALL FOR ELECTION ON 
American Asbestos 
Products v. Ind. Sch. 





LIABILITY OF OFFICIALS 
WHEN PURCHASE 
ORDERS FAILED TO 
SHOW EVIDENCE OF 
UNENCUMBERED 
BOE of Burbank Ind. Sch. REVERSED DETACHMENT OF 
Dist. No. 20 v. Allen TERRITORY BY COUNTY 
SUPT 
ANNEXATION BY REQUEST, ELECTION WAS VOID 
AND ANNEXATION WAS VOID 
COURT AFFIRMED THAT INDIVIDUALS WERE LIABLE 
FOR DEBT. COURT REVERSED IN THAT DISTRICT 
WAS NOT LIABLE. 
COURT FOUND THAT ACT OF 1943 CALLED FOR 
ONLY WHOLE DISTRICT ANNEXATIONS AS IT 
RELATED TO THE SITUATION OF THE SCHOOLS IN 
THIS CASE. 
BOE of Chickasha V. City REVERSED BONDHOLDER REQUEST COURT FOUND THAT BOND HOLDER MAY NOT 
of Chickasha ex rel. FOR DISTRICT TO COMPEL DISTRICT TO INCLUDE IN ESTIMATE AS 
Chicago R.I. & R. RY. v. AFFIRMED 
Vogel 
INCLUDE IN ITS ESTIMATE OTHER MEANS AND REMEDIES ARE AVIALABLE AND 
OF NEEDS THE DEBT OF DISTRICT MAY CHOOSE TO SATISFY DEBT IN OTHER 
PAVING ASSESSMENT WAY 
SCHOOL ASKED COURT SUSTAINED RAIL COMMISSION'S DECISION 
RAILROAD COMPANY TO THAT THE RAILROAD IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF THE 
PROVIDE FOR A SAFE CROSSING. 
RAIL CROSSING FOR 
SCHOOL CHILDREN 
Claiborne v. Joint Cons. AFFIRMED AUTHORITY OF COUNTY COURT FOUND THAT NO AUTHORITY FOR 
ANNEXATION EXISTED BECAUSE THE TERRITORY 
WAS NOT PART OF THE DISTRICT TO WHICH THE 
DETACHMENT DESRIBED 
Sch. Dist. No. 7 SUPT TO CONDUCT 
ANNEXATION 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 48 v. REVERSED LEGITIMACY OF COUNTY 
Union Graded Sch. Dist. SUPT IN ANNEXATION OF 
No. 7 DISTRICTS 
COURT FOUND THAT UNDER ACT OF 1943 THAT 
SUCH ANNEXATIONS WERE ILLEGAL AS 
CONDUCTED IN THESE TWO DISTRICTS 
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Jones v. Heubert REVERSED ISSUE OF AUTHORITY OF COURT FOUND COUNTY SUPT DID NOT HAVE 
Maynard v. Parman· AFFIRMED 
COUNTY SUPT TO CALL AUTHORITY OF TO CALL FOR ANNEXATION UNDER 
FOR ANNEXATION CIRCUMSTANCES IN 79 O.S. SUPP. 1943 891.1 
PROTEST OF PETITION 
AND ELECTION FOR 
DETACHMENT OF AREA 
AND ANNEXATION TO 
ANOTHER DISTRICT 
COURT SAID THAT PROTESTERS MUST BE IN AREA 
AFFECTED NOT JUST ELECTORS OF DISTRICT 
AFFECTED 
BOE of Oklahoma City V. GRANTED CALCULATION OF ADA OF COURT FOUND THAT STATE AID FOR DISTRICTS AT 
State BOE SEPARATE SCHOOL IN 15 MILL LIMIT ALSO INCLUDES THE ADA 
STATE AID FOR CALCULATION FOR STATE AID FOR THE SEPARATE 
SEPARATE SCHOOL SCHOOLS IN THE DISTRICT 
Cons. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. REVERSED 
Panther Oil & Grease 
PAYMENT FOR GOODS 




Edwards v. Board of 
Education 
AFFIRMED TAXPAYER FILED SUIT TO 
PREVENT TEACHER 
SALARIES TO BE PAID 
ABOVE CONTRACTED 
AMOUNT 
COURT FOUND THAT CONTRACT AND 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR GOODS WERE MADE PRIOR TO 
FISCAL YEAR AND VOID 
COURT FOUND THAT THE TEACHER CONTRACTS 
CALLED FOR SALARIES TO TEACHERS MORE OR 
LESS IN SALARY AS EVENTUAL APPROVAL OF 
LEVIES BY VOTERS AND EXCISE BOARD. 
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BY EXCISE 
BOARD APPROVED ADDITIONAL MONEY 
Fairview Sch. Dist. No. 78 AFFIRMED 
v. Burkhalter, County 
REGISTRATION OF COURT FOUND THAT WARRANT SHOULD BE ISSUED 
WARRANT BY COUNTY TREASURER AS PAYABLE AS 
Treasurer TREASURER DID NOT FILE A BRIEF IN THE CASES 
Harden v. BOE, Ind. Sch. DISMISSED ANNEXATION BOUNDARY COURT FOUND THAT AFTER COLLECTION OF TAXES 
Dist. No. 22 AND EXPENDED TAXES THAT THE RIGHTFUL 
Mid-Continent Pipe Line AFFIRMED 
Co. v. Creek County 
Excise Board 
LEGALITY OF CLOSED 
DISTRICT TO HAVE LEVY 
FOR PAY FOR TRANSFER 
FEES OF STUDENTS TO 
OTHER DISTRICT 
OWNER OF TAX MONEY WAS mootPOINT 
COURT FOUND THAT TEMPORARILY CLOSED 
DISTRICT MUST PAY TRANSFER FEES AND LEVY 
FOR PAYMENT WAS LEGAL 
Sch. Brd of Cons. Sch. AFFIRMED RESIDENT PROTEST OF COURT FOUND ANNEXATION WITIN CONFINES OF 
Dist. No. 47 v. Monsey ANNEXATION LAW AS PROCESSED BY COUNTY SUPT 
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Thompson v. Freeney REVERSED RECOVERY OF TAXES 
UNDER PROTEST BY 
PROTESTEE 
COURT FOUND TAXES WERE LEVIED LEGALLY AND 
APPROVED BY VOTERS IN ELECTION AS 
PRESCRIBED BY LAW 
Cruzan v. Kirk 
Harden v. Morris 
AFFIRMED TAXPAYER SOUGHT TO COURT FOUND THAT EXISTING LEGISLATION 
DISMISSED 
PREVENT COUNTY SUPT REQUIRED THE MAJORITY OF VOTES IN . 
FROM CARRYING OUT ANNEXATION AND DETACHMENTS CASES IN ORDER 
THE ANNEXATION OF TO BE SUCCESSFUL 
DISTRICTS 




CASE WAS DISMISSED BECAUSE AREA 
. REPRESENTED BY BOE SEAT WAS REA TI ACHED TO 
ANOTHER DISTRICT BY ANOTHER COURT ACTION 
Ind. Cons. Sch. Dist. No. AFFIRMED INJUNCTION SOUGHT BY COURT FOUND COUNTY SUPT ACTED WITHIN 
AUTHORITY AS ELECTION WAS HELD AND 
APPROVED ANNEXATION 
7 v. Bowen . DISTRICT AGAINST 
Spann v. Creswell 
COUNTY SUPT ORDER TO 
ANNEX 
REVERSED AUTHORITY OF COUNTY 
SUPT TO DECIDE FATE OF 
PROPERTY OF ANNEXED 
DISTRICT AT TIME OF 
ANNEXATION 
COURT FOUND COUNTY SUPT DOES NOT HAVE 
AUTHORITY TO DECIDED FATE OF 
PROPERTY/BUILDING OF ANNEXED DISTRICT AT 
TIME OF ANNEXATION 
State ex rel. BOE v. State AFFIRMED DISTRICT SOUGHT COURT SAID THAT STATE'S FUNCTION IS TO 
BOE BALANCE OF STATE AID PROVIDE FOR THE "MINIMUM" NEED OF A DISTRICT 
State ex rel. Graham v. AFFIRMED 
Monsey 
OWED BY STATE BOARD AS PRESCRIBED BY STATUTE AND NOTTO PROVIDE 
FOR A SURPLUS 
MANDAMUS TO COMPEL 
COUNTY SUPT TO 
CONDUCT HEARING FOR 
ELECTION AND ORDER 
ANNEXATION 
COURT FOUND THAT COUNTY SUPT ACTED WITHIN 
SCOPE OF STATUTE BY NOT CALLING FOR 
ANNEXATION 
BOE v. State BOE GRANTED ORIGINAL MANDAMUS IN COURT FOUND THAT STATE AID MUST BE PAID TO 
SUPREME COURT FOR DISTRICTS AS SPECIFICALLY PRESCRIBED BY LAW, 
STATE TO PAY STATE AID NOT DISCRETIONARY 
TO DISTRICT AS 
PRESCRIBED BY LAW 
Fidelity Phoenix Ins. Co. AFFIRMED OBLIGATION OF COURT FOUND CONTRACT WITH INSURANCE 
V. BOE Rosedale INSURANCE COMPANY TO COMPANY VALID AND MUST PAY CLAIM BASED ON 
PA y FOR DAMAGE TO DAMAGE CAUSED BY WINDSTORM 
SCHOOL BY WINDSTORM 
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Kirk v. Harjo Cons. Sch. AFFIRMED TAXPAYER SOUGHT TO 
Dist. No. 5 PREVENT THE SALE OF 
SCHOOL BONDS 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND THAT A THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF 
QUALIFIED VOTERS, 1/3 OF THE QUALIFIED VOTERS 
IN DISTRICT, FILED FOR A PETITION FOR THE BOND 
ELECTION DESPITE SOME NAMES REMOVED DUE 
TO DISQUALIFICATION 
State ex rel. Chapel V. DENIED ISSUE OF STATE DENYING COURT FOUND ITWAS DUTY TO PROVIDE STATE 
State Board of Education STATE AID FOR AID TO SEPARATE SCHOOLS AS STIPULATED BY 
SEPARATE SCHOOL LAW AND SCHOOL QUALIFIES BY STATUTE 
Texas Pipe Line Co. V. AFFIRMED PROTEST OF TAX LEVY COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT MAY INCLUDE IN ITS 
Tulsa Cnty. Excise Brd. FOR TRANSFER FEES ESTIMATE OF NEEDS FOR GENERAL FUND THE 
COST OF TRANSFER FEES 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. 
No. 93 v. Dixson 
GRANTED DISTRICT BROUGHT SUIT 
TO REQUIRE COUNTY 
TREASURER TO 
TRANSFER PROCEEDS OF 
BOND TO DISTRICT'S 
George v. Randels, AFFIRMED VALIDITY OF 
PROCEDURES USED IN 
ANNEXATION 
County Superintendent 
James v. Union Graded AFFIRMED 
Sch. Dist. No. 2 
ISSUE OF PROPERTY 
OWNERSHIP AFTER 
ANNEXATION 
COURT FOUND THAT USE OF THE BOND MONEY 
WAS INTENDED FOR SE PARA TE SCHOOLS AND 
WAS LEGAL ACCORDING TO LAW 
COURT FOUND THAT COUNTY SUPT FOLLOWED 
PROCEDURES AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW IN 
ANNEXATION OF DISTRICTS 
COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT MAY USE OR 
DISPOSE OF PROPERTY, BUILDINGS AT DISCRETION 
AFTER ANNEXATION 
Standish Pipe Line Co. V. AFFIRMED TAX PROTEST OF LEVIES COURT FOUND THAT ITEMIZATION OF BUILDINGS 
Okmulgee County AND FUNDS ON ESTIMATE OF NEEDS WAS 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION OF THE DISTIRCT 
TABLE VII 
ISSUES AND PERCENT AGES LITIGATED IN THE 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT: 1940s. 
CA TE GORY - Total NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT Number of Cases = 88 OF CASES OF CASES PLAINTIFF PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT DEFENDANT 
Finance Issues 47 53.41% 11 12.50°!o 36 40.90% 
District Issues 35 39.77% 14 15.90% 21 23.86% 
Personnel Issues 6 6.81% 1 1.13% 5 9.09% 
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TABLE VIII 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES WON AND LOST 
BY OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 1940s 
CATEGORY NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Cases Won By School Districts 56 68.29% 
Cases Lost by School Districts 26 31.71% 
Eighty-eight cases were adjudicated in the 1930s. Six cases involving public school 
issues did not include school districts as the plaintiff or defendant. 
Cases Won by Districts as Plaintiff 11 13.42% 
Cases Won by Districts as Defendant 45 54.89% 
Cases Lost by Districts as Plaintiff 12 14.64% 






















OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1950s 
Case Name Date Decided Citation Decision for 
School/Other* 
BOE of Wakita v. Schultz 1950 224 P.2d 258 OP 
Camino v. Simon 1950 219 P.2d 1019 SD 
Derieg v. Board of Education of Carnegie 1950 216 P.2d 307 SD 
Sewell v. Reinhardt 1950 219 P.2d 996 SD 
St. Louis-San Francisco RY Co. v. Long, County 1950 223 P.2d 542 SD 
Treasurer 
Barnett v. Allen 1951 238 P.2d 811 SD 
City of Healdton ex rel. Johnston v. BOE 1951 232 P.2d 138 OD 
Davenport v. Board of Education 1951 230 P.2d 271 SD 
Kreiger v. Cons. Dist. No. 2 1951 134 P.2d 389 SP 
St. Louis-San Francisco RY Co. v. Craig Cnty. 1951 230 P.2d 896 SD 
Excise Brd. 
rrri-State Gas. Ins. Co. v. La Fon 1951 237 P.2d 124 OD 
Wooten v. State ex rel. Butler, County Treasurer 1951 230 P.2d 889 OD 
Bowen v. Brock 1952 244 P.2d 546 SD 
Duncan v. Askew 1952 251 P.2d 515 OD 
lloachim v. Board of Education of Walters 1952 249 P.2d 129 SD 
Liles v. Smith 1952 244 P.2d 582 SD 
Martin v. Cnty. Election Board 1952 245 P.2d 714 OP 





















TABLE IX (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1950s 
Case Name Date Decided Citation Decision for 
School/Other 
Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Creek Cnty. Exe. 1952 249 P.2d 79 SD 
Brd. 
SEBA v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 3 1952 1253 P.2d 259 SP 
Spencer v. BOE of Sch. Dist. No. 6 1952 246 P.2d 333 SD 
State ex rel. v. Board of Education 1952 246 P.2d 368 SD 
Board of Education v. State 1953 1257 P.2d 1080 SD 
Dominic v. Davis 1953 1262 P.2d 143 SD 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Williamson 1953 262 P.2d 701 SP 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 62 v. Dep. School Dist. No. 1953 1259 P.2d 826 NIA 
66 
Ins. Sch. Dist. No. 65 v. Stafford 1953 257 P.2d 172 OD 
State v. State Board of Education 1953 256 P.2d 446 SP 
York v. Garrison 1953 253 P.2d 835 SD 
Bryant v. Mitchell 1954 1275 P.2d 271 SP 
Douglas v. Board of Cnty Commissioners 1954 271 P.2d 720 OD 
Littlefield v. Howery 1954 266 P.2d 957 OD 
Mundy v. Dep. Sch. Dist. No. 32 1954 272 P.2d 209 SD 
Murphy v. Darnell 1954 268 P.2d 860 SD 
-
Sears v. Board of Education, Etc. 1954 271 P.2d 319 SD 






















TABLE IX (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1950s 
Case Name Date Decided Citation Decision for 
School/Other 
Grady v. Marshall 1955 288 P.2d 1101 SD 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 65 v. State Board of 1955 289 P.2d 379 OP 
Education 
I.Jones v. McKenzie 1955 285 P.2d 438 OD 
Loper v. Shumate 1955 282 P.2d 239 SD 
Matlock v. Board of Cnty. Commissioners 1955 1281 P.2d 169 SD 
Sch. Dist. No. 22, Osage Cnty. v. Worten 1955 289 P.2d 150 SP 
State v. State Board of Education 1955 287 P.2d 704 SP 
State v. State Board of Education 1955 289 P.2d 653 OP 
State v. State Board of Education 1955 295 P.2d 279 OP 
Grand Lodge of Okla., Etc. v. Webb 1956 306 P.2d 340 OP 
Jeffers v. Edge 1956 295 P.2d 787 OD 
Kiowa Cnty. Exe. Brd. v. St. Louis-San Fran RR 1956 301 P.2d 677 SD 
State v. State Board of Education 1956 1293 P.2d 583 OP 
Duncan v. Golden 1957 316 P.2d 1116 OP 
Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Stephens County 1957 312 P.2d 883 SD 
Smith v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 16 1957 321 P.2d 430 SP 
Board of Adjustment v. Board of Education 1958 326 P.2d 800 SP 

















TABLE IX (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1950s 
Case Name Date Decided Citation Decision for 
School/Other 
Dep. Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. Williamson 1958 325 P.2d 1045 SP 
Driskell v. Ind. School District 1958 323 P.2d 964 SD 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Purdy 1958 322 P.2d 206 SP 
St. Louis-San Francisco RR Co. v. Johnston 1958 330 P.2d 206 SD 
County Excise Board 
St. Louis-San Francisco RR Co. v. Marshall 1958 330 P.2d 203 SD 
Cnty. Exe. 
Wilds v. Golden 1958 330 P.2d 373 SD 
Burgess v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 1959 336 P .2d 1077 SD 
Dahl v. Hughes 1959 307 P.2d 248 SD 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1, McIntosh Cnty. v. Howard 1959 336 P.2d 1097 SD 
Jones v. Burkett 1959 346 P.2d 338 SD 
McCurtain Cnty. Exe. Brd. v. St. Louis-San Fran 1959 340 P.2d 313 SD 
RR 
Meinders v. BOE of Wynnewood 1959 344 P.2d 572 SD 
Osage Cnty. Exe. Brd. v. Missour-Kan-Tex RR 1959 340 P.2d 217 SD 
Co 
State v. BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 1959 339 P.2d 534 SD 
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OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1950s 
Case Name Court's 
Decision 
Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
BOE of Wakita V. Schultz AFFIRMED TRANSFER OF STUDENTS COURT FOUND THE TRANSFERS VALID AS BOE DID 
NOT FILE TRANSFER IN TIME AS PRESCRIBED BY 
LAW 
Camino v. Simon AFFIRMED OWNERSHIP OF LAND COURT FOUND THAT LAND WAS DEEDED TO 
SCHOOL DISTRICT BY DECEASED RELATIVE OF 
PLAINTIFF AND DESPITE LACK OF SCHOOL ACTIVITY 
ON LAND, PROPER OWNERSHIP REMAINED WITH 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Derieg v. Board of 
Education of Carnegie 
DISMISSED DISPOSITION OF SCHOOL COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT MAY DISPOSE OF 
Sewell v. Reinhardt AFFIRMED 
St. Louis-San Francisco AFFIRMED 
RY Co. v. Long, County 
Treasurer 
Barnett v. Allen AFFIRMED 
PROPERTY PROPERTY IT PAID TO PLACE ON LAND WITH 





PERMISSION OF OWNER AND PROCEEDS OF 
DISPOSITION IS PROPERTY OF DISTRICT 
PROPERTY OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT MAY BE 
DISPOSED OF BY THE SCHOOL DISTRICT DESPITE 
ON PROPERTY OWNED BY OTHER WHEN DEED 
STIPULATED IT REVERT BACK TO OWNER UPON 
NOT USING PROPERTY FOR SCHOOL PURPOSE. 
COURT FOUND THAT COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT 
ACTED ACCORDING TO LAW IN ORDERING 
ANNEXATION OF DISTRICTS AS WAS VOTED ON BY 
MAJORITY OF ELECTORS 
COUNTY SUPT WON IN HIS ANNEXATION ORDER AS 
THE PROCESS OF THE STATUTE WAS FOLLOWED 
WITH AN ELECTION WITH THE REQUIRED NUMBER 
ON THE PETITION AND VOTING IN FAVOR OF THE 
ANNEXATION DESPITE THE WISHES OF THE 
ANNEXING DISTRICT. 
City of Healdton ex rel. REVERSED REQUIREMENT OF COURT FOUND THAT ITWAS LEGAL TO SUE A 
Johnston V. BOE DISTRICT TO ISSUE LEVY SCHOOL DISTRICT AND REQUIRE IT TO ISSUE LEVY 
FOR DEBT OWED FOR FOR DEBT FOR STREET IMPROVEMENTS IT WAS 
PAVEMENT LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO PAY, BUT ORIGINAL 
ASSESSMENTS DECISION TO REQUIRE TO PAY PENALTY NOT 
VALID. 
Davenport V. Board of AFFIRMED LEGITIMATE TITLE OF COURT FOUND THAT ACTION BY PLAINTIFF TO 
Education SCHOOL LAND QUIET TITLE INVALID AS OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY 
Kreiger v. Cons. Dist. No. AFFIRMED 
2 
USE OF SCHOOL 
PROPERTY AFTER 
CONSOLIDATION 
WAS PROPERLY IDENTIFIED AS TO THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 
COURT FOUND THAT PROPERTY NOT INTENDED TO 
BE ABANDONED BY ANNEXED DISTRICT TO REMAIN 
PROPERTY OF DISTRICT 
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OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1950s 
Case Name Court's 
Decision 
Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
St. Louis-San Francisco AFFIRMED 
RY Co. v. Craig Cnty. 
LEGITIMACY OF 15 MILL COURT FOUND THAT PROPERLY HELD ELECTION 
INCREASED LEVY FOR INCREASED 15 MILL LEVY PROPER UNDER 
SCHOOL LAW OF 1949 AND ARTICLE 10, SECTION 9 
OF STATE CONSTITUTION Excise Brd. 
Tri-State Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
La Fon 
Wooten v. State ex rel. 
Butler, County Treasurer 
Bowen v. Brock 
Duncan v. Askew 
AFFIRMED WORKMAN'S WORKER ON A SCHOOL BUILDING WAS HURT AND 
COMPENSATION RELATED FILED CLAIM WITH INSURANCE COMPANY 
TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS PURCHASED BY AGENCY OUTSIDE OF SCHOOL AS 
WORKMAN'S COMP. SCHOOLS AT THIS TIME DID 
NOT FALL UNDER WORKMAN'S COMP AND WAS 
ENTITLED TO REWRITE POLICY 
AFFIRMED LEGITIMACY OF COUNTY COURT FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO VACANCY IN 
SUPERINTENDENT IN THE OFFICE TO WHICH TO APPOINT A COUNTY 
HOLDING OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT; THE OUSTING OF THE COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT WAS VALID. 
REVERSED REPLACEMENT OF BOE 
MEMBER AFTER 
RESIGNATION 
COURT FOUND THAT BOE MAY REPLACE BOE 
MEMBER AFTER RESIGNATION 
GRANTED WRIT FOR CERTIORARI IN COURT FOUND THAT COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT 
TRANSFER OF STUDENTS MUST APPROVE TRANSFER AS IT IS NOT 
DISCRETIONARY IN STATUTE WHEN STUDENT HAS 
COMPLETED THE GRADES OFFERED IN SENDING 
DISTRICT TO A HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Joachim v. Board of AFFIRMED ACCEPTANCE OF BID COURT FOUND THAT THE BOE IN THIS CASE AS 
Education of Walters JUST IN ASKING FOR AN ORAL INTERPRETATION OF 
A BID AND FOUND BID GOOD AS BOE HAD FRAUD 
OR BAD FAITH IN THEIR ACTION. THE PLAINTIFF 
WANTED HIS LOWER BID TO WIN. 
Liles V. Smith AFFIRMED QUIET TITLE OF LAND COURT FOUND SCHOOL DISTRICT WAS ENTITLED 
OWNERSHIP TO LAND UNDER THEORY OF ADVERSE 
POSSESSION AS PLAINTIFF WAITED TOO LONG TO 
A TIEMPT TO QUIET TITLE 
. Martin v. Cnty. Election AFFIRMED ELECTION OF COUNTY COURT FOUND THAT PERSON SEEKING 
Board SUPERINTENDENT REGISTRATION TO RUN FOR COUNTY 
Merritt Ind. Sch. Dist. No. REVERSED OWNERSHIIP OF SCHOOL 
2 v. Jones PROPERTY AFTER 
ANNEXATION AND NOT 
USED 
SUPERINTENDENT WAS RIGHTLY DENIED 
REGISTRATION AS HE DID NOT MEET STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENT OF CERTIFICATION 
COURT FOUND THAT SCHOOL PROPERTY CANNOT 
BE OBTAINED BECAUSE OF LACK OF USE BY 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
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OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1950s 
Case Name Court's 
Decision 
Mid-Continent Pipe Line AFFIRMED 
Co. v. Creek Cnty. Exe. 
Brd. 
SEBA v. Ind. Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED 
No. 3 
Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
CALCULATION OF TAX TAX LEVY ASSESSED WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AS 
LEVY CASH SURPLUS IN HAND AT CLOSE OF PREVIOUS 
.FISCAL YEAR WAS AN ACTIIVTY ACCOUNT AND NOT 
SUBJECT TO THE BALANCE CONTROLLED BY THE 
COUNTY TREASURER. CANNOT BE USED IN 
BALANCE OF DISTRICT UNLESS IN POSSESSION OF. 
AFFIRMED COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT ACTED WITHIN THE 
LAW IN CONDEMNATION OF LAND AND ACQUIRED 
LAND BY EMINENT DOMAIN FOR BUILDING OF LAND 
FOR SCHOOL GYMNASIUM AGAINST THE WISHES 
OF THE LAND OWNERS. 
Spencer V. BOE of Sch. AFFIRMED DISPOSITION OF SCHOOL COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT MAY DISPOSE OF 
Dist. No. 6 PROPERTY PROPERTY ERECTED BY SCHOOL ON PROPERTY 
State ex rel. v. Board of AFFIRMED 
Education 




EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS 
OWNED BY INDIVIDUAL 
COURT FOUNT THAT A TAXPAYER MAY BRING SUIT 
AGAINS A DISTRICT FOR MISAPPROPRIATING 
FUNDS AND BOE MEMBERS MAY BE HELD LIABLE 
FOR KNOWINGLY DOING SO. 
Board of Education V. AFFIRMED SUPERINTENDENT'S COURT FOUND THAT THE BOE MEMBER THAT WAS 
State SALARY AND LIABILITY OF A PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN 
BOE MEMBERS FOR AS A DEFENDANT AND BOE VIOLA TED THE LAW AS 
PAYING SALARY SUP'T DID NOT HAVE VALID CERTIFICATE TO BE A 
SUPERINTENDENT. 
Dominic v. Davis AFFIRMED SCHOOL ANNEXATION COURT FOUND ELECTION WAS CONDUCTED 
ELECTION PROPERLY AND EVIDENCE SUPPORTING CLAIM OF 
ILLEGAL VOTERS (BLACK) WAS NOT 
SUBSTANTIATED 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. GRANTED LEGITIMACY OF BONDS COURT FOUND THAT BONDS SHOULD BE ISSUED AS 
Williamson BY SCHOOL THE STATUTE 70 O.S. 1951, SEC. 7-1 IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 62 V. AFFIRMED ANNEXATION OF COURT FOUND THAT ANNEXATION OF DEPENDENT 
Dep. School Dist. No. 66 DEPENDENT SCHOOL SCHOOL.DISTRICT WAS VALID UNDER CURRENT 
DISTRICT STATUTE 
Ins. Sch. Dist. No. 65 v. AFFIRMED BREACH OF CONTRACT COURT FOUND THAT TEACHER WAS ENTITLED TO 
Stafford OF TEACHER BY BOE PAY AS DESCRIBED IN HER CONTRACT AND WAS 
WRONGFULLY TERMINATED BASED ON THE 
SITUATION AT HAND; ANNEXATION WITH OTHER 
DISTRICT. 
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OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1950s 
Case Name Court's 
Decision 
Issues Litigated 
State v. State Board of REVERSED REAPPORTIONMENT OF 
Education STATE AID FUNDS BY 
STATE BOARD 
York v. Garrison AFFIRMED ANNEXATION 
Bryant v. Mitchell AFFIRMED ANNEXATION 
Douglas v. Board of Cnty AFFIRMED REDUCTION OF 
Commissioners SALARYOF TEACHER BY 
Littlefield v. Howery REVERSED 
BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS 
ANNEXATION 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND THAT OTHER FEDERAL MONIES 
RECEIVED BY DISTRICTS SHOULD NOT BE USED IN 
CALCULATING MINIMUM PROGRAM INCOME THUS 
AFFECTING THE AMOUNT OF ELIGIBILITY FOR 
STATE AID 
COURT AFFIRMED THE ORDER OF THE COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT AS THE ELECTION FOR 
ANNEXATION WAS VALID AND CONDUCTED 
ACCORDING TO STATUTE 
COURT FOUND THAT THE COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT CONDUCTED THE ELECTION AS 
PRESCRIBED BY LAW AND THAT THE LAW FOR 
CONDUCTING SUCH ELECTIONS IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT FOUND THAT BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO 
REDUCE TEACHER SALARY. 
COURT FOUND THAT BLACKS WERE QUALIFIED 
ELECTORS AND WHEN CONSIDERED AS SUCH THE 
PETITION FOR ANNEXATION IN THIS CASE DID NOT 
HAVE ENOUGH SIGNATURES; THEREFORE, 
ELECTION AND RESULT WAS INVALID. 
Mundy V. Dep. Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED OWNERSHIP OF SCHOOL COURT FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF EXCEEDED 
No. 32 PROPERTY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON CHALLENGING DEED 
Murphy v. Darnell 
Sears v. Board of 
Education, Etc. 
AFFIRMED LEGITIMACY OF COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT TO 
HOLD OFFICE 
AFFIRMED PAYMENT FOR SERVICES 
NOT PROPERLY 
APPROVED BY BOE AND 
ENCUMBERED 
TO LAND 
COURT FOUND THAT WINNER OF COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT ELECTION WAS ELIGIBLE TO 
HOLD OFFICE EVEN THOUGH HE DID NOT HAVE 
ADMIN. CERTIFICATE AT TIME OF ELECTION BUT BY 
THE TIME HE TOOK OFFICE. 
COURT FOUND THAT BILL FOR SERVICES 
RENDERED BY PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PAYABLE DUE 
TO THE FACT THAT THE BOE DID NOT APPROVED 
THE EXPENDITURE NOR WAS THERE AN 
ENCUMBRANCE PRIOR TO THE WORK 
St. Louis-San Francisco AFFIRMED 
RR Co. v. Bryan Cnty. 
ESTIMATE OF NEEDS COURT FOUND THAT WHEN A SCHOOL HOLDS AN 
ELECTION FOR AN ADDITIONAL 5 MILL LEVY FOR 
THE ERECTION OF A SCHOOL BUILDING AND IT IS 
APPROVED BY EXCISE BOARD, THE FAILURE TO Ex. Brd. 
POST THE ESTIMATE OF NEEDS DOES NOT NEGATE 
THE LEVY 
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Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 65 v. AFFIRMED 





CALL FOR ANNEXATION 
ELECTION 
LEGITIMACY OF STATE 




Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT IN HIS REFUSAL TO CALL AN 
ANNEXATION ELECTION AS IT IS THE JOB OF THE 
COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT TO VERIFY THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE PETITION AND THE VALIDITY OF 
THE SIGNATURES 
THE COURT FOUND THAT THE TIME CONSTRAINTS 
PLACED ON THE STATE IN NOTIFYING THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF ITS CHANGE IN STATUS WAS MOOT AS 
THE LEGISLATURE CHANGED THE NOTICE 
REQUIRMENT FOUND IN 70 O.S. 1951, SEC. 4-2. 
Jones V. McKenzie REVERSED PROPERTY COURT FOUND THAT BUILDING ON PROPERTY 
OWNED BY SCHOOL DISTRICT WAS DISTRICT 
PROPERTY BUT COST OF REMOVAL WAS AT ISSUE. 
COST OF SUCH REMOVAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT 
THE EXPENSE OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Loper V. Shumate GRANTED REMOVAL OF BOE COURT FOUND THAT INFERIOR JUDGE ACTED 
MEMBER FROM BOARD INCORRECTLY IN ORDERING REMOVAL OF BOE 
MEMBER FROM BOARD AS THE STATUTE WAS 
MISAPPLIED. 
Matlock v. Board of Cnty. AFFIRMED LEGITIMACY OF BOND COURT FOUND THAT PROCESS OF BOND ELECTION 
Commissioners ELECTION PROCESS FOR IMPROVEMENTOF SEPARATE SCHOOLS WAS 
Sch. Dist. No. 22, Osage GRANTED 
Cnty. v. Worten 
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN LIGHT OF THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT CASE BROWN V. BOE 
TRANSFER OF STUDENTS COURT GRANTED DISTRICT'S REQUEST FOR COURT 
TO DENY INFERIOR JUDGE'S DECISION TO GRANT 
THE TRANSFER OF 11 STUDENTS TO DISTRICT. 
SENDING SCHOOL HAD PROGRAM OF STUDY 
NEEDED BY STUDENTS 
State V. State Board of REVERSED STATE AID TO SCHOOL COURT FOUND THAT IN COMPUTING MINIMUM 
Education PROGRAM INCOME, THE SCHOOL DOES NOT HAVE 
TO INCLUDE REVENE THAT MAY BE RECEIVED, 
ONLY REVENUE KNOWN TO BE RECEIVED. STATE 
AID WAS IMPROPERLY REDUCED BY STATE. 
State v. State Board of AFFIRMED STATE EQUALIZATOIN AID COURT FOUND THAT INCLUSION OF ESTIMATED 
Education TO SCHOOL AMOUNT OF FEDERAL FLOOD RELIEF SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN INCLUDED IN ESTIMATE OF NEEDS THUS 
AFFECTING MINIMUM PROGRAM INCOME AND 
ELIGIBILITY FOR STATE AID 
State v. State Board of AFFIRMED STATE AID TO SCHOOL COURT FOUND THAT FLOOD CONTROL RENTALS 
Education INCLUDED IN ESTIMATE AND CALCULATION IN 
MINIMUM PROGRAM INCOME BY STATE VALID EVEN 
IF OVERESTIMATED BECAUSE ALL IS ESTIMATED. 
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Grand Lodge of Okla., 
Etc. V. Webb 




Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
SCHOOL PROPERTY ' COURT FOUND THAT THE PROPER 
OWNERSHIP OWNERSHIP OF LAND WAS IN THE LAND OF 
THE DECENDENT OF THE PERSON WHO 
PROVIDED THE LAND TO THE SCHOOL. WHEN 
THE PROPERTY CEASED TO BE USED AS A 
SCHOOL, IT REVERTED BACK TO THE OWNER 
ACTION TO QUIET TITLE COURT FOUND THAT THE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
TO PROPERTY IN WAS NOT IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY 
DISPUTE BETWEEN AS IT HAD NEVER OBTAINED TITLE TO THE 
CHURCH AND SCHOOL PROPERTY; COURT WILL ERR ON THE SIDE 
OF THE ONE WHO POSSESSES THE 
PROPERTY. 
Kiowa Cnty. Exe. Brd. REVERSED/AFFIRMED GENERAL FUND TAX ALL PUPILS ATTENDING SCHOOL SHALL BE 
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING THE 
NEED FOR A LEVY AND FOUND 70 O.S. SUPP. 
v. St. Louis-San Fran IN PART LEVY 
RR 
State v. State Board of 
Education 
Duncan v. Golden 
Mid-Continent Pipe 
Line Co. v. Stephens 
County 
Smith v. Ind. Sch. Dist. 
No. 16 
Board of Adjustment v. 






1955 SEC 4-40 UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR ALL CURRENT 
EXPENSES BE USED IN THE CALCULATION OF 
STATE AID TO SCHOOL COURT FOUND THAT MINIMUM PROGRAM 
INCOME CALCULATION BY STATE MUST 
INCLUDE LEGALLY ESTIMATED INCOME FROM 
SOURCES OTHER THAN AD VALOREM TAXES, 
AND DISTRICTS WHICH EXPECTED TO 
RECEIVE FEDERAL FOREST RESERVE FUNDS, 
TRANSFER OF 
STUDENTS 
ESTIMATE OF NEEDS 




COURT FOUND THAT THE COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT CORRECTLY DENIED THE 
TRANSFER REQUESTS OF STUDENTS FROM 
TWO DISTRICTS THAT BOTH PROVIDED 
SECONDARY PROGRAMS FOR H.S. 
GRADUATION. 
COURT FOUND THAT INCOME FROM DISTRICT 
THAT IS NOT LISTED LEGISTLATIVELY AS 
RECURRENT DOES NOT REDUCE THE NEED 
OF THE DISTRICT UNTIL IT BECOMES 
RECURRENT, IN THIS CASE OIL AND GAS 
FROM WELL ON SCHOOL PROPERTY. 
COURT FOUND THAT APPEAL WAS NOT FILED 
WITHIN STATUTORY GUIDELINES TO 
SUPREME COURT. 
SCHOOL'S REQUEST COURT AFFIRMED LOWER COURTS ORDER 
FOR VARIANCE TO TO GRANT THE VARIANCE AND ALLOW THE 
ZONING IN SCHOOL TO CONSTRUCT THE PARKING LOTS. 
RESIDENTIAL ZONING COURT FOUND THAT THE FAILURE OF THE 
ORDINANCE TO SPECIFICALLY ALLOW 
FOR A PARKING LOT PARKING LOTS DOES NOT PROHIBIT THEM. 
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Butler v. Prokop 
Court's 
Decision 
Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
REVERSED VACANCY OF SCHOOL COURT FOUND THAT THE CASE WAS DISMISSED AT 
BOARD POSITION THE LOWER COURT LEVEL BUT WRONGLY 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. COURT STATED THAT 
CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE AND PLAINTIFF MAY RE-FILE. 
Dep. Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. GRANTED WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO COURT FOUND THAT SCHOOL TRANSPORTATION 
EQUIPMMENT JS INCLUDED IN THE MEANING OF 
EQUIPMENT IN ART. 10, SEC. 26 OF THE OKLA. 
Williamson REQUIRE APPROVAL OF 
BOND ISSUE 
CONSTITUTION. ALSO 10% INDEBTEDNESS FOR 
TRANSPORTATION EQUIP. NOT VIOLATE CONST. 
Driskell v. Ind. School SUSTAINED ORIGINAL ACTION TO COURT FOUND THAT SCHOOLS ARE NOT 
MUNICIPALITIES UNDER THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION LAWS OF OKLAHOMA AT, THIS 
TIME. 
District REVIEW ORDER BY STATE 
AGENCY 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. DISMISSED VIOLATION OF CONTRACT CASE WAS DISMISSED BY COURT AS THE 
Purdy BY TEACHER DEFENDANT TEACHER DID NOT FILE NOTICE IN THE 
SUPREME COURT WITHIN THE 15 DAY LIMIT AS 
PRESCRIBED BY COURT RULES. 
St. Louis-San Francisco 
RR Co. v. Johston Cny. 
Exe. 
AFFIRMED LEGITIMACY OF TAX LEVY THE ERRORS MADE IN THE ESTIMATE OF NEEDS 
DID NOT WARRANT VOIDING THE TAX LEVY. 
ESTIMATE ONLY MENTIONED ERECTING A BULDING 
AND DID NOT MENTION FURNITURE. ESTIMATE 
ALSO TREATED ASSETS FOR USE IN BUILDING AS 
COMING FROM OTHER THAN AD VALOREM. 
St. Louis-San Francisco AFFIRMED 
RR Co. v. Marshall Cnty. 
LEGITIMACY OF SCHOOL COURT FOUND THAT THE ELECTION WHICH CALLED 
TAXES FOR THE ERECTION OF SCHOOL BUILDING IS NOT 
NULLIFIED BY ESTIMATE CALLING FOR 
REMODELING, FURNITURE, AND ERECTING A 
BULDING. 
Exe. 
Wilds v. Golden AFFIRMED ANNEXATION ELECTION COURT FOUND THAT A PETITION GIVEN TO THE 
COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT TO CALL FOR AN 
ANNEXATION IS NOT INVALID BECAUSE IT DOES 
NOT LIST THE SCHOOL BUILDING, WITH ITS SITE, TO 
BE INCLUDED IN THE ANNEXATION. 
Burgess v. Ind. Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED ATTEMPT TO QUIET TITLE COURT FOUND THAT SCHOOL OWNED PROPERTY 
No. 1 OF PROPERTY DESPITE THE FACT THE GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
Dahl v. Hughes 
AND GOVERNMENT DESCRIPTION OF PROPERY 
WERE NOT ENTIRELY ACCURATE. 
AFFIRMED PERSONAL INURY OF COURT FOUND THAT THE GENERAL RULE OF 
STUDENT SCHOOLS ARE OPERATED BY THE STATE AND 
LIABILITY OF STUDENTS AND SCHOOLS IS NOT 
PRESENT AS SCHOOLS PERFORM GOVERNMENTAL 
FUNCTION. 
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Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
McIntosh Cnty. v. 
Howard 
Jones v. Burkett 
McCurtain Cnty. Exe. 
Brd. v. St. Louis-San 
Fran RR 







Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
CONTRACT FOR SALE COURT FOUND THAT THOSE WHO CONTRACT 
OF ITEMS TO SCHOOL TO SALE ITEMS TO SCHOOL DO SO WITH 
ANNEXATION 
TAX PROTEST OF 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
EMERGENCY 5 MILL 
LEVY 
ACTION BY PLAINTIFFS 
TO QUIET TITLE OF 
SCHOOL PROPERTY 
ASSUMPTION THEY KNOW THE LAW AND 
RULES FOR SUCH SALE, SUCH AS 
ENCUMBRANCE, IN CURRENT FISCAL YEAR, 
EXPENDITURE APPROVED BY THE BOE, ETC. 
COURT FOUND THAT CERTAIN ELECTORS 
WHO PARTICIPATED IN ANNEXATION 
ELECTION WERE NOT VALID ELECTORS AS 
THE DID NOT MEET THE 30 DAY RESIDENCE 
REQUIREMENT 
COURT REVERSED LOWER COURT AND 
FOUND THAT SCHOOL DISTRICTS MAY 
ISSUED THE 5 MILL EMERGENCY LEVY IF 
SUSTAINED BY THE VOTE OF THE ELECTORS 
OF THE DISTRICT. SUCH CANNOT BE DENIED 
IF LAW AND PROCEDURES ARE FOLLOWED. 
COURT FOUND THAT SCHOOL THAT 
RECEIVES LAND UNDER CONDEMNATION 
PROCEEDINGS AFTER 15 YEARS, FREE 
SIMPLE TITLE FOR THE SCHOOL OCCURS. 
Osage Cnty. Exe. Brd. REVERSED/AFFIRMED EMERGENCY LEVIES COURT FOUND THAT CAPITAL OUTLAY 
EXPENDITURES DO NOT FALL IN THE 
CATEGORY OF CURRENT EXPENSES, SO NOT 
IN CONFLICT WITH CONSTITUTION, BUT 
SECTION OF 70 O.S. 1957 SUPP, SEC 4-40 
WHICH CALL FOR SUCH TO BE INLCUDED IS 
v. Missour-Kan-Tex IN PART 
RR Co 
State v. BOE of Ind. AFFIRMED 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 
COMPOSITION OF COURT FOUND THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
SCHOOL BOARD AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATE 
FOUND IT APPROPRIATE FOR THE TULSA 
SCHOOL DISTRICT TO HAVE 7 BOE MEMBERS 
AS PRESCRIBED BY ITS ORDINANCE AND MAY 
FILL IT BY ORDINANCE. 
TABLE XI 
ISSUES AND PERCENTAGES LITIGATED IN THE 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT: 1950s · 
CATEGORY - Total NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Number of Cases = 68 DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT OF CASES OF CASES PLAINTIFF PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT DEFENDANT 
Finance Issues 29 42.65% 8 11.76% 21 30.88% 
District Issues 27 39.70% 19 27.94% 8 11.76% 
Personnel Issues 11 16.18% 10 14.70% 1 .0147% 
District v. District 1 1.470% N/A N/A N/A N/A Issues 
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TABLE XII 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES WON AND LOST 
BY OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 1950s 
CATEGORY NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Cases Won By School Districts 49 73.13% 
Cases Lost by School Districts 18 26.87% 
220 
Sixty-eight cases were adjudicated in the 1950s. One case during this decade involved 
one school district as the plaintiff and another as the defendant. This case was not 
included in the statistics. 
Cases Won by Districts as Plaintiff 11 16.42% 
Cases Won by Districts as Defendant 38 56.72% 
Cases Lost by Districts as Plaintiff 8 11.94% 





















OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1960s 
Case Name Date Decided Citation Decision for 
School/Other* 
Pushmataha Cnty. v. St. Louis-San Francisco RY 1960 354 P.2d 404 SD 
St. Louis - San Francisco RY Co. v. McCurtain Cnty. 1960 352 P.2d 896 SD 
Craig v. Unknown Heirs, Etc Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1-29 1961 358 P.2d 835 OD 
Hatfield v. Jimmerson 1961 365 P.2d 980 SD 
Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Ind. Sch. Dist. 1961 363 P.2d 835 ss 
Afterburn v. Summers 1962 372 P.2d 614 SD 
Board of Education v. City of Vinita 1962 376 P.2d 276 SD 
Edwards v. Pierce 1962 376 P.2d 269 SD 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 52 v. Antone 1963 384 P.2d 911 OD 
Hines v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 50, Grant Cnty. 1963 380 P.2d 943 OD 
In Re Warren School District Election 1963 384 P.2d 49 SD 
Gray v. BOE of Pawhuska Ind. Sch. Dist. 1964 389 P.2d 498 SD 
State v. BOE of Dep. Sch. Dist. No. D-38 1964 389 P.2d 356 OD 
West v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 2, McClain Cnty. 1965 412 P.2d 185 SP 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Hunter 1966 414 P.2d 231 OD 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Glendenning 1967 431 P.2d 832 SP 
City of Idabel v. Sch. Dist. No. 5 1967 434 P.2d 285 OD 















TABLE XIII (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1960s 
Case Name Date Decided Citation Decision for 
School/Other 
Morrison v. BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 6 1967 424 P.2d 963 SD 
Caddo Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1-5 v. Sampson 1968 447 P.2d 765 SD 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 35 of Cherokee Cnty. v. Doty 1968 448 P.2d 846 SD 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 40, Ottawa Cnty. v. Allen 1968 446 P.2d 282 OP 
Oklahoma Farm Bureau v. State Brd. of Educ. 1968 444 P.2d 162 N/A 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Tulsa Cnty. v. Wright 1969 460 P.2d 422 SD 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Maris 1969 458 P.2d 305 SP 
Choctaw Cnty. Excise Brd. v. St. Lious-San Fran 1969 456 P.2d 545 SD 
In re Hickory School District D-3, Murray Cnty. 1969 454 P.2d 670 OD 
In re Wickstrum 1969 454 P.2d 660 SD 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 25, Adair Cnty. v. Smith 1969 463 P.2d 332 SP 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. State Brd. of Education 1969 451 P.2d 684 SD 
222 
*Key for "Decision" Column: The first letter designates the winner in the case. "S" = 
School; "0" = Other (Taxpayer, Agency, Business, etc.). "N/A" = A school was not a 
plaintiff or defendant in the case yet the case concerned public schools. "SS" = a school 
v. a school. The second letter indicates whether the school was a plaintiff ("P") or 
defendant ( "D") . 
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TABLE XIV 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1960s 
Case Name Court's 
Decision 
Pushmataha Cnty. v. St. REVERSED 
Louis-San Francisco RY 
St. Louis - San Francisco AFFIRMED 
RY Co. v. McCurtain 
Cnty. 
Craig v. Unknown Heirs, REVERSED 
Etc Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1-
29 
Hatfield v. Jimmerson AFFIRMED 
Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Ind. REVERSED 
Sch. Dist. 







ESTIMATE OF NEEDS 
OWNERSHIP OF 





Board of Education v. REVERSED CLOSING AN 
· City of Vinita 
Edwards v. Pierce 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 
BUILDING BY DISTRICT 
AFFIRMED ANNEXATION 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND THAT LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
FINDING THE DISTRICT INCORRECTLY APPLIED 
EXPENDITURES TO THE BULDING FUND AND 
CHARGED THE GENERAL FUNO. 
COURT FOUND THAT CLASSIFICATION OF 
EXPENDITURES IN ESTIMATE OF NEEDS AS 
CURRENT EXPENSES RATHER THAN CAPITAL 
OUTLAYS WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF 
STATUTE OR STATE BOARD RULE. 
COURT FOUND THAT PROPERTY NOT USED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH HOW IT WAS DEEDED TO 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, AS IT WAS UNUSED BY THE 
DISTRICT SUPPLIED SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR THE 
DEED TO REVERT BACK TO THE HEIRS. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE ANNEXATION OF THE 
DEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT TO AN 
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT WAS 
CONDUCTED BY THE COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT 
ACCORDING TO STATUTE AND BY ELECTION. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE ANNEXATION OF THREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS INTO ONE WAS NOT 
CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO STATUTE AND THE 
COUNT SUPERINTENDENT ERRED IN APPROVING 
THE ANNEXATION. 
COURT FOUND THAT ORDER FOR COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT FOR ANNEXATION OF DISTRICT 
WAS PROPER AND ACCORDING TO STATUTE. 
COURT FOUND THAT LOWER COURT WAS IN 
ERROR WITH GRANTING INJUNCTION AGAINST 
SCHOOL DISTRICT PROHIBITING THE CLOSING OF 
AN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AS SUCH IS A 
DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE BOE 
COURT FOUND THAT THE RUDIMENTS OF A 
PETITION FOR AN ELECTION FOR AN ANNEXATION 
HAD NOT BEEN MET AND THE COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT WAS AFFIRMED FOR NOT 
CALLING AN ELECTION. 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED BUSSING OF PAROCHIAL COURT AGREED WITH LOWER COURT IN GRANTING 
No. 52 V. Antone STUDENTS PERMANENT INJUNCTION PREVENTING SCHOOL 
DISTRICT FROM BUSSING STUDENTS ATIENDING 
PAROCHIAL SCHOOL TO AND FROM THE 
PAROChllAL SCHOOL 
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TABLE XIV (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1960s 
Case Name Court's 
Decision 
Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
Hines V. Ind. Sch. Dist. REVERSED TRANSFER OF STUDENT COURT FOUND THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
No. 50, Grant Cnty. NOT GRANTING THE TRANSFER OF A STUDENT 
FROM A DEPENDENT DISTRICT UPON COMPLETION 
OF 8TH GRADE TO A HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
In Re Warren School AFFIRMED ANNEXATION COURT FOUND THAT ANNEXATION PETITION AND 
District Election ELECTION HELD AND DECISION MADE BY COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT TO APPROVE ANNEXATION WAS 
CONDUCTED AND APPROVED ACCORDING TO 
STATUTE. 
Gray v. BOE of AFFIRMED SCHOOL ATIENDANCE IN COURT FOUND THAT STUDENTS WERE ENTITLED 
Pawhuska Ind. Sch. Dist. DISTRICT OTHER THAN TO ATTEND SCHOOL IN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH 
WHERE PARENTS LIVE THEIR PARENTS LIVED AND LIVING WITH 
GRANDPARENTS WHO WERE NOT GUARDIANS IN 
ANOTHER DISTRICT DOES NOT GRANT 
ENTITLEMENT TO ATTEND. 
State v. BOE of Dep. AFFIRMED CONTRACT/SALARY OF COURT FOUND THAT TEACHER, WHO WAS ALSO A 
Sch. Dist. No. D-38 SCHOOL EMPLOYEE STATE REPRESENTATIVE, SHOULD RECEIVE HIS 
SALARY AS A TEACHER BUT IN THE FUTURE SHALL 
NOT BE ELIGIBLE OR THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED. 
West v. Ind. Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED LIABILITY COURT FOUND THAT PRIVATE COMPANY CAR THAT 
No. 2, McClain Cnty. HAD HIT AND DAMAGED A SCHOOL BUS WAS LIABLE 
FOR THE DAMAGES TO THE BUS. 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 8 V. AFFIRMED ADVERSE POSSESSION SCHOOL DISTRICT OCCUPIED AND USED A PIECE 
Hunter OF LAND OWNED IN TITLE BY A PRIVATE PARTY. 
COURT FOUND THAT ADVERSE POSSESSION WAS 
NOT FOUND FOR THE DISTRICT IN THIS CASE. 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 v. Glendenning 
AFFIRMED TRANSFER OF STUDENT COURT FOUND THAT LOWER COURT JUDGE ERRED 
IN OVERTURNING THE DENIAL OF STUDENT 
TRANSFERS BY THE COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT. 
City of Idabel v. Sch. Dist. REVERSED 
No. 5 
High Hill Rural AFFIRMED 
Development v. Great 
Plains Rural 
LIABILITY OF SCHOOL 
DISTRICT IN PA YING 
IMPROVEMENT BONDS 
FOR UNIMPROVED LAND 
COLLECTION OF 
INSURANCE FOR FIRE 
POLICY 
COURT FOUND THAT SCHOOL DISTICT WAS LIABLE 
FOR ITS SHARE OF THE COST OF DELINQUENT 
IMPROVEMENT BONDS ON IMPROVED LAND OWNED 
BY THE DISTRICT. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE INSURANCE COMPANY 
WHICH CARRIED THE FIRE POLICY FOR THE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT HAD TO PAY THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT FOR THE BUILDING DESTROYED BY FIRE 
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE BUILDING WAS NOT 
USED BY THE DISTRICT. 
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TABLE XIV (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1960s 
Case Name Court's 
Decision 
Morrison v. BOE of Ind. AFFIRMED 
Sch. Dist. No. 6 
Caddo Ind. Sch. Dist. No. REVERSED 




Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 35 of REVERSED TRANSFER OF STUDENT 
Cherokee Cnty. v. Doty 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 40, AFFIRMED TITLE TO PROPERTY 
Ottawa Cnty. v. Allen 
State Farm Bureau v. DENIED CONSTITUTIONAL 
State Brd. of Educ. ACTIONS OF STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED WORKER'S 
No. 1, Tulsa Cnty. v. COMPENSATION 
Wright 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND THAT BONDS APPROVED BY BOE 
AND VOTERS WERE LEGITIMATE AND WERE 
PROPERLY ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION OF 
SCHOOL BUILDING. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE ANNEXATION OF TWO 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE 
COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT ACCORDING TO 
STATUTE AND BY THE ELECTION HELD. PROTEST 
WAS INCORRECTLY FILED WITH WRONG SUP'T. 
COURT GRANTED CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE 
DECISION OF A DISTRICT COURT JUDGE IN 
APPROVING THE TRANFERS OF SEVENTEEN 
STUDENTS FROM A SCHOOL DISTRICT TO 
ANOTHER. COURT REVERSED ORDER. 
COURT FOUND THAT SCHOOL DISTRICT WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO OWN LAND PREVIOUSLY GRANTED 
TO A SCHOOL DISTICT THAT HAD BEEN ANNEXED. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
REGULATIONS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENTOF 
EDUCATION, AS AUTHORIZED BY THE STATE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND STATUTES, IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL, SPECIFICALLY IN THE AREA OF 
ACCREDITATION. 
COURT FOUND THAT CUSTODIAN WHO WAS 
INJURED WHILE WORKING FOR THE SCHOOL WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS ACCORDING TO THE WORKMAN'S 
COMPENSATION ACT. 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. AFFIRMED TRANSFER OF STUDENT COURT FOUND THAT LOWER COURT JUDGE WAS 
No. 2 V. Maris IN ERROR IN GRANTING TRANSFERS OF STUDENTS 
Choctaw Cnty. Excise REVERSED 
Brd. v. St. Loius-San 
Fran 
In re Hickory School AFFIRMED · 
District D-3, Murray Cnty. 
SINKING FUND 
ANNEXATION 
FROM ONE IND. SCH. DISTRICT TO ANOTHER. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE SINKING FUND LEVY 
ISSUED BY THE COUNTY EXCISE BOARD FOR A 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE SCHOOL DISTRICT WAS 
VALID AND THE PROPER METHOD FOR A SCHOOL 
DISTRICT TO PAY A JUDGMENT. 
COURT FOUND THE ANNEXATION ELECTION OF 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS VOID AND THE PETITION FOR 
THE ELECTION WAS DEFECTIVE ACCORDING TO 
REQUIREMENTS OF STATUTE. 
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TABLE XIV (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1960s 
Case Name Court's 
Decision 
Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
In re Wickstrum AFFIRMED SCHOOL ANNEXATION COURT FOUND THAT ANNEXATION BY COUNTY 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 25, REVERSED STUDENT TRANSFER 
Adair Cnty. v. Smith 
SUPERINTENDENT WAS CORRECT IN AFFIRMING 
THE ANNEXATION AS THE PETITION AND ELECTION 
FOR THE ANNEXATION WERE CONDUCTED 
ACCORDING TO STATUTE. 
COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ERRED IN APPROVING THE TRANSFERS OF 
TWENTY STUDENTS FROM DISTRICT TO OTHER. 
FOUND TOPOGRAPHY WAS NOT PROPER 
GROUNDS FOR TRANSFER. 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. AFFIRMED SCHOOL ANNEXATION PATRONS OF AN ANNEXED DISTRICT SOUGHT TO 
State Brd. of Education DISQUALIFY THE ANNEXATION THAT TOOK PLACE 
IN 1949. CbURT FOUND THAT STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS, LACHES APPLIED. 
TABLE XV 
ISSUES AND PERCENTAGES LITIGATED IN THE 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT: 1960s 
CATEGORY -Total NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT Number of Cases = 30 OF CASES OF CASES PLAINTIFF PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT DEFENDANT 
Finance Issues 8 26.67% 1 12.50% 7 87.50% 
District Issues 19 63.33% 2 · 10.53% 17 89.47% 
Personnel Issues 1 3.33% 0 14.70% 1 100% 
District v. District/ 2 6.67% N/A N/A N/A N/A Other Issues 
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TABEXVI 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES WON AND LOST 
BY OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 1960s 
CATEGORY NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Cases Won By School Districts 20 71.43% 
Cases Lost by School Districts 8 28.57% 
Thirty cases were adjudicated in the 1960s. One case during this decade involved one 
school district as the plaintiff and another as the defendant. Another case involved a . 
private organization as the plaintiff and the State Board of Education as the defendant. 
These cases were not included in the statistics. 
Cases Won by Districts as Plaintiff 4 14.29% 
Cases Won by Districts as Defendant 16 57.14% 
Cases Lost by Districts as Plaintiff 1 3.57% 





















OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1970s 
Case Name Date Citation 
Decided 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 20 v. Adams 1970 465 P.2d 464 
Gammil v. Shackelford 1970 480 P.2d 920 
Hendricks v. McCreary 1970 467 P.2d 478 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 53 v. Ind. Sch. Dist. 1-128 1970 474 P.2d 643 
State Ex Rel. Darnell v. State Board of Educ. 1970 475 P.2d 181 
Tryon Depend. Sch. Dist. No. 125 v. Carrier 1970 474 P.2d 131 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Overton 1971 491 P.2d 278 
Goble v. Mazie Dep. Sch. Dist. D-32 1971 488 P.2d 156 
Haller v. Austin 1971 487 P .2d 1360 
Marshall v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa Cnty. 1971 485 P.2d 1052 
Swezey v. Fisher 1971 484 P.2d 501 
C&C Tile v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 7 ofTulsa Cnty. 1972 503 P.2d 554 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 16 v. Reed 1972 503 P.2d 1265 
Kitchens v. McGowen 1972 503 P.2d 218 
In re Transfer of Students 1973 507 P.2d 543 
Lovelace v. Ingram 1973 518 P.2d 1102 







































TABLE XIX (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1970s 
Case Name Date Citation 
Decided 
State v. Brunson 1973 513 P.2d 872 
Adams v. Professional Practices Commission 1974' 524 P.2d 935 
BOE of D.S.D. No. 32 v. State BOE 1974 521 P.2d 390 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 48 v. Rives 1974 531 P.2d 335 
Ind. Sch. Dist. N. 89 v. McReynolds 1974 528 P.2d 313 
Assn. of Classroom Teachers v. Sch. Dist. No. 89 1975 540 P.2d 
1171 
Christian v. State Board of Education 1975 540 P.2d 570 
Martin v. Harrah Ind. Sch. Dist. 1975 543 P.2d 
1370 
Oldham v. Drummond BOE, Ind. Sch. Dist. 1-85 1975 542 P.2d 
1309 
Hennessey v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 4 1976 552 P.2d 
1142 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Lollar 1976 547 P.2d 
1324 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 8 of Seiling v. Swanson 1976 553 P. 2d 496 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1-2 v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1-23 1976 553 P.2d 150 
Assn. of Classroom Teachers v. Ind. Sch. Dist. 1977 571 P.2d 847 
Assn. of Classroom Teachers v. Moore Brd. of Educ. 1977 567 P.2d 979 
Haynes v. Pryor High School 1977 566 P.2d 852 































TABLE XIX (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1970s 
Case Name Date Citation Decision for 
Decided School/Other 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa City v. Albus 1977 572 P.2d 554 SP 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 40 v. Sarkey's, Inc. 1977 569 P.2d 1000 SP 
Assn. of Classroom Teachers v. Brd. Of Educ. 1978 576 P.2d 1157 SD 
Cavett v. Geary Brd. of Education 1978 587 P.2d 991 SD 
Graybill v. State Brd. of Education 1978 585 P.2d 1358 SD 
Goodin v. Board of Education, Etc. 1979 601 P.2d 88 SP 
Haskell Lemon Const. v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 12 1979 589 P.2d 677 SD 
Sarkeys v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 40, Etc. 1979 592 P.2d 529 SD 
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*Key for "Decision" Column: The first letter designates the winner in the case. "S" = School; "O" = Other (Taxpayer, Agency. 
Business, etc.). "NIA"= A school was not a plaintiff or defendant in the case yet the case concerned public schools. "ss·· = a school 
v. a school. The second letter indicates whether the school was a plaintiff ("P") or defendant ("D"). 
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TABLE XVIII 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1970s 
Case Name 
BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. 





Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 53 
v. Ind. Sch. Dist. 1-128 
State Ex Rel. Darnell 
v. State Board of 
Educ. 
Tryon Depend. Sch. 
Dist. No. 125 V. 
Carrier 
Fireman's Fund Ins. 
Co. v. Overton 
Goble v. Mazie Dep. 
Sch. Dist. D-32 






























Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT JUDGE DID NOT 
HAVE THE EVIDENCE, AS PRESCRIBED AS THE 
REFUSAL OF THE RECEIVING SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, NEEDED IN ORDER TO REFUSE THE 
TRANSFERS. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION HAD AUTHORITY AND 
CORRECTLY DENIED ACCREDITATION TO THE 
TRYON SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
COURT FOUND BOE MEMBERS COULD STRIKE 
THEIR NAMES FROM A PETITION FOR AN 
ANNEXATION ELECTION AND THE COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT ACTED ACCORDINGLY. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE TRANSFER OF FUNDS 
FROM ANNEXED DISTRICT TO THE NEW 
DISTRICT WAS CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO 
LAW, DESPITE THE ARGUMENTS OF AN 
INTERVENING DISTRICT THAT IT WAS ENTITLED 
TO A PORTION. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE STATE WAS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR APPORTIONING MONEY TO 
THE COUNTY FOR A PORTION OF THE SALARY 
OF THE COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT. 
COURT FOUND THAT SCHOOL DISTRICTS WERE 
ANNEXED IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE LAW. THREE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
ANNEXATIONS WERE COMBINED WITH ONE 
DECISION AS ALL DISTRICTS WERE INVOLVED. 
COURT FOUND THAT SCHOOL EMPLOYEE 
WHOSE SALARY WAS PAID OUT OF 
APPROPRIATED FUNDS WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
INSURANCE BENEFITS PAID BY DISTRICT AS HE 
WAS INJURED WHILE OUTSIDE OF HIS JOB AS 
TEACHER AND PAID BY ACTIVITY ACCOUNT, 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS THAT WERE ANNEXED 
DISAGREED OVER WHICH SCHOOL DISTRICT 
BECAME THE CONTROLING BOARD AFTER THE 
ANNEXATION. COURT REVERSED THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AND 
AWARDED NEW. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE PETITION CALLING 
FOR AN ANNEXATION ELECTION WAS VAL.ID 
AND DIRECTED THE COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT TO HOLD THE ELECTION 
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TABLE XX (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1970s 
Case Name 
Marshall v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa 
Cnty. 
Swezey v. Fisher 
C&C Tile v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 7 of Tulsa 
Cnty. 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 16 
v. Reed 
Kitchens v. McGowen 
In re Transfer of 
Students 
Lovelace v. Ingram 
Schickram v. Kay 
Cnty. Sup't. of 
Schools 































Decision & Final Resolutions 
THE DEPENDENT OF A SCHOOL EMPLOYEE 
WHO DIED ON THE JOB FILED SUIT SEEKING A 
CLAIM UNDER WORKER'S COMPENSATION. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE 
EMPLOYER/WORKER'S COMPENSATION WAS 
NOT LIABLE FOR ACCIDENTS. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE CONFLICT CREATED 
BY THE ANNEXATION OF TWO SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS FOR THREE SCHOOL DISTRICTS DID 
NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT REASON TO 
OVERTURN THE ANNEXATION AS ITWAS 
CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO LAW. 
COURT FOUND THAT INSURANCE COMPANY 
WAS NOT ABLE TO GET A RETURN FROM A 
LOAN IN TRUST IT HAD PAID THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT IN ANTICIPATION FOR PAYING A 
CLAIM FOR THE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
COURT FOUND THAT ERRORS WERE MADE IN 
JURY TRIAL AND LIABILITY FOR BUS ACCIDENT 
WAS REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR 
DETERMINATION. 
COURT FOUND NO CAUSE TO ASSUME 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE AS 
OTHER CASES HAD DECIDED SIMILAR ISSUES 
AND THE COURTS DOCKET WAS FULL. 
COURT FOUND THAT ORIGINAL ORDER OF 
COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT TO APPROVE 
TRANSFER REQUESTS OF STUDENTS WAS 
VALID AS TIME LIMITS PRESCRIBED IN 70 O.S. 8-
103. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE LETTER SENT TO THE 
TEACHER DESRIBING HER TERMINATION DID 
NOT MEET STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AS IT 
DID NOT STIPULATE A STATUTORY CAUSE. 
COURT FOUND THAT COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT APPROVED ANNEXATION 
ACCORDING TO LAW AND THAT THE ELECTION 
HELD APPROVING THE ANNEXATION WAS 
CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO LAW. 
COURT GRANTED WRIT OF ORIGINAL 
JURISDICTION IN HEARING A WRIT TO DENY 
THE APPROVAL OF THE TRANSFER OF 
STUDENTS. COURT HELD TRANSFERS WERE 
NOT VALID ACCORDING TO LAW. 
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TABLE XX (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 






BOE of Ind. Sch. Dist. 
No. 48 v. Rives 
Ind. Sch. Dist. N. 89 
v. McReynolds 
Assn. of Classroom 
Teachers v. Sch. Dist. 
No. 89 
Christian v. State 
Board of Education 
Martin v. Harrah Ind. 
Sch. Dist. 
Oldham v. Drummond 
BOE, Ind. Sch. Dist. I-
85 
Hennessey v. Ind. 
Sch. Dist. No. 4 






















NEGOTIATIONS & THIRD 
















Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND THAT THE PROFESSIONAL 
PRACTICES COMMISSION INCORRECTLY 
REVERSED THE DECISION TO TERMINATE A 
TEACHER AS IT HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH THE 
STATUTE. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE APPROVAL OF 
STUDENT TRANSFERS WAS DONE SO 
CONTRARY TO LAW AND SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN APPROVED. 
COURT FOUND THAT LOWER COURT AND 
STATE INDUSTRIAL COURT WERE CORRECT IN 
AWARDING DEATH BENEFITS TO SPOUSE OF 
SCHOOL EMPLOYEE WHO DIED WHILE 
WORKING. 
COURT FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE TEACHER 
ASSOCIATION THAT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
ALLOWED FORA THIRD PARTY THAT WAS 
MUTUALLY AGREED UPON TO ACT AS A FACT 
FINDING CHAIRPERSON 
COURT FOUND THAT THE COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN 
ADDITIONAL TEN PERCENT IN SAL.ARY. COURT 
FOUND THAT LOCAL BOARD DID NOT VIOLATE 
OPEN MEETING LAW IN VOTE TO NOT RE-HIRE 
SUPERINTENDENT. 
COURT REVERSED THE LOWER COURT AND 
UPHELD THE TERMINATION OF A TEACHER 
FROM A SCHOOL DISTRICT. TEACHER FAILED 
TO COMPLY WITH STATE AND DISTRICT 
REQUIREMENTS. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE BOE DID VIOLA TED 
THE OPEN MEETING LAW IN TERMINATING A 
TEACHER IN THE DISTRICT. 
COURT FOUND THAT PTA WAS ABLE TO USE 
SCHOOL BUILDING FOR ITS MEETINGS AS 
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS WERE ALLOWED TO 
USE SCHOOL BUILDING 
COURT FOUND THAT THE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
ILLEGALLY TERMINATED A TENURED TEACHER 
WHO WAY PAIDD WITH FEDERAL FUNDS AND 
TAUGHT HALF TIME. HALF TIME DID NOT 
MITIGATE TENURE AND FEDERAL FUNDS ARE 
PUBLIC FUNDS. 
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TABLE XX (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1970s 
Gase Name 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 8 of 
Seiling v. Swanson 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1-2 
V. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. I-
23 
Assn. of Classroom 
Teachers v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. 
Assn. of Classroom 
Teachers v. Moore 
Brd. of Educ. 
Assn. of Classroom 
Teachers v. Brd. Of 
Educ. 
Haynes v. Pryor High 
School 
In Re Appt. of Brd. of 
Educ. of West. 
Heights Ind. Sch. Dist. 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of 
Tulsa City v. Albus 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 40 






















RECOGNITION BY BOE 
TEACHER 
ASSOCIATION 






DISABILITY TO SCHOOL 
EMPLOYEE 






Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND THAT ISSUE OF STUDENTS · 
LENGTH OF HAIR WAS NOT SUFFICIENCT 
REASON UNDER OKLAHOMA LAW TO SUSPEND 
FROM SCHOOL. 
COURT FOUND THAT STUDENTS WERE ABLE TO 
ATTEND SCHOOL OF THEIR CHOICE BUT 
MANDATED THAT IN FUTURE MUST ATTEND 
SCHOOL AS PROVIDED BY LAW IN THE STATE. 
COURT FOUND THAT TEACHER ASSOCIATION 
HAD COMPLIED WITH LAW IN GETTING 
REQUIRED MAJORITY OF SIGNATURES ON 
CARDS NEEDED FOR THE BOE TO RECOGNIZE 
THE UNIT AS THE BARGAINING UNIT FOR 
TEACHERS. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE BOE MUST ACCEPT 
THE AUTHORIZATION CARDS AS SIGNED BY THE 
MAJORITY OF TEACHERS IN THE DISTRICT AS 
VALID AUTHORIZATION FOR THE TEACHER 
ASSOCIATION TO ACT AS THE BARGAINING 
UNIT. 
COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT ACTED 
ACCORDING TO PROCEDURE AND LAW IN THE 
ELECTION HELD FOR DETERMINING THE 
TEACHER ORGANiZATION AS THE OFFICIAL 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIT. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE AWARD OF 
PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS TO A COACH 
WITH A HEART CONDITION WAS NOT VALID AND 
VACATED THE LOWER COURTS DECISION. 
COURT APPROVED THE ELECTION AND BONDS 
ISSUED BY THE SCHOOL DISTRICT PURSUANT 
TO THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN 70 O.S. 4011 
COURT FOUND THAT DISABILITY BENEFITS FOR 
A SCHOOL EMPLOYEE WERE INCORRECTLY 
AWARDED BY INDUSTRIAL AND LOWER 
COURTS. 
SCHOOL DISTRICT FILED SUIT IN SUPREME 
COURT FOR ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO 
PREVENT THE SALE OF THE MAJORITY OF 
ASSETS OF A CHARITABLE TRUST FOR WHICH 
THE SCHOOL DISTRICT WAS A BENFICIARY. 
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TABLE XX (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1970s 
Case Name 
Cavett v. Geary Brd. 
of Education 
Graybill v. State Brd. 
of Education 
Goodin v. Board of 
Education, Etc. 
Haskell Lemon Const. 
V. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 
12 
Sarkeys v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 40, Etc. 
BOE of D.S.D. No. 32 























Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND THAT BOE DID NOT VIOLATE 
THE TENURE LAW AS THE TEACHER DID NOT 
COMPLETE 3 YEARS OF TEACHING AS 
REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE. 
COURT FOUND THE TERMINATION OF THE 
TEACHER IN THE SCHOOL DISTRICT TO BE 
VALID AND WITHIN THE LAW. COURT FOUND 
THAT BOE IS NOT REQUIRED TO CONSIDER A 
REQUEST TO RECONSIDER - SUCH WAS NOT A 
VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE OR DUE 
COURT OVERTURNED LOWER COURT IN 
DETERMINATION THAT SCHOOL DISTRICT WAS 
ENTITLED TO APPORTIONMENT OF FEDERAL 
FOREST FUNDS APPORTIONED TO THE 
COUNTY. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE DISTRICT 
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE STATUES 
SURROUNDING THE COMPETITIVE BIDDING 
ACT. 
AFTER A RESOLUTION WAS MADE ON THE 
ASSETS OF A CHARITABLE TRUST FAMILY 
MEMBERS FILED SUIT TO CHALLENGE THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 
ROLE IN BRINGING THE CASE TO A 
RESOLUTION. THE COURT DENIED. 
COURT FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF 
SCHOOL DISTRICT AS THE TRANSFER OF 
STUDENTS WAS APPROVED BY THE COUNTY 
SUPERINTENDENT OUTSIDE THE STATUTORY 
LIMITATIONS. 
TABLE XIX 
ISSUES AND PERCENTAGES LITIGATED IN THE 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT: 1970s 
CATEGORY - Total NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Number of Cases = 42 DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT OF CASES OF CASES PLAINTIFF PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT DEFENDANT 
Finance Issues 7 16.67% 3 42.86% 4 57.14% 
District Issues 20 47.62% 8 40.00% 12 60.00% 
Personnel Issues 11 26.19% 3 27.28% 8 72.72% 
District v. District/ 4 9.52% NIA N/A N/A N/A Other Issues 
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TABLE XX 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES WON AND LOST 
BY OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 1970s 
CATEGORY NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Cases Won By School Districts 27 71.05% 
Cases Lost by School Districts 11 28.95% 
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Forty-two cases were adjudicated in the 1970's. Four cases during this decade involved 
one school district as the plaintiff and another as the defendant. These four cases were 
not included in the statistics. 
Cases Won by Districts as Plaintiff 11 28.95% 
Cases Won by Districts as Defendant 16 42.10% 
Cases Lost by Districts as Plaintiff 4 10.53% 




















OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1980s 
Case Name Date Citation 
Decided 
Board of Ed. of Dep. Sch. v. Allen 1980 615 P.2d 1009 
Cave Springs Pub. Sch. Dist. 1-30 v. Blair 1980 613 P.2d 1046 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Okla. City Fed. Of 1980 612 P.2d 719 
Teachers 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson 1980 608 P.2d 1153 
Miller v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 56 1980 609 P.2d 756 
Baird v. Ind. Sch. Dis. No. 1 1981 622 P.2d 1072 
Beall v. Altus Public Schools 1981 632 P.2d 400 
Chandler v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 12 1981 625 P.2d 620 
Childers v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 1981 645 P.2d 992 
Davis v. Sch. Dist. No. D-14 1981 625 P.2d 630 
Maupin v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 26 1981 632 P.2d 396 
BOE, Vici Pub. Schools v. Morris 1982 656 P.2d 258 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 52 v. Okla. Industries 1982 646 P.2d 1276 
Authority 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 9 v. Glass 1982 639 P.2d 1233 
Jackson v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 16 1982 648 P.2d 27 
Johns v. Wynnewood Sch. BOE 1982 656 P.2d 248 







































TABLE XXI (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1980s 
Case Name Date Citation 
Decided 
Herweg, by and Through Stanard v. BOE of 1983 673 P.2d 154 
Lawton 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Board of County 1983 674 P.2d 547 
Commissioners 
Lucas v. Ind. Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 35 1983 674 P.2d 1131 
Wetsel v. Independent School District 1-1 1983 670 P.2d 986 
Wood v. Ind. School District No. 141 1983 661 P.2d 892 
Independent School Dist. 1-29 v. Crawford 1984 688 P.2d 1291 
Burdick v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 52 1985 702 P.2d 48 
Burrows Const. Co. v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 2 1985 704 P.2d 1136 
Maule v. Ind. Sch. dist. No. 9 1985 714 P.2d 198 
DeLafleur v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 11 1986 727 P .2d 1352 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. City of Okla. City 1986 722 P.2d 1212 
Andrews v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 29 1987 737 P.2d 929 
Fair School Finance Council of Okla. v. State 1987 746 P.2d 1145 
Spencer Development Co. v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. I- 1987 741 P.2d 477 
89 
Tulsa Cnty. Brd. of Equal. v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 1987 143 P.2d 1016 
Whitley v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1-4 1987 741 P.2d 455 































TABLE XXJ (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1980s 
Case Name Date Citation 
Decided 
Doe v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No 1-89 1988 780 P.2d 659 
Short v. Kiamichi Area Vo-Tech School 1988 761 P.2d 472 
State ex rel. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Barnes 1988 762 P.2d 921 
Wilson v. Gipson 1988 753 P.2d 1349 
Beacon Realty Investments v. Cantrell 1989 771 P.2d 602 
Dean v. Wes Watkins Vo-Tech School Dist. No. 1989 782 P.2d 116 
25 
Jet-Nash Dist. No. 1-4 v. Cherokee Dist. No 1-46 1989 776 P.2d 553 













*Key for "Decision" Column: The first letter designates the winner in the case. "S" = School; "O" = Other (Taxpayer, Agency, 
Business, etc.). "NIA"= A school was not a plaintiff or defendant in the case yet the case concerned public schools. "SS" = a school 
v. a school. The second letter indicates whether the school was a plaintiff ("P") or defendant ("D''). 
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TABLEXXII 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1980s 
Case Name 
Board of Ed. of Dep. 
Sch. v. Allen 
Cave Springs Pub. 
Sch. Dist. 1-30 v. Blair 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 89 
v. Okla. City Fed. of 
Teachers 
lndp. Sch. Dist. No. 1 
v. Jackson 
Miller v. lndp. Sch. 
Dist. No. 56 
Baird v. Ind. Sch. Dis. 
No. 1 
Beall v. Altus Public 
Schools 
Chandler v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 12 
Childers v. Ind. Sch. 































BOND ISSUE ELECTION 
WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION 









Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT OVERTURNED THE LOWER COURT AND 
ORDERED THE PETITION AS INVALID. COURT 
FOUND THAT PETITION 60 PERCENT MUST BE 
CALCULATED USING NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE 
VOTERS RATHER THAN REGISTERED VOTERS. 
COURT FOUND THAT SINCE THE DISTRICT DID 
NOT NOTIFY THE TEACHER BY CERTIFIED MAIL 
PRIOR TO APRIL 10, THE NON-RENEWAL WAS. 
INVALID AND HER CONTRACT WAS 
AUTOMATICALLY RENEWED FOR THE 
FOLLOWING SCHOOL YEAR. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE STATUTES REQUIRE 
THE SCHOOL DISTRICT TO NOT RECOGNIZE 
THE BARGAINING UNIT DURING A STRIKE; YET 
THE NONRECOGNITION SHALL LAST ONLY AS 
LONG AS THE STRIKE. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF THE DRIVER OF A CAR THAT 
SMASHED INTO THE GYM OF THE SCHOOL WAS 
LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES. 
COURT FOUND THAT PURSUANT TO LOCAL 
BOE'S RULES THAT WERE CONSISTENT WITH 
STATUTE THAT REASONS FOR NONRENEWAL 
MUST BE STATED. AS THEY WERE NOT, 
TEACHER NONRENEWAL WAS INVALID. 
COURT FOUND AS DID THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
THE BOND ELECTION HELD FOR THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AN ELEMENTARY AND HIGH 
SCHOOL BUILDINGS WAS CONDUCTED 
ACCORDING TO STATUTE. FOUR MONTH 
REQUIREMENT DID NOT APPLY. 
COURT FOUND THAT A STUDENT INJURED 
WHILE WORKING ON A SCHOOL PROJECT IS 
NOT ENTITLED TO WORKMANS' 
COMPENSATION AS HE IS NOT AN EMPLOYEE 
NOR IS HE PAID. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE PURCHASE WAS 
LEGAL AND THE PARTIAL OWNER OF THE 
PROPERTY BEFORE THE SALE HAD NO 
LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO DISSOLVE THE 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT. 
COURT REVERSED LOWER COURT ORDER TO 
REVERSE THE TERMINATION IN THAT 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED FOR 
THE STATUTORY CAUSES FOR TERMINATION 
AND PROCEDURAL RULES WERE FOLLOWED 
AS REQUIRED BY LAW. 
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TABLE XXII (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1980s 
Case Name 
Davis v. Sch. Dist. 
No. D-14 
Maupin v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 26 
BOE, Vici Pub. 
Schools v. Morris 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 52 
v. Okla. Industries 
Authority 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 9 
v. Glass 
Jackson v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 16 
Johns v. Wynnewood 
Sch. BOE 
Earnest v. Sch. Board 
of Ind. Dist. No. 16 
Herweg, by and 
Through Stanard v. 





















SCHOOL DISTRICT TO 









TORT CLAIMS ACT 
RECOVERY OF SALARY 
BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEE 
FOR EMERGENCY 
LEAVE 
TORT CLAIMS ACT FOR 
INJURY IN ATHLETICS 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. THE DISTRICT REFUSED DOOR TO 
DOOR BUS SERVICE FOR A STUDENT. THE 
STUDENT LIVED ON A ROAD THAT WAS TOO 
DANGEROUS FOR BUS TRAVEL. DISCRETION 
OF SCHOOL WAS ALLOWED. 
COURT FOUND THAT AFTER THE HEARING 
PANEL RE-INSTATED A TEACHER TO HIS 
TEACHING CONTRACT, THE COACHING OR 
EXTRA DUTIES ONCE OCCUPIED ARE 
SEVERABLE FROM THE CONTRACT AND NOT 
PART OF TEACHING CONTRACT. 
COURT FOUND THAT STATUTES DID NOT 
PROVIDE FOR A DUE PROCESS HEARING OR 
TENURE OF SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS. 
COURT FOUND THAT A SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
WHICH COULD BE EFFECTED BY THE TAXES 
COLLECTED BY THE OIA, WAS WITH 
AUTHORITY TO INTERVENE LEGALLY IN SUITS 
AGAINST THE OIA. 
COURT FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE FORD MOTOR 
COMPANY FOR ITS TAX REFUND ON PERSONAL 
PROPERTY UNDER THE FREEPORT 
EXEMPTION. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE BOE FAILD TO GIVE 
NOTICE AS TO THE REASONS FOR 
NONREEMPLOYMENT IN ITS NOTIFICATION TO 
THE TEACHER. AS SUCH THE NOTICE WAS 
NOT VALID. 
COURT FOUND THAT TIME LIMITATIONS THAT 
ARE PART OF THE TORT CLAIMS ACT APPLY TO 
A MINOR AS THEY DO TO AN ADULT. 
COURT FOUND THAT DISTRICT POLICY THAT 
REQUIRES THE EMPLOYEE TO LOSE THE DAY'S 
PAY FOR MISSING WORK DUE TO EMERGENCY 
. LEAVE AS VALID AND NOT CONTRARY TO 
STATE STATUTE. 
COURT FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT AND INTERPRETED THE TORT CLAIMS 
ACT TO INCLUDE ALL INJURIES WHICH RESULT 
FROM ATHLETICS. 
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TABLE XXII (Continued) 
OKLAHOMASUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1980s 
Case Name 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1 
v. Board of County 
Comm'rs 
Lucas v. Ind. Pub. 
Sch. Dist. No. 35 
Wetsel v. Ind. SCh. 
Dit. 1-1 
Wood v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 141 
Ind. Sch. dist. 1-29 v. 
Crawford 
Burdick v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 52 
Burrows Const. Co. v. 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 2 
Maule v. Ind. Sch. 
dist. No. 9 
DeLafleur v. Ind. Sch. 
















INVESTED TAX FUNDS 
TORT CLAIMS ACT 
















Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND THAT THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS HAD NO LEGAL RIGHT TO THE 
INVESTED TAX FUNDS INVESTED BY A SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. COURT FOUND INVESTMENTS AND 
USE OF MONEY BY SCHOOL DISTRICT LEGAL. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE CLAIM FILED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS INVALID AS IT DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH STATUTES. STATUTE REQUIRES CLAIM 
TO BE FILED WITH SUPERINTENDENT WITHIN 
120 DAYS. THIS WAS NOT MET. 
COURT VACATED COURT OF APPEALS 
DECISION AND AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF 
THE TRIAL COURT. COURT FOUND NO LIABILITY 
ON THE PART OF THE TEACHER OR PRINCIPAL 
IN INJURY OF STUDENT 
COURT FOUND THAT THE DUE PROCESS 
PROVISIONS OF THE STATUES REQUIRED FOR 
TEACHER NONRENEWAL HAD BEEN FOLLOWED 
BY THE SCHOOL DISTIRCT. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE JURY VERDICT IN 
AWARDING THE STUDENT WHO WAS HURT AND 
THE PARENTS AS SEPARATE CLAIMS VALID 
UNDER THE TORT CLAIMS ACDT 
COURT AGREED WITH LOWlER COURT IN 
SUSTAINING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
STUDENTS TO CONTINUE THEIR ENROLLMENT 
IN THE SCHOOL DISTRICT THEY HAD ATTENDED 
FOR FIVE YEARS. FAIRNESS OF LAW WAS THE 
POINT AND POOR RECORDS. 
COURT FOUND THAT NO SUSTAINABLE ORAL 
CONTRACT EXISTED BETWEEN THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT AND THE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. 
COURT ALSO FOUND THAT CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY MUST PAY ATTORNEY FEES. 
COURT REVERSED BOTH THE TRIAL COURT 
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS. COURT FOUND 
THAT THE LOCAL BOE MUST ACT AS THE 
AGENT BETWEEN TWO COMPETING 
BARGAINING UNITS, IN THIS CASE THE OEAAND 
AFT. 
COURT ORDERED SCHOOL DISTRICT TO 
RECOGNIZE UNIT OR CALL FOR AN ELECTION 
TO DETERMINE THE PROFESSIONAL 
BARGAINING UNIT. 
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TABLE XXII (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1980s 
Case Name 
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 89 
v. City of Okla. City 
Andrews v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 29 
Fair School Finance 
Council of Okla. v. 
State 
Spencer Development 
Co. v. Ind. Sch. Dist. 
No. 1-89 
Tulsa Cnty. Brd. of 
Equal. v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 
Whitley v. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1-4 
Winters by and 
through Winters v. 
City of Okla. City 
Doe v. Ind. Sch. Dist. 
No 1-89 


















ZONING LAWS AS 
APPLIED TO SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS 
SCHOOL POLICY 







VALUATION OF REAL 
PROPERTY 
TORT CLAIMS ACT 
ATTORNEY FEES 
TORT CLAIMS ACT 
NONRENEWAL OF 
TEACHER 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND NO LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO 
RESTRICT A SCHOOL DISTRICTS COMPLIANCE 
TO A CITY'S ZONING LAWS. 
COURT AFFIRMED LOWER COURTS RULING 
WHICH UPHELD THE LEGITIMACY OF A SCHOOL 
INCREASING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
PARTICPATION IN EXTRACURRICULAR 
ACTIVITIES. SUCH INCREASE DID NOT VIOLATE 
THE OPEN MEETING ACT. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE DISPARITIES THAT 
EXISTED BETWEEN LOCAL DISTRICTS IN THE 
ABILITY TO GENERATE LOCAL REVENUES 
MORE THAN OTHERS DID NOT VIOLATE THE 
STATE OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
COURT FOUND THAT TRIAL COURT WAS IN 
ERROR IN REDRAWING BOUNDARIES OF 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS; THOSE STUDENTS LIVING 
IN DISPUTED AREA MAY NOT BE FORCED TO 
ATTEND OTHER DISTRICT AS DRAWN BY 
LOWER COURT. 
COURT FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS. COURT FOUND THAT THE JOB OF 
THE BOARD WAS TO RATE PROPERTY BASED 
ON FAIR CASH VALUE. 
COURT FOUND THAT TIME LIMITS IN STATUTE 
WERE NOT APPLICABLE AS THE PROPERTY 
DAMAGES IN THE CASE WERE SETTLED WHILE 
NEGOTIATIONS EXTENDED THE TIME LIMIT ON 
PERSONAL INJURY ISSUES IN THE CASE. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE ATTORNEY WHO HAD 
FILED THE SUITS HAD DONE SO THREE 
PREVIOUS OCASSIONS AND HAD LOST ALL 
THREE. COURT FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE CITY 
TO GAIN ATTORNEY FEES. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE 6 MONTHS TIME LIMIT 
FOR FILING FOR A CLAIM UNDER THE TORT 
CLAIMS ACT, AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE TIME LIMITS FORFEITS 
THE RIGHT TO FILE A CLAIM. 
COURT DETERMINED THAT U.S. SUPREME 
COURT'S DECISION REQUIREING A 
PRETERMINATION HEARING WAS RENDERED 
ONLY TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE BOE 
TERMINTATED THE EMPLOYEE. THE BOE DID 
NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO KNOW ABOUT 
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TABLE XXII (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1980s 
.. Case Name 
State ex rel. Ind. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v. Barnes 




Dean v. Wes Watkins 
Vo-Tech School Dist. 
No. 25 
Jet-Nash Dist. No. 1-4 
v. Cherokee Dist. No 
1-46 
Mindemann v. Ind. 
















TORT CLAIMS ACT 
REFUND OFAD 
VALOREM TAXES 
CHALLENGE TO BOND 
ELECTION 
ANNEXATION 
BOE'S OBLIGATION TO 
HEAR GREIVANCE 
Decision & Final Resolutions 
COURT FOUND THAT THE STATUTE DID NOT 
ALLOW DISCRETION IN DISTRIBUTING 
PROTESTED TAX FUNDS. THE TREASURER 
DOES NOT HAVE DISCRETION TO HOLD FUNDS. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
HAD DISTRIBUTED MONEY FROM INSURANCE 
THROUGH THE LOWER COURT. APPEAL WAS 
FOR MORE. COURT FOUND THAT TORT CLAIMS 
ACT DID NOT REQUIRE MORE. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE TRIAL COURT AND 
THE COURT OF APPEALS WERE RIGHT AND 
WRONG IN THIS CASE AS THE COURT 
AFFIRMED AND REVERSED IN PART. COURT 
FOUND THAT AD VALOREM TAXES MAY NOT BE 
INCREASED WITHOUT NOTICE TO OWNER. 
COURT FOUND THAT PURSUANT TO STATUTES, 
CHALLENGES TO BOND ELECTIONS MAY BE 
EXECUTED 30 DAYS AFTER THE ELECTION 
DESPITE WHETHER OR NOT THE BONDS HAVE 
BEEN ISSUED. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE ANNEXATION ORDER 
OF THE FEDERALLY OWNED LAND WAS 
INVALID. COURT FOUND THAT THE 
TRANSPORTATION AREA MUST BE ASSIGNED 
BEFORE ANNEXATION MAY TAKE PLACE. 
COURT FOUND THAT THE NEGOTIATED 
AGREEMENT WHICH CALLED FOR GREIVANCES 
TO GO TO A BINDING ARBITRATOR WAS IN 
VIOLATION OF STATUTES. 
TABLE XXIII 
ISSUES AND PERCENTAGES LITIGATED IN THE 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT: 1980s 
CATEGORY - Total NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT 
Number of Cases = 42 OF CASES OF CASES . PLAINTIFF . PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT DEFENDANT 
Finance Issues 17 40.48% 5 29.41% 12 70.59% 
District Issues 13 30.95% 4 30.77% 9 69.23% 
Personnel Issues 10 23.81% 0 0% 10 100% 
District v. District/ 2 4.76% N/A NIA N/A N/A Other Issues 
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TABLEXXIV 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES WON AND LOST 
BY OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 1980s 
CATEGORY NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Cases Won By School Districts 28 70.00% 
Cases Lost by School Districts 12 30.00% 
248 
Forty-two cases were adjudicated in the 1980s. One case during this decade involved one 
school district as the plaintiff and another as the defendant. One case did not involve a 
particular school as the plaintiff or defendant but decided an issue applicable to all 
schools. These two cases were not included in the statistics. 
Cases Won by Districts as Plaintiff 7 17.50% 
Cases Won by Districts as Defendant 21 52.50% 
Cases Lost by Districts as Plaintiff 1 2.50% 




















OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1990s 
Case Name Date Citation 
Decided 
Raines v. Ind. School Dist. No. 6 1990 796 P.2d 303 
Brd. of Cnty. Commissioners v. City of 1991 820 P.2d 797 
Muskogee 
O'Neal v. Joy Dependent School District 1991 820 P.2d 1334 
Babb v. Ind. School Dist. No. 1-5 1992 829 P.2d 973 
Brewer v. Ind. School Dist. No. 1 1993 848 P.2d 566 
Hall v. Noble Public Schools 1993 848 P.2d 1157 
Haynes v. Tulsa Public Schools Transit 1994 879 P.2d 128 
Juvenal v. Okeene Public Schools 1994 878 P.2d 1026 
Rusk v. Ind. School Dist. No. 1 1994 885 P.2d 1365 
Thompson v. Ind. Sch. District No. 94 1994 886 P.2d 996 
Curtis v. Board of Educ. of Sayre Public Schools 1995 914 P.2d 656 
Barton v. Ind. School Dist. No. 1-99 1996 914 P.2d 1041 
Frank Calvert v. Tulsa Public Schools 1996 932 P.2d 1087 
Pointer v. Western Heights Ind. Sch. Dist. 1996 919 P.2d 5 
Clay v. Ind. School Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa County 1997 935 P.2d 294 
Evans v. Oaks Mission Public Schools 1997 945 P.2d 492 































TABLE XXV (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES, CITATIONS, 
AND DECISION WINNERS: 1990s 
Case Name Date Citation 
Decided 
Hill, Etc. v. BOE Dist. 1-009 1997 944 P.2d 930 
House v. Ind. School Dist. 1-29 of Muskogee 1997 939 P.2d 1127 
County 
Scheer v. Ind. School Dist. No. 1-26 1997 948 P.2d 275 
Brandon v. Ashworth 1998 955 P.2d 233 
In Re: Matter of Tax Levy of Ardmore 1998 959 P.2d 580 
Macy v. Oklahoma City 1998 961 P.2d 804 
Reynolds v .. Union Public Schools 1998 976 P.2d 557 
Whitehead v. Tulsa Public Schools 1998 968 P.2d 1211 













*Key for "Decision" Column: The first letter designates the winner in the case. "S" = School; "O" = Other (Taxpayer, Agency, 
Business, etc.). "NIA"= A school was not a plaintiff or defendant in the case yet the case concerned public schools. "SS" = a school 
v. a school. The second letter indicates whether the school was a plaintiff ("P") or defendant ("D"). 
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TABLEXXVI 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1990s 
Case Name Court's Issues Litigated -Decision & Final Resolutions 
Decision 
Raines v. Ind. School REVERSE BINDING ARBITRATION COURT REVERSED THE LOWER COURT BY 
Dist. No. 6 D FINDING THAT THE BINDING ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT IN THE DISTRICT WAS COUNTER 
TO STATE STATUTE. THE PROVISION, 
SPECIFICALLY IN THIS CASE, DELEGATES THE 
AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD TO REPRIMAND A 
Brd. of Cnty. AFFIRMED COLLECTION OF COURT FOUND THAT THE CONSTITUTION 
Commissioners v. City REEVALUTION COSTS ALLOWED FOR THE SCHOOL DISTRICT TO PAY 
of Muskogee A SHARE OF THE REEVALUATION COSTS OF 
THE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
O'Neal v. Joy REVERSE LIABILITY OF DISTRICT COURT FOUND THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF 
Dependent School D IN STUDENT THIRD PARTY TESTIMONY DURING THE TRIAL 
District ACCIDENT/TORT WAS IN ERROR. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE 
CLAIMS ACT DRIVER'S RECORD IN TH TRIAL WAS IN ERROR AS WELL. 
Babb v. Ind. School REVERSE TERMINATION OF COURT.REVERSED THE LOWER COURT AND 
Dist. No. 1-5 D TENURED TEACHER REINSTATED THE TEACHER. COURT FOUND 
THROUGH REDUCTION THAT A TENURED TEACHER TAKES PRIORITY 
IN FORCE OVER A NONTENURED TEACHER IN CASES OF REDUCTION IN FORCE POLICIES. 
Brewer v. Ind. School AFFIRMED TORT CLAIMS ACT COURT FOUND THAT UNDER THE TORT 
Dist. No. 1 CLAIMS ACT THE SCHOOL IS LIABLE, IF 
BOUGHT INSURANCE, UP TO THE AMOUNT OF 
THE COVERAGE BEYOND THE LIMITS THE 
SCHOOL IS NOT LIABLE FOR ATTRACTIVE 
NUISANCE AND THE FAILURE TO INSPECT. 
Hall v. Noble Public AFFIRMED TERMINATION AND COURT FOUND THAT THE DISTRICT WAS NOT 
Schools NONREHIRE OF LIABLE FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION AFTER 
SUPPORT EMPLOYEE EMPLOYEE WHO HAD FILED WORKERS COMPENSATION CLAIMS WAS LET GO WITH 
OTHER EMPLOYEES IN FINANCIAL CRUNCH. 
COURT FOUND NO REASON DISTRICT HAD TO 
REHIRE WHEN OTHERS WERE REHIRED. 
Haynes v. Tulsa Public DENIED WORKERS COURT FOUND CAUSE TO AWARD THE 
Schools Transit COMPENSATION WORKERS COMPENSATION CLAIM AND 
DISMISS THE RESPONDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE. 
Juvenal v. Okeene AFFIRMED TORT CLAIMS ACT COURT FOUND THAT THE SCHOOL WAS NOT 
Public Schools LIABLE FOR A CHILD THAT WAS INJURED 
WHILE TRYING TO CLIMB THE ROOF OF A 
SCHOOL BUILDING . THE SCHOOL WAS NOT 
LIABLE FOR THE INJURY AS IMMUNITY WAS 
PROVIDED FROM TORT CLAIMS ACT. 
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TABLE XXVI (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1990s 
Case Name Court's Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
Decision 
Rusk v. Ind. School DISMISSE APPEAL TIMELINE COURT DISMISSED THE APPEAL AS THE 
Dist. No. 1 D APPEAL WAS NOT MAILED BY CERTIFIED MAIL 
BUT BY PRIORITY MAIL. 
Thompson v. Ind. Sch. AFFIRMED ATTORNEY'S FEES COURT FOUND THAT THE LOWER COURT WAS 
District No. 94 CORRECT IN AFFIMRING THE JURY AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES TO THE SCHOOL. 
Curtis v. Board of AFFIRMED TORT CLAIMS ACT COURT FOUND THAT PE CLASS ACTIVITIES 
Educ. of Sayre Public ARE IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY UNDER TORT 
Schools CLAIMS ACT, NOT JUST INTERSCHOLASTIC COMPETITIONS. 
Barton v. Ind. School REVERSE REDUCTION IN FORCE COURT FOUND AS IT DID IN BABB THAT THE 
Dist. No. 1-99 D OF TENURED TEACHER WHO IS TERMINATED IN REDUCTION 
TEACHER IN FORCE POLICIES MUST BE REASSIGNED TO 
AN AREA HE IS CERTIFIED YET OCCUPIED BY A 
NONTENURED TEACHER. 
Frank Calvert v. Tulsa REVERSE TORT CLAIMS ACT COURT FOUND THAT THE PARTIES IN THIS 
Public Schools D ISSUE WERE RIGHTFULLY ABLE TO PURSUE A 
SUIT UNDER THE TORT CLAIMS ACT. PARENTS 
FAILED TO APPOINT THEMSELVES AS THE 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
ESTATE AFTER DEATH. 
Pointer v. Western AFFIRMED TORT CLAIMS ACT COURT FOUND THAT DESPITE FILING IN 
Heights Ind. Sch. Dist. FEDERAL COURT THE TIME LIMIT, STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED FOR THIS CASE. 
LOOKING AT 12 O.S. 1991, SECTION 1367 AND 
28 U.S.C. SECTION 100, THE COURT FOUND 
THE FILING UNTIMELY. 
Clay v. Ind. School AFFIRMED PAYMENT OF COURT FOUND THAT SCHOOL DISTRICTS, AS IT 
Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa I REEVALUATION HAD PREVIOUSLY, MAY BE HELD 
County REVERSE PROGRAM ACCOUNTABLE FOR A PORTION OF THE 
DIN PART REEVALUTION PROGRAM OF THE COUNTY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE. 
Evans v. Oaks Mission AFFIRMED TORT CLAIMS ACT COURT OVERTURNED APPEALS COURT AND 
Public Schools AFFIRMED THE LOWER COURT. COURT FOUND 
THAT PE CLASS HAS INHEHERENT RISK OF 
INJURY AND TORT CLAIMS ACT PROVIDES 
IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR SCHOOL IN 
CASES OF INJURY. 
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TABLE XXVI (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1990s 
Case Name Court's Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
Decision 
Franks v. Union City AFFIRMED TORT CLAIMS ACT COURT FOUND THAT THE SCHOOL HAD 
Public Schools DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION IN PROVIDING 
SECURITY AND POLICE PROTECTION AT 
SCHOOL OR SCHOOL FUNCTIONS. 
Hill, Etc. v. BOE Dist. I- AFFIRMED TRANSFER OF COURT HELD THAT A STUDENT ON TRANSFER 
009 STUDENTS FOR ELEVEN YEARS MAY NOT BE DENIED THE 
TRANSFER FOR THE SENIOR YEAR, 70 O.S. 
SUPP. 1993, SECTION 8 
House v. Ind. School AFFIRMED TERMINATION OF COURT FOUND THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
Dist. 1-29 of Muskogee TEACHER TEACHER DUE PROCESS ACT WERE MET BY 
County THE PRINCIPAL AND AN ADMONISHMENT 
ALONG WITH A PLAN FOR IMPROVEMENT 
WERE PROVIDED. 
Scheer v. Ind. School AFFIRMED TENURE OF TEACHER COURT FOUND THAT TEACHER GAINS TENURE 
Dist. No. 1-26 STATUS UPON COMPLETING THREE YEARS OF 
TEACHING ON A CONTRACT IN A DISTRICT. 
THE PERIOD OF TIME EMPLOYED ON A 
TEMPORARY CONTRACT IS NOT INCLUDED. 
Brandon v. Ashworth REVERSE SUPERINTENDENT'S COURT FOUND THAT TAXPAYERS IN A SCHOOL 
D CONTRACT DISTRICT HAD LEGAL STANDING TO BRING 
ACTION TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY AND 
LEGALITY OF A SUPERINTENDENT'S 
CONTRACT. COURT ALSO FOUND CONTRACT 
DID NOT VIOLA TE SECTION 26, ARTICLE 10 OF 
THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION. 
In Re: Matter of Tax AFFIRMED LEGITIMACY OF COURT FOUND THAT THE SECOND BUILDING 
Levy of Ardmore BUILDING FUND FUND ELECTION HELD AFTER THE FIRST 
ELECTION FAILED WAS CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO STATUTES AND NOT PROHIBITED BY THE 
CONSTITUTION. 
Macy v. Oklahoma City AFFIRMED LEGITIMACY OF SUIT WAS BROUGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
ANNEXATION LEGITIMACY OF A 1966ANNEXA TION ELECTION. 
ELECTION COURT FOUND THAT THE SUIT MAY NOT 
RESULT IN A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WHEN 
A STATUTORY RESOLUTION IS AVAILABLE. 
SUCH IS AVAILABLE IN ANNEXATION 
Reynolds v. Union AFFIRMED TORT CLAIMS ACT COURT FOUND THAT AN INJURY TO A VISITOR 
Public Schools AT THE SCHOOL WAS NOT GROUNDS TO HOLD 
THE SCHOOL LIABLE AS THE EVENT FELL 
UNDER THE INSPECTION POWERS AND 
FUNCTIONS CLAUSE OF THE TORT CLAIMS 
ACT. 
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TABLE XXVI (Continued) 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, ISSUES 
AND FINAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1990s 
Case Name Court's Issues Litigated Decision & Final Resolutions 
Decision 
Whitehead v. Tulsa DENIED WORKERS MOTION TO DISMISS WAS DENIED BY THE 
Public Schools COMPENSATION COURT. COURT FOUND THAT APPEAL RULES 
FOR WORKERS COMPENSATION MAY USE 
POSTAL DATE BY U.S. POSTAL SERVICES AS 
DATE OF FILING RATHER THAN DATE 
RECEIVED. 
Martin v. Johnson REVERSE NONRENEWAL OF THE COURT FOUND THAT THE DISMISSAL AND 
D NONTENURED AWARDING OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE 
TEACHER DEFENDANT WERE INAPPROPRIATE AND 
REMANDED THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
*Key for "Decision" Column: The first letter designates the winner in the case. "S" = School; "O" = Other (Taxpayer, Agency, 
Business, etc.). ·'NIA"= A school was not a plaintiff or defendant in the case yet the case concerned public schools. "SS" = a school 
v. a school. The second letter indicates whether the school was a plaintiff ("P") or defendant ("D"). 
TABLEXXVII 
ISSUES AND PERCENTAGES LITIGATED IN THE 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT: 1990s 
CATEGORY - Total NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Number of Cases = 26 DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT OF CASES OF CASES PLAINTIFF PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT DEFENDANT 
Finance Issues 8 30.78% 0 0% 8 100% 
District Issues 9 34.61% 0 0% 9 100% 
Personnel Issues 9 34.61% 0 0% 9 100% 
District v. District/ 0 0% NIA N/A N/A N/A Other Issues 
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TABLE XXVIII 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES WON AND LOST 
BY OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 1990s 
CATEGORY NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Cases Won By School Districts 15 57.69% 
Cases Lost by School Districts 11 42.31% 
Twenty-six cases were adjudicated in the 1990s. 
Cases Won by Districts as Plaintiff 0 0% 
Cases Won by Districts as Defendant 15 57.69% 
Cases Lost by Districts as Plaintiff 0 0% 
Cases Lost by Districts as Defendant 11 42.31% 
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CATEGORY-









ISSUES AND PERCENTAGES LITIGATED IN THE 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT: 1930- 1999 
NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER 
OF CASES OF CASES DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT PLAINTIFF PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
154 43.63% 43 27.92% 111 
123 34.84% 50 40.65% 73 
59 16.71% 15 25.42% 44 









Three hundred fifty-two cases were adjudicated from 1930 to 1999. Fourteen cases 
involved one school district as the plaintiff and another as the defendant. Three other 
cases involved parties as the plaintiff and defendant other than school districts yet decided 
issues affecting public schools. 
TABLE:XXX 
TOT AL PERCENTAGES OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS AS 
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS IN THE 














336 109 32.44% 227 67.56% 
The total number of cases used for this table was reduced by the number of cases that did 
not involve a school district as the plaintiff or defendant or involved cases that school 
districts were the plaintiff and defendant. This number was sixteen cases. The total 
number of cases included in the study was 352. 
TABLEXXXI 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT CASES WON AND LOST 
BY OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 1930- 1999 
CATEGORY 
Cases Won By School 
Districts 









Three hundred fifty-two cases were adjudicated from 1930 to 1999. Fourteen cases 
involved one school district as the plaintiff and another as the defendant. Two other cases 
involved parties as the plaintiff and defendant other than school districts yet decided 
issues affecting public schools. These sixteen cases were not included in the statistics. 
Cases Won by Districts as 76 22.42% 
Plaintiff 
Cases Won by Districts as 162 48.31% 
Defendant 
Cases Lost by Districts as 33 9.92% 
Plaintiff 
Cases Lost by Districts as 65 19.35% 
Defendant 
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1930s 1940s 1950s 
Figure 1. The Number of Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases Adjudicated During the 












1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Figure 2. The Number of Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases Adjudicated From 
1930-1999. 
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The number of cases heard by the Court appear on the vertical axis. The decade 
in which the number cases were heard appear on the horizontal axis. While the 1930s 
produced a significant increase in the number of cases heard by the Court, the 1940s 
continued that trend. The 1950s began a downward trend that continued in the 1960s. 
While a small increase in the number of cases occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, the 






19305 19405 19505 19605 19705 19805 19905 
Figure 3. The Percentages of Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases Involving 
Oklahoma's Public Schools Adjudicated by Decade. 
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Of the 336 (352 total) cases adjudicated by the Court involving a public school as 
the defendant or plaintiff in the years 1930 to 1999, this graph represents the percentage 
of cases heard in each of the seven decades of the study. 
APPENDIXC 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL 
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Human subjects were not used for this study, 
therefore an Oklahoma State University 
Institutional Review Board Approval 
was neither requested nor received. 
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